Very few bilateral relationships are as uncertain as Sino-American relations. When Chinese President Hu Jintao's April visit to Washington was announced, American think tanks and policy makers in their pre - visit assessments did not show much enthusiasm. Hu Jintao's visit failed to break any new ground. Despite China declaring its intention to buy goods worth over $ 50 billion including Boeing planes from the US, no new milestones were achieved. Sino - American relations remain mired in apprehensions and misperceptions towards each other and differences over major international issues.

Hu Jintao must share the blame. China's economic, political and military profiles have risen in recent times, but Hu has emerged as a conservative, rigid and doctrinaire leader. Unlike Jiang Zemin, he has no fascination for the west, especially the United States. Despite being in power for three years, he took no initiative to break the ice with the US leadership. This particular visit was long overdue. Hu and his government should have done their homework properly, which explains why Hu returned empty handed.

However, Hu is not the only culprit. There are too many differences between the US and China: Tibet, Taiwan, Korea, US-Japan alliance, and non – proliferation. to name a few. The US Secretary of Defence has openly criticized China's military build up during last year's Shangri La Dialogue. The Quadrennial Defence Review published by the Pentagon in February 2006 raised serious concerns about China's rising military profile. Then there is a trade war between the two countries with the US being at the receiving end of China's allegedly unfair trade practices resulting in huge trade deficits and job losses for the Americans. Indeed, at about the time when Hu Jintao was in Washington, the WTO was organizing a Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) to review China's WTO compliance, apparently at the behest of the US.

For many years, the US has brought out annual reports on various issues related to China, increasing the bad blood between the two sides. These include an annual report on the military power of China; an annual report on the human rights situation in China; and an annual report on trade relations between the two countries. In addition, special reports are also commissioned, like the one published by the US Treasury Secretary on 'China's under-valuation' of the Yuan' in May 2005. China, too, has started publishing reports to present its side of the story. These reports vitiate the atmosphere and heighten confusion in the bilateral relationship. Witness, for example, the confusion on trade deficits that the US has with China. US statistics show that, in 2005, United States' cumulative trade deficit with China was over $ 200 billion whereas, according to Chinese sources, this was $ 102 billion.

If bilateral relations are not openly estranged this is because American priorities have changed in recent times. Instead of positioning China as a top priority in its foreign policy, the US is busy waging war against terrorism and countering WMD proliferation. China's cooperation is considered vital for taming rogue states like North Korea. Hence, the US finds it essential to engage China on vital issues. Hu Jintao's visit was important in the sense that both the parties are willing to be 'equal stake holders' on international issues. But, until bilateral issues are sorted out, sound and healthy US – China relations cannot be constructed.

The 'expectation gap' probably explains why Hu could not achieve greater success in Washington. Unlike earlier great powers, China's rise as a great power is unique. It was not accompanied by an upheaval in international relations nor a war with the reigning great powers. China has shrewdly refused to permit hostility with the US or any other great power with the sole exception of Japan. US policy makers are still not clear about managing relations with a rising China. The initial 'China containment theories' are dead stock and have few takers in the US administration.

China is a rising power and presents formidable foreign policy challenges for the US. China's behavior is increasingly assertive due to its economic, military and political clout. Witness, for example, its exclusion of the US from the East Asian Summit last December. President George Bush and his advisors should have taken the cue from this incident and adopted a strategic framework to deal with China. Hu's visit had the potential for developing this framework. Unfortunately, Bush failed to seize this opportunity. Many reasons explain why Hu's America visit was not successful.

The views expressed here are the author's own and do not reflect the views of the Indian Defence Accounts Service