The Kaiga Nuclear Power Plant is back in the news again. This time on a serious note – the security of our nuclear installations is at stake. Over 50 workers at the Kaiga nuclear plant have been hospitalized after drinking tritium infested water from a water cooler at the facility. Tritium is a radioactive form of hydrogen, which if inhaled or consumed can lead to cell damage and increase the risk of cancer. Though the radiation was of low magnitude and did not cross the vast expanse several questions on the security of nuclear assets have been raised in the aftermath of this incident. Are we prepared enough to prevent such mishaps? Especially, after the 26/11 terror attacks the security stakes of our nuclear assets have been raised. The other major concern revolves around the existing procedure of employee verification and the effectiveness of the intelligence network.

Just three days before this incident, we observed the first anniversary of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, the most unfortunate event in recent years. After the FBI’s revelation that the 26/11 incident is linked with suspected Lashkar operatives David Headley and Tahawur Rana, concerns on nuclear security have deepened. Two weeks before the Kaiga incident, a high alert was sounded pertaining to the security of nuclear installations. This actually was the fallout of the Headley case. It has been reported that between 2006 and 2009, Headley visited the areas where the nuclear assets are located. Though Indian nuclear assets are physically secure with better access controls, the fear of sabotage, whether in terms of material or personnel, cannot be negated. This is quite evident from the mishaps at Kaiga.

An effective intelligence ring both inside and outside the perimeters of the nuclear installations is the need of the hour. As far as personnel reliability procedures are concerned, we did have well placed procedures but the incidents at Kaiga and a similar act at Tarapore atomic power sub-station a few years ago, where radiation spread through a small quantity of radioactive waste deliberately stored by an employee in a tiny bottle, set off alarm bells. Just a day ago, two contract workers, who attempted to steal two computers containing data and were successful in passing through the first security check, were held by the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) at Tarapur Nuclear Station. Therefore, greater emphasis must be placed on employee verification, especially when we have provisions to employ contract workers. A periodic assessment of these procedures is necessary. An armed attack on our installations would be thwarted. A possible option for any terrorist group would be sabotage through an insider. CISF is responsible for the security of nuclear assets in India. They have been well trained and imparted with specialized training to meet any catastrophe. CISF can play a vital role in preventative vigilance through its own intelligence network. Intelligence inputs could further be disseminated to other agencies along with the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). Inter-agency intelligence sharing is substantial, given the fact, that we lacked this attribute in the past. 

Authorities at Kaiga remained unwary after a series of incidents. Kaiga is marred by controversies. This is the third incident this year at Kaiga, which has puzzled the investigating agencies. The first incident relates to Ravi Mule, a non-technical employee, who died under mysterious circumstances in Kaiga Township. The second incident relates to the death of Loganathan Mahalingam. Mahalingam’s body was found five days after he went missing. He was working on simulators and involved in training young scientists. He had more then twenty years of experience and before Kaiga he worked at the Kalpakkam Nuclear Power Plant, which too is outside the purview of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and can be utilized for military purposes. This was the second time he went missing, the first being at Kalpakkam. There are different theories propagated by the investigating agencies. Kaiga too is outside the safeguard agreement and strategically important.  Moreover, it is important due to its close proximity to India’s largest naval base – INS Kadamba.  Mystery still shrouds over Kaiga. Three major incidents in one year need a thorough investigation and a comprehensive review of security arrangements.

The debate on nuclear terrorism is quite audible in the wake of the growing strategic partnership with the United States in the aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks. It has been well understood that the strategy is to inflict maximum damage and instability in the neighbourhood, where fundamental extremist ideology is spreading like wild fire, could well effect the security of India. India has growing energy needs and has entered into a landmark deal with the United States on civil-nuclear cooperation. Very recently, India has successfully negotiated with Canada to ink a deal on nuclear cooperation. It is an opportunity for India after a decade of nuclear isolation to establish nuclear relationships and revive nuclear trade with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Incidents like Kaiga only serve to provide an opportunity for adversaries to malign the image of India at international forums. All we need at this juncture is to assure the cooperating nations of our adherence to international norms concerning nuclear nonproliferation and security. This can only be achieved through a comprehensive security apparatus mounted on an excellent intelligence network with the key word being ‘coordination’ between all the security agencies.