Nuclear posturing is enabled by a country’s operational intent which includes the contours of a doctrine, deployment abilities, command and control structures and suchlike. It is this, rather than the mere acquisition of weapons capability that determines the state of geopolitical power dynamics. This article will look at Pakistan’s nuclear posture in the wake of two recent developments: the Hatf-9 test in April 2011 and the construction of an unsafeguarded fourth reactor at Khushab.

Towards the end of May this year, Newsweek ran exclusive images of the speedy construction of a fourth nuclear reactor at Khushab, Pakistan, following revelations made in an ISIS report. The speedy construction and operationalization of a fourth nuclear reactor at Khushab will lead to a significant increase in Pakistan’s plutonium production capacity. Plutonium is a feasible component for smaller warheads because it makes lighter weapons than uranium. The Hatf-9 or Nasr missile system is an easily deployable, nuclear-capable tactical missile. The focus on plutonium, along with the recent missile test, might therefore suggest that Pakistan has developed miniaturized, low-yield nuclear warheads for battlefield use.

Is Hatf-9 a response to India’s ‘non-policy’ of Cold Start?
Cold Start implies that by launching attacks that are characterized by fast mobility and limited battle force deployment, India should be able to wage an attack that is below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold, provided that it is known. Pakistan is also at a comparative disadvantage because its conventional forces are not at par with those of India’s. Conventionally, India can escalate the game of provocations to the extent that it intends by controlling the pace and quality of aggression and deter Pakistan from responding via nuclear means, since going nuclear would elicit a much larger geographic, economic and political price. Cold Start is thus meant to allow escalation dominance to work in India’s favour.
 
Hatf-9 therefore, speaks as much of Pakistan’s desire to control escalation dominance as it does of closing the nuclear deterrence chasm created by Cold Start’s limited war set-up, as Vipin Narang argues on Michael Krepon’s blog at Arms Control Wonk. This makes for efficient nuclear posturing: Stone-walling India’s limited war options by threatening to use tactical nuclear weapons against Indian military forces, if they happen to encroach on Pakistani soil. This makes Cold Start nearly redundant because of the lowering of Pakistan’s nuclear threshold.

The problem with Pakistan’s strategy is that it is contingent on the conviction that India will not resort to waging an all-out conventional war against Pakistan, or worse still, massive nuclear retaliation. The indication of tactical nuclear missile usage is a highly risky strategy because ironically, it signals an implicit faith in Indian self-control. Cold Start may be read as India’s belief in nuclear restraint, but a situation that employs tactical nuclear missiles (first strike) will be answered with (massive) punitive nuclear retaliation, as promised by the Indian nuclear doctrine. What then, if all bets are off?

Is it a placebo?
Ambiguity works well as a strategy and the testing of a weapon does not have to be an actual deployment decision. The Hatf-9 test implies that Pakistan may have succeeded in creating miniaturized nuclear warheads. Doubts have however, been raised about the actual nuclear-capability of this missile and whether it is in existence at all - the creation of miniaturized nuclear warheads requires high skill, and evidence of the possession, or the successful testing of these missiles could be staged. It has also been said that the Pakistani military is unlikely to introduce an untested weapon in a battle scenario. Both positions need closer examination.

To answer the first claim, publicity photos of the test, conducted at an undisclosed location, have been revealed; to reject this as flimsy evidence would be foolhardy. Even if one were to question whether this test actually took place, it must be noted that many tests are simulation-based and do not require actual ‘testing’, to which smaller warheads are perfectly suited.

The second claim underlines the difference between the utility of an object, and its usability. While the utility of the Hatf-9 has been dealt with, its usability throws up a number of issues. First, if push comes to shove, will Pakistan readily detonate a nuclear missile within its borders? Second, as Scott Sagan’s vulnerability/invulnerability’ paradox states, a tactical nuclear weapon will have to be in a constant state of readiness, creating problems of devolution of control. This in turn leads to questions about Pakistan’s ability to control escalation dominance given the suspected Islamist infiltration of the Pakistani military and alleged split between the high command and lower cadre. In addition, the workings of the SPD, Pakistan’s nuclear sentinel, are little known, generating further doubt about the safety of the country’s nuclear arsenal. How can escalation dominance then be suitably monitored in an irrationality crisis, for example, or a loss of control?

The persistence of the South Asian arms race
Pakistan has consistently attempted to match India’s conventional capabilities. The Hatf-9 can therefore also be read as Pakistan’s belated answer to India’s acquisition of the Russian 300-mm Smerch rocket launch system in 2005, which has a range of about 90km. The Pakistani acceleration of the arms race in South Asia could also be a strategy to guarantee US involvement and to perhaps reduce the sustained American pressure on Pakistan to combat radical elements on Pakistan’s western front.