Karbi Anglong: Theatre of Violence
Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman
Research Assistant, IPCS
e-mail:
mirza@ipcs.org
The
recent upsurge of violence in the Karbi Anglong district of Assam has sent
the entire government machinery and the security establishment into a tizzy.
It is a logistical nightmare for the state government and the paramilitary forces,
given the remoteness of the areas where this violence has erupted. At least
29 people have been killed in separate incidents of violence - all belonging
to the Hindi-speaking community in the district - by suspected militants of
the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the Karbi Longri National Liberation
Front (KLNLF). The Unified Command Structure in Assam, comprising the
administration, police and the paramilitary forces, has failed to check
terrorist activities in the region.
The
geographical location of Karbi Anglong is of crucial significance for understanding
the genesis of this recent increase in violence. Karbi Anglong is one of the
largest districts in India in terms of territory and shares its district borders
with the states of Nagaland and Meghalaya. Its extended neighbourhood includes
Tripura, Manipur, Mizoram, Bangladesh and Myanmar. The Kaziranga National Park
cuts through this district and most of the area has dense forest cover. This
district, therefore, provides the most suitable area for militant organizations
to operate in and from. The supply of arms and ammunition is also facilitated
by the porous borders of nearby states and countries like Bangladesh and Myanmar.
Policing
in areas like Karbi Anglong has been largely ineffective due to its
large tracts of dense forests and riverine nature. Also, there are very few
police outposts in the district; in some places, the nearest police station
is about 50kms away. The district headquarters in Diphu is also cut off from
most of its remote areas. The Hindi-speaking people living in Karbi Anglong
are scattered in as many as 80 clusters, which makes it virtually impossible
for the paramilitary forces and police to provide them effective security at
all times.
The
vast and well-consolidated terrorist networks of the ULFA, KLNLF, NSCN
(IM), and other militant outfits have been operating out of Karbi Anglong at
will. The Karbi and Dimasa tribes in this district have been fighting for a
long time for control over this territory, with the last major bout of violence
occurring two years ago. This ethnic conflict has been fuelled by the Naga militant
outfits to gain control over more land for their proposed Greater Nagalim state.
They have been providing support to the Dimasa tribe against the Karbi tribe,
which has resulted in a vicious cycle of violence in Karbi Anglong.
Another
theory floating around about the recent attacks on Hindi-speaking people in Karbi Anglong is that they have been orchestrated and funded by Pakistan's
Inter-Services Intelligence and other jihadi outfits within Bangladesh. Flushing
out the Hindi-speaking population from this region would facilitate the influx
and settling of illegal Bangladeshi migrants for labour-intensive jobs in the
district, which have till now been controlled by the Hindi-speaking people.
The ULFA has also been targeting these migrants in Karbi Anglong along with
other areas in Guwahati and around many districts of Upper and Lower Assam to
drum up sympathy among the indigenous Assamese population as its popularity
has been waning. It has long been accused of attacking mainstream Assamese-dominated
areas, where many Assamese have been killed. The ULFA has also been seeking
to expand its recruiting base beyond the predominantly rural areas to urban
areas, banking on its anti-Hindi speaking migrants stand. The ULFA has had enough
breathing space and time to regroup and bolster its network during the ceasefire
announced by the state government over the last two years.
As
regards the political dynamics of the Karbi Anglong region, the Assam government
and the Unified Command have to face several challenges. They have to contain
the violence and provide security to the Hindi-speaking people in the region.
Further, they have to undertake effective policing in riverine and forested
areas, and build an effective logistical network in the huge Karbi Anglong district.
They also have to check terrorist activities and the arms and ammunition inflow
from neighbouring states and countries. The ethnic conflict in Karbi Anglong
has to be effectively countered; else it has the potential to spiral out of
control and lead to a greater escalation of violence in the region.