India, China and Asian Security
Bhartendu Kumar Singh
Indian Defence Accounts Service
If the recent proceedings of the London based International Institute of Strategic
Studies sponsored conference, popularly known as the Shangri La Dialogue, are
any indication, India is gradually being recognised as a core state in Asian
security architecture along with China and Japan. The formal support for New
Delhi's policing of the Indian Ocean came from none other than Australia that
still has an 'underdeveloped' relations with India.
One factor that has had an impact on India's changing fortunes in Asian security
calculations is its recent 'defence diplomacy'. Apart from a seminal contribution
in Tsunami relief measures in 2004-2005 in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Maldives,
the Indian Navy initiated several maritime security and capacity building measures
including joint exercises with foreign navies. India also managed a nuclear
deal with US, a privilege that was denied to Pakistan. High level defence contacts
were established with countries as far as Mongolia, South Korea and Japan. India
has also shown its willingness in the Compulsory Pilotage Project of Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore and is taking steps to join the Container Security Initiative
(CSI) led by the US.
The
reward has come as an 'encouraging response' from major powers for a more
proactive role for India in the Asia - Pacific. While India stole the show at
the Shangri La Dialogue, China kept a low profile. Apparently, it was not too
happy with the Taiwanese presence. In recent times, China has shown willingness
to be a partner in Asian security by supplementing the theme of 'peace and
development' with the concept of 'peaceful rise'. It has also come with regular
white papers on defence to show greater transparency, the last being in December 2005. In
addition, it has engaged Asian countries through diplomacy, regional institutions,
trade linkages and joint defence exercises. However, its military modernisation
and growing assertiveness in the region deter a sense of confidence among the
regional players. While engaging China through institutional mechanisms, they
are seeking a balance of power through the US and India.
Given
the proliferation and diversification of security challenges in Asia, both China
and India are vital cogs in Asian security. Not only have they an unresolved
border between them and hence may be considered a part of the problem, they also
have stakes directly or indirectly, in many other security issues in the region.
Hence, Sino - Indian mutual engagement is the sine qua non of Asian security.
On
bilateral front too, China is a challenge as well as an opportunity for India's defence diplomacy. It has strengthened its infrastructure in Tibet through roads,
railways and airports. China has also consolidated its presence in the Bay of
Bengal through collaboration with Myanmar and in Arabian Sea through Pakistan's
support. As Pentagon's recent Annual Report on China's military power puts it,
China is rapidly building up its capacity for area denial, precision strikes,
expeditionary operations and extended maritime operations. Competitive advantage
in military modernisation and power projection will have spill over effects.
This may not bode well either for Asian security project or for India's own
future.
The
developmental priorities of the Chinese regime as well as the booming Sino -
Indian trade have provided the Indian leadership an opportunity to engage China
at a higher level defence diplomacy. When the Indian Defence Minister
recently visited China, it was not a bandwagoning exercise. Rather, it was meant
to engage China in creating additional confidence building measures (CBMs) along
the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Instead of seeing each other as threats, the
two countries decided to look at broader challenges in the Asia Pacific. To
this end, the visit was also meant to narrow down differences between India
and China on major security threats in the region. India is conducting regular
security dialogue with China to work out a common stand on issues such as cross
- border terrorism, sea piracy, drug trafficking and health hazards to bigger
issues such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), sovereign
intervention, internal conflicts, ethnic violence and separatism.
'Engaging China' policy will not succeed unless India supplements it by modernising
its own military and enhancing its power projection. This is what China has
done in South East Asia where its diplomatic activities are backed by offensive
defence policies. Unfortunately, India is seen as a conservative power in its
own neighbourhood. The benefit of doubt goes to China. Without being interventionist,
India can create more strategic space for itself in issues involving Nepal,
Sri Lanka and Myanmar. The Nehruvian tradition of assertive diplomacy and policy
initiatives to resolve conflict issues can get India laurels and help in its
image building. After all, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Boao
Forum are China's own initiatives with a high success rate. China is also getting
all the credit for Six Party Dialogue, irrespective of its fate.
Events
like the Shangrila Dialogue remind that India need to enhance its economic,
political and military linkages with the rest of the region to have a say in
regional issues. Unless India recognises this reality, it cannot hope to be
an equal partner with China in Asian security considerations.
VIEWS EXPRESSED ARE PERSONAL