Defamed former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has been courting controversy inside Thailand since his descent from power in 2006 and presently as he attempts to amass political clout through external channels. Despite his fugitive status he is a persistent influence in Thailand’s politics and democratic discourse. At the international level, he is prominent for being the bone contention between the Vejjajiva administration and Cambodia, where he is the economic advisor. As the legal onslaught against Shinawatra gains momentum, will his foot soldiers, the red shirts,' counter-campaigns, offset it? Could his ascending notoriety portend a successful political comeback?  If Thaksin’s contentious assets of US$76 billion are seized by the Supreme Court’s verdict on 26 February, will it be the end of the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party? Moreover, could a man whose political tenure inadvertently created vast polarities in Thai society be able to win the trust and favor of the masses again?

Interestingly, the mass movement that was his downfall comprised of not only the urban elites, disgruntled royal civil servants or business groups that lost patronage under his rule but also his target voters - the rural poor, farmers and working class. This was because his economic policies and developmental social programs flopped. A good example of such a flop was the ‘30 baht health scheme’. Implemented in public hospitals across Thailand, it promised treatment within 30 baht for nearly every illness. Simultaneously, the ‘medical hub project’ which sought rich foreign patients, was launched in the private hospitals. Thaksin’s intention was to make medicine both a lucrative business for the country and affordable to citizens. Instead it resulted in an internal brain drain. The underfunding of public hospitals caused good doctors to shift to the private sector. Now, although the poor were technically entitled to treatment of serious diseases in public hospitals; there were no competent doctors available.

Thaksin demonstrated similar shortsightedness in the agriculture sector, which became exceedingly export oriented under the TRT. Regional FTAs were accompanied with tariff eliminations on fruits and vegetables, leading to substantial price slumps. This adversely affected the livelihood of farmers. Although, Thaksin’s easy credit schemes were great for start-up agribusinesses, they failed to address the general problem of rural indebtedness and poverty. Far from being the Asian Hugo Chavez, his critics alleged that unlike his campaign, his policies were in fact not pro-poor. There was no Chavez-style anti-imperialist opposition of the Washington Consensus’ neoliberal agenda. Much of TRT’s appeasement was prioritized towards giving certain business oligarchs competitiveness in the national and global arena. The social programs were instated to manage poverty and maintain overall stability and popularity.

Ultimately, an assortment of grassroots grievances lent legitimacy and majority to the anti-Thaksin movement but his removal from office was executed by the royal-military nexus. What is especially interesting about Thaksin Shinawatra is that his political adversaries, the National liberation alliance (NLA), have unrelentingly persecuted him even though he is no longer in office. Still, despite the thorough disgrace of their leader, his supporters have not given up. Notwithstanding allegations of corruption, nepotism, botched policies and even violence against minorities in the Southern Muslim sectors of Thailand, the red shirts’ most recent protest was a grenade attack on 14 January on the army headquarters in central Bangkok. Under the banner of the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), the red shirts have demanded a) re-instatement of the 1997 constitution, b) dissolution of the current coalition plus fresh elections and c) a royal amnesty for their leader. For the current government, tensions regarding Thaksin are more than a passing nuisance. This was demonstrated recently when Sri Lanka’s Mahinda Rajapaksa administration had to officially refute reports that as with Cambodia, Thaksin has been appointed economic advisor for Sri Lanka. This was deemed plausible because Cambodia and Srilanka have been frequented by Thaksin in his self-imposed exile.

For a fighting chance, the Phoenix (Thaksin) needs a major shift in his domestic political strategy. A seizure of assets shall be a severe impediment on Thaksin’s mobility and political prospects, especially due to the likelihood that his clout is underpinned by his affluence. Given that his defamation had been quite pervasive, the chances for legal clemency let alone a political rebirth in Thailand are not very good. Moreover, a sustainable political comeback cannot be winged from overseas. Firstly, the legal shackles and other allegations of abuse of power should be addressed. In a more protracted timeframe, Mr Shinawatra should endeavor to undo the damage to his image and also re-examine his policies that had left multiple sections of Thai society feeling that they did not have room under the government’s umbrella. The Chavez style policy of addressing opposition and grievances through counter-slander campaigns and demonstrations is not beneficial in the long run. Ultimately for both the NLA and the UDD, political resilience shall rest on which way the mass sentiment sways. Herein lies the central role of Thailand’s evolving democratic institutions and the politicians’ respect for the same.