The naval confrontation between the two Koreas comes amid expectations of revival of direct talks between the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States (US). Naval patrol vessels from the North and South exchanged the salvo on 11 November near the Daechong Island along the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea; disputed territorial waters and the scene of earlier sanguinary naval clashes of 1999 and 2002. The timing of the clash could prove to be a stumbling block for future negotiations on the North Korean nuclear issue. What did Pyongyang want to convey ahead of President Obama’s visit to South Korea? Is the posture of North Korea a prelude to the forthcoming diplomatic overtures to end the stand-off on North’s nuclear program? The US State Department accepted the North’s invitation to dispatch US envoy Stephen Bosworth to carry forward the negotiations aimed at denuclearization of North Korea. It is to be seen, how Obama’s coalition deals with the North’s recent move on the Korean chess board.

It seems, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il is testing Obama’s administration and conveying a hostile message to the conservative Lee Myung Bak’s administration that the war is not yet over. Lee’s administration is less tolerant than its predecessors. This is quiet evident from the South Korean Naval posture. The rules of engagement at sea are changed; provocation is followed by immediate retaliation and the commanders have greater discretionary powers than before. Pyongyang is also irked by Seoul’s participation in US led PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative). DPRK views it as a mechanism for the war of aggression by US in the form of harassment meant for DPRK cargo liners on the pretext of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Right from the beginning North Korea has maintained its stance on the reunification of Korea as a basis of any negotiations with South Korea. Though the step to participate in the PSI was taken by President Lee’s administration in retaliation to the North Korean nuclear test in May; it is being condemned by pro-unification activists even at home as previous governments had never gone so far in order to provoke North Korea. The land borders are peaceful but the resentment is shown by North Korea at sea after a span of seven years.  According to Lee Chi Dong, an analyst from Yonhap News Agency, ”PSI represents a major u-turn.” It is a logical statement. Active participation in PSI will not only irk North Korea but China as well. China serves as a major exporter of goods for North Korea as well as a key player in Six-Party talks. It must be understood that the Korean chess board has more players in the vicinity.

As far as United States is concerned, North Korea’s recent misadventure of engaging a South Korean patrol boat seems like a move to strengthen its bargaining position prior to Obama’s Seoul visit. The Obama administration is keen to pursue negotiations with North Korea, even after its hostile posture. The patience and grit displayed by United States is commendable; a rare scenario. In the aftermath of naval clash, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton speaking at the news conference in Singapore said, “This does not in any way affect the decision to send Ambassador Bosworth.” The motives of the United States behind this passive approach are not known. It could be due to President Obama’s extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation and his initiatives on disarmament for which he is being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize or perhaps he wants to regain the diplomatic ground lost by Bush administration. Whatever the case may be, it is indeed a positive step to restart the negotiations to convince North Korea to re-enter the Six-Party talks.

A negotiation with DPRK depends greatly on the Lee administration’s general approach to the issue. A hard-line approach would result in aggravation of the situation on Korean peninsula. The Lee administration has proposed Five-Party talks excluding North Korea. This would only infuriate the North Korean regime; checkmate is not possible without a ‘King’. The objective is negotiation with North Korea for greater progress of the Korean people. Therefore, Lee must adopt some of the compassionate values of the Kim Dae-jung model. Isolation and containment of North Korea will not solve the problem. The most viable method is the revival of Six-Party talks and economic engagement The current structure of Six-Party talks lacks a system of checks and balances. The United States, South Korea, Japan and North Korea adopted collective hard-line positions which resulted in the policy of aversion by China and Russia. There is a need to follow the policy of constructive engagement by all the parties. Here, North Korea must understand that gunboat diplomacy will not work and bargains have no place in relationships. For the last 56 years there have been moves and counter-moves on the Korean chess board but a checkmate to North Korea would prove beneficial to the whole world; even to North Korea itself.