The recent proposition by a Chinese strategist that China should facilitate ‘the disintegration of India’ into some 30 smaller states, so as to decimate all challenges to its supremacy and establish a pax-Sinica in the Asia-Pacific region, may have been dismissed at official levels, but the polemics do provide a glimpse into such fantasies. While such fantasies, being nursed by few scholars in China, clearly miss out the history and politics of India, they are not stand-alone proposals. In early sixties, the US – based scholar, Selig S Harrison rather declared that that India would fall apart into ‘12 states’. Bhutto fired up Pakistani nationalism by vowing a long war to break India and eke out Kashmir. Fortunately, India is united and raring to go!

The Chinese strategist’s assumptions are based on numerous sub-level identities that he feels cannot be assimilated into the wider Indian identity and therefore, sooner or later will drift apart. He envisions a ‘mid-wife’ role for China that will be in cahoots with friendly countries like Paksitan, Nepal and Bhutan. It is not very difficult to guess the imagined gains to China in case India disintegrates - China would be the undisputed leader of the region. At the global level, China would have more resources and diplomatic support to play the leadership game with the US. But then, China could find also find itself in a different kind of muddle, surrounded by an arc of unstable states.
While China may not attack India in the near future (as claimed by an Indian defence expert) and may never have the capacity to ensure India’s disintegration, it would certainly prefer a weaker India. Thus, at the macro level, China would not let US, Japan and India develop a common perspective and approach on China. Within the South Asian sub-system, China has been playing balance of power games for a long time to reduce India’s influence. Apart from Sino–Pakistan machinations against India, China has weaned away Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka considerably to its own sphere of influence. Its presence is ubiquitous in Myanmar and even a distant Maldives is being pampered. In all these countries, China has been busy constructing ports, roads, other infrastructure facilities and supplying economic and military aid. In return, it is systematically turning these countries against India.  

Should there be a war with India, China can thrust through many regions to gain advantage. First, China could march through Nepal and capture part of UP and Bihar plains. Those who pooh-pooh the idea may consider the understanding between China and Nepal to extend the Qinghai-Tibet railroad to Nepal. Though commercial considerations may drive the project now, it could be used to mobilise Chinese troops in future. India does not have even proper defences along the Nepal border and has only sporadic garrison presence to counter any inward movement of Chinese troops. Second, in case China has an alliance with Nepal and Bangladesh, the three can combine together to cut off the Siliguri corridor, known in India as ‘Chicken’s neck’ since this narrow corridor connects northeast India to the mainland. It is debatable whether India can defend this most vulnerable tract with a single corps presence in the region. Third, China could align with Pakistan and the two could launch a two-directional offensive to segregate Kashmir valley from the rest of India. The situation could be more challenging if it comes with pre-fabricated internal disturbances in Kashmir valley. Last, China can also use oceanic route to attack India, either on its own or using the naval bases of Myanmar or Pakistan.

In all the above possibilities, India may suffer territorial damage but not disintegration at Chinese hands. Moreover, in contemporary international relations, states have broken not because of external wars or attacks, but out of internal crises and problems. India is no exception. More than China or any other country, it is India’s internal problems that may imperil the unity and integrity of the country. Witness for example, the menace of Naxalism, rampant in over two hundred districts which, if not tamed and managed in time, could be one factor that could lead towards disintegration. Management of such challenges is largely an internal issue and India can achieve the task by overcoming its ‘soft state’ syndrome. At the same time, a democratic India has more capacity to handle such internal discontent than China, which remains an autocratic country.

To be fair, unlike Pakistan and many other states, China stopped supporting secessionist forces against other countries in the 1970s and takes a benign view of internal affairs of other states. Certainly then, publicising such fanciful imaginations of India’s disintegration will neither be achievable nor in sync with China’s foreign policy goals. Perhaps, the sources of such fantasies lie in ignorance of India’s diverse but assimilative culture, its accommodative politics and the democratic arrangement of society and governing structures. Chinese scholars should rather focus on understanding these aspects of India that will help them appreciate its ‘unity in diversity’.

 

Note: The author is on deputation to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The views expressed herein are those of the author alone.