Zafarullah Khan Jamali was elected as the thirteenth Prime Minister of Pakistan on 21 November 2002, after more than a month of conducting elections. That he managed to get only the minimum required number of votes (172 of the total 329) in the lower house reveals his precarious position and the political maneuvers behind his election.

The military regime has successfully made its supporter as the Prime Minster after the unexpected results of the October 10 elections. Despite pre-poll rigging, the PML-Q failed to get the required seats to form a government on its own. The PPP and the MMA have won adequate seats – not to form a government on their own, but to prevent the PML-Q from doing so. It was only after splitting the PPP and politically allowing ten PPP MNAs to form the PPPP Forward Block, which voted in his favour, that Jamali won.

The following significant questions need to be answered. How safe is Jamali as the Prime Minister? How stable would his government be? How free would he be as the Prime Minister to conduct his own policies? Will he take on the military regime, as Junejo did after being appointed by Zia ul Haq? This article focuses on the first question.

How safe is the Prime Minister?

Jamali’s position as the Prime Minister is very fragile. Before deciding on Jamali, the regime was in negotiation with the PPP and the MMA, only to deny them later. The MMA and PPP sport grouses on the manner in which their demands were rejected. Worse, the PPP was split, with a section of its MNAs forming a Forward Block, to facilitate Jamali.

Even after Jamali has been elected, negotiations are underway between the PPP and MMA over a joint strategy against the PML-Q. Yet, given the history of animosities between them it is unlikely that both would come together. Prior to the elections, the PPP was against the inclusion of MMA in the ARD, which was led by the veteran Nawabzada Nasrullah; apart from PPP, PML-N was the other major party in the ARD. Even after the elections, efforts taken to bring the MMA and PPP under the ARD banner failed, as the PPP was against any alliance with the MMA. PML-N has no problems with the MMA; however, it does not have adequate seats to make any impact. PML-N, in fact, had voted for Fazlur Rahman during the PM election.

Nevertheless, given the history of brazenness in Pakistan politics, one would not be surprised if the PPP and MMA come together. Also one should not underestimate the capabilities of the maverick Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, the alliance maker. Moreover, the fact that the PPP is facing a split might force it to cooperate with the MMA.

Notwithstanding the threat of possible PPP-MMA collusion, the new Prime Minister would also face problems from his own supporters due to lack of political and ideological cohesiveness. PML-Q apart, the support for Jamali has come from three main sources – the PPP Forward Block, led by Faisal Saleh Hayat, the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) and the National Alliance. The military regime has lured the PPP Forward Block with promise of important portfolios. Those MNAs who are yet to get any portfolio or those saddled with insignificant portfolios may withdraw their support at any time. After all, the Forward Block consists of MNAs from Punjab who are known for their lust for power.

The MQM has voted for Jamali after a series of negotiations. The ‘no-go-areas’ of Karachi have been abolished, mainly to pacify MQM sentiments. Secondly, the MQM has also been promised an upper hand in Sind Provincial Assembly, presumably the post of Chief Minister. While the security forces have their apprehensions on the abolition of the ‘no-go-areas,’ the military regime fulfilling MQM aspirations in Sindh Provincial Assembly also seem remote. In this situation, the MQM may withdraw its support to Jamali anytime, especially over the formation of the government in Sindh.

Even within his own party, the PML-Q, Jamali’s position is not safe. Before the elections, he was neither their Prime Ministerial candidate nor had he requisite political clout. Jamali became an option only after the electoral defeat of Mian Azhar, the person groomed by the regime for the Prime Minster post. Despite his defeat, Mian Azhar proposed Farooq Leghari as the Prime Minster despite the latter not being a part of PML-Q; even today, Mian Azhar is not confident of Jamali and Leghari habours hopes of becoming the Prime Minister. It was the Chaudhrys, the other power center at PML-Q, who had proposed Jamali and the Mian Azhar group is now worried with the possibility of Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi becoming the next Chief Minster in Punjab; they fear that these two significant posts (Prime Minister and Chief Minister) would strengthen the hands of the Chaudhrys.

Jamali’s support within his party is brittle; it is exacerbated by challenges from the MMA and PPP; the only support is from the regime, which also is premised on how amenable Jamali is to its policies.