Nuclear Compulsions and Dangers in South Asia

28 Feb, 2002    ·   710

Maj Gen Ashok Krishna argues that “the Bush administration will maintain pressure on India and Pakistan to exercise nuclear restraint and rethink their policies”
Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna
General

 

 

The need for nuclear stability in South Asia is engaging the attention of the international community. Mutual suspicions between India and Pakistan , the absence of transparency, their use of coercive nuclear diplomacy, poor intelligence and inadequate command, control and communications systems will assume greater significance after the deployment of nuclear weapons. In states of high alert, dispersed nuclear arsenals would require the mating of warheads with delivery systems, in which case, the potential for accidental, or, inadvertent nuclear use will inevitably increase. The danger of intentional, including pre-emptive nuclear use, could also increase because of misperception, misinformation or miscalculation.

 

 

 

 

Nuclear Compulsions of India and Pakistan

 

 

Pakistan . Guided by its animosity towards and rivalry with India , Pakistan ’s nuclear weapons capability is aimed at matching and undermining India ’s regional influence. Domestic imperatives play a significant role in shaping Pakistan ’s nuclear policy. Pakistan ’s nuclear weapons programme is the preserve of its anti-Indian military establishment. Its political bureaucracy assumes a subordinate role. Even during Pakistan ’s brief democratic interludes, the military retained control over the nuclear weapons programme. In May 1998, it pressurized Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to hold retaliatory nuclear tests to counter the perceived Indian threat and offset perceived Indian gains in power and prestige. As long as the military leadership dominates nuclear decision making in Pakistan , its nuclear policy will be shaped by nuclear developments in India .

 

 

India . India justifies its nuclear weapons programme due to security threats from Pakistan and China . In his letter to President Clinton written after the May 1998 nuclear tests, Prime Minister Vajpayee had stated, “We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed aggression against India in 1962… (That) country has materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear weapons state. At the hands of this bitter neighbour we have suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years. And we have been the victim of unremitting terrorism and militancy sponsored by it in several parts of our country….” India also hopes to match China ’s regional and global standing with a countervailing nuclear weapons capability.

 

 

These political and military compulsions of India and Pakistan are unlikely to change in the future. Therefore, both states will continue to possess nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons are only for deterrence and not for use, there are a host of nuclear dangers which need being attended to by both countries.

 

 

Nuclear Dangers

 

 

Indian and Pakistani stockpiles of fissile materials are currently small, hence, their basic safety and security systems are dependent on guards, gates and guns. These arrangements are at present sufficient to prevent nuclear theft by sub-state dissidents or terrorists. However, should India and Pakistan opt for an operational nuclear force, the resultant nuclear arms race will lead to an expansion of these stockpiles, increasing the potential for nuclear theft and diversion. 

 

 

Both India and Pakistan claim that their nuclear warheads are currently un-assembled and stored at separate sites from delivery systems, reducing the chances of theft or unauthorized or inadvertent nuclear use. This situation would change if India and Pakistan operationalise their nuclear arsenals, increasing the risks of nuclear use.

 

 

Further, should India and Pakistan use their limited financial resources to enlarge their stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium, it is unlikely that they would be able to pay attention to strengthening nuclear custodial security and safety measures, because of financial and technological constraints and the lack of a safety culture. Nuclear theft or diversion could result in the acquisition of sensitive materials by terrorists. However, because of its proven Chinese nuclear weapon designs and Chinese and North Korean-based ballistic missiles, Pakistan could possibly mate its nuclear warheads with Chinese M-11 missile and other missile systems.

 

 

Fissile Materials

 

 

The other aspect of concern is the existing stocks of fissile materials. Until Pakistan feels it has enough weapons usable fissile material to stop production, it can point to India ’s existing stocks as an asymmetry that needs to be remedied before any moratorium or cut-off treaty is acceptable. Being on the centre stage after the September 11 attacks, the conditions required to bring Pakistan into a world wide effort to limit un-authorized access to WMD technologies will now be possible. Hence, Pakistan could stop the production of weapons grade fissile material in future.

 

 

Conclusion

 

 

At this stage in South Asia ’s nuclear development, the Bush administration will maintain pressure on India and Pakistan to exercise nuclear restraint and rethink their policies to advance the US global nonproliferation objectives and anti-terrorism goals. The United States would also engage India and Pakistan to contain the Kashmir conflict and enhance crisis stability in South Asia . 

 

 

 

 

 

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