A new wave of violence has engulfed Assam. Mortar attacks have occurred on the Legislative assembly complex in Dispur, on two locations in the heart of Guwahati city, on an Air Force Base near the Guwahati Airport, on the oil refinery in Digboi, on police outposts in Bongaigaon and Goalpara districts. The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) appears to have woken up after a lull and unleashed acts of sabotage in the State, which appeared to be returning to normalcy. The ULFA chief, Paresh Baruah, has called up the vernacular newspapers in Guwahati on March 15, warning that such attacks would continue. A day later, on March 16, the outfit triggered an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blast in Goalpara district killing 6 people, including a jawan of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF).

The Unified Command Structure, which oversees counter-insurgency operations in the State, has termed these acts as those of desperation. However, this characterization is misleading. In January 2003, the vernacular newspapers in Guwahati, notorious for their exaggerated and sympathetic reportage about ULFA, predicted a series of bloody strikes by it in the lower Assam districts. This prediction has come true, though after a delay of 3 months. The area of these ‘bloody strikes’ has gone beyond lower Assam and also spread to the relatively high security zones in Upper Assam.

The fact remains that ULFA is active in a number of districts in the State. The precision and regular nature of such attacks further indicates that, despite a significant loss of cadres in 2002 (126 killed, 98 surrendered and more than 100 arrested), ULFA can orchestrate sabotage of a serious nature. Its striking capability, mostly through its core Enigma group, remains intact. In addition, its bases in Bhutan, Myanmar and Bangladesh provide it safe sanctuaries and the opportunity to indulge in hit and run tactics. Disturbing trends like its linkages with the al-Qaeda (in spite of the ULFA Chief’s denials) and its overt dependence on the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan have come to the fore. 

The Assam government proposes to constitute a task force on counter-insurgency in the region. Speaking in the Legislative Assembly on March 10, Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi stressed the need for modernization of the intelligence apparatus and increasing the number of police stations in the State. However, the wisdom behind the move for setting up a task force to supplement the existing Unified Command Structure is questionable.

The state government is hardening its stance. The Chief Minister, who had offered to go to Bhutan and Bangladesh and talk to the outfit, was reported to have said on March 10, ‘There seems to be no option, but to crush the militant outfits, including ULFA.’ It is a natural reaction since he has waited, after assuming power in May 2001, for the outfit to change its character, while stressing the need for dialogue, even with the conditionalities attached by the ULFA.

However, ULFA suddenly finds itself subject to attack by some of its votaries. The 26-year-old youth organization, the Assam Jatiyatabadi Yuba Chhatra Parishad (AJYCP), which talked of the ‘step motherly’ approach of the Union government and underlined the need for an urgent dialogue, has condemned the ULFA after the IED blast in Goalpara. The AJYCP general secretary was quoted by the local media on March 18 as having said, ‘People have taken to the streets against the dastardly acts of violence by militants and very soon such protests could acquire the form of mass revolt.’ Senior citizens and intellectuals have also reacted strongly against this violence. But, it would be too early to conclude that these statements represent a decisive shift against the outfit and its actions.

There still is a silver lining in these recent developments. The loss of innocent lives and national resources apart, these attacks provided the State with an opportunity to mobilize the common people against the outfit. To quote the Chief Minister, ‘By attacking Assam’s own resources and targeting innocent civilians, the ULFA has shown its darkest face to the world. It is now nothing but a group of hoodlums.’ This opportunity must be exploited by the authorities to build a movement against the culture of violence in the State. The authorities had missed a similar opportunity after the ULFA killed the social worker, Sanjoy Ghose, in July 1997, leading to huge protests by the people against it. This time around, the bus must not be missed.