First, it was the statement by the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice that India should abandon its association with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and openly ally with the US that caused ripples among strategic experts. Now it is the Indo-US nuclear deal. If there is one country that should be concerned, if not worried by the recent developments, it is China.

It is well known that both India and China have always been at loggerheads on nuclear issues despite an improvement in their overall bilateral relations. When India went nuclear in 1998, Beijing's tone was akin to that of Washington. However, while the US subsequently followed up with a policy of 'engagement and accommodation' of India's legitimate interests on nuclear issues, China continued to demand a roll back of India's nuclear programme. Even as the Indo-US nuclear energy cooperation agreement was being negotiated, the Chinese official media attacked it, arguing that the bilateral deal would inflict a 'hard blow' upon the global non-proliferation regime and trigger a domino effect.

The nuclear deal embodies the US recognition of India as a quasi-nuclear state. China may not be comfortable with India's new status for a number of reasons, not excluding India's rising stature as a great power. China fears that the deal will open the possibilities of Indo-US cooperation on a number of other strategic issues. If India and the US are allowed to cooperate more closely, it is bound to redefine the Asian balance of power.

This was probably one of the guiding factors in the Chinese President Hu Jintao proposing a 'strategic partnership' with India during his trip to New Delhi last year. The Chinese were also instrumental in revitalizing the trilateral strategic cooperation with Russia and sought its institutionalization. China has sought to establish closer ties with India through a web of political, economic and military relations.

Suddenly, India has become the toast of all stakeholders in Asian security. No great game can succeed in Asia without India's active involvement. For example, the US proposal has come at a time when its superpower delusions have been challenged due to the Afghanistan and Iraq fiascoes. Its traditional allies, mostly from the NATO group, have been playing power games, thus prolonging the American agony. Further, there is an increasing resistance to American agendas in its relations with Russia and China. An alliance with India, formal or discreet, could provide the US a much desired pillar of support in the Asian continent.

Should India ally with the US? This is indeed a million dollar question. If India joins the US bandwagon, the balance of power in Asia could change overnight. The coming together of democratic US, Japan, India and Australia could send China into reverse gear. The ongoing Asian security discourse, responsible for forging a broad understanding on major issues in the region, would be thrown off course. Worse, the gradual expansion of Sino-Indian relations, much needed for stabilizing Asian security, may come to a halt.

The fundamental contradictions between India and China are too apparent to permit any 'strategic partnership.' Apart from the differences over the border, on the expansion of the UN Security Council and different perspectives on establishing a favourable world order, the two countries exhibit a basic conflict of values, besides mutual suspicions and misperceptions. The perennial competition for power and influence in Asia will prevent India and China from coming together on a permanent basis.

Fortunately, the Asian balance of power, as it is evolving, may not be based on any ideological considerations as during the Cold War. Instead, loose coalitions are likely to emerge on specific issues. So, while on many issues, India and China might have similar views, on others India and US may find themselves pitted against China. Similarly, there could also be Sino-US understanding against India.

As a rising power, India needs to build good relations with both the US and China. Alignment with one could invite a knee-jerk reaction from the other. Since all great powers have stakes in Asian security, India would do well to maintain good relations with all of them. Hence, issue-based cooperation and not alliances are the long term options for Indian foreign policy. India must develop innovative ideas and arrangements that would appeal to a wider fraternity in Asia. The Indo-US nuclear deal is an example of protracted but fruitful talks with tangible benefits for India. It also indicates how deals can be clinched without distorting the balance of power in Asia.

Note: The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Government.