Of late, a number of insurgent outfits, fighting for homelands of different types are building alliances in India’s north-east. A commonality of views and resolve to carry on fighting, have replaced any clash of interests among them. Does this mean the war against insurgency will get more protracted now? Would marginalised outfits get a fresh lease of life? Possibly yes, if the counter-insurgency establishments in various States of the region do not adopt a similar strategy. 

  The formation of alliances illustrates the march of insurgency in the northeast. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), commonly known as the mother of all insurgencies in the region, is the common factor behind the birth and growth of insurgency movements in the region. To widen its sway, the NSCN, and later the Isak-Muivah faction (NSCN-IM), arranged for the training and providing of weapons to outfits in different states. A strategic understanding between these outfits has always been their game plan, when facing the security forces. The junior partner contributes a major share of extortion moneys to the coffers of the dominant outfit. The nascent outfit also provides hideouts in regions where the influence of the ‘major partner’ is only bare minimum. And, all in return for training facilities and a few arms and ammunition. 

  However, these linkages in the formative days of the outfits must be distinguished from recent developments embodying tactical understandings between mature outfits. Recently, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) in Assam and the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) reached an understanding. This was followed by an alliance between the Tripura based All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) and the Manipur People’s Liberation Front (MPLF). An umbrella organisation of three insurgent outfits was formed in Manipur, namely the UNLF, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK). Towards the end of September 2002, the ATTF and the MPLF, made a joint appeal to the people of Manipur and Tripura to unite in the fight to achieve their respective homelands. They justified the militancy in Tripura and Manipur as reflecting an outburst of resentment in the people. UNLF being the common element in both these alliances, this development would effectively bring together five outfits. 

  It is important to note that they are the oldest in the region. UNLF was established in 1964, PREPAK in 1977, PLA in 1978, and ULFA in 1979. The ATTF is the junior-most, being founded in 1990. While it is natural for a new outfit to look for partners to provide training and arms, the alliances sought by a die-hard outfit like ULFA reveals a different picture. Intelligence sources believe that ULFA is on the run, and requires breathing space, which such alliances provide. These alliances ensure a widening of its shrinking sphere of influence.  As the ULFA’s influence in Assam gets limited to some pockets, it would try to neutralise losses of popular support by seeking a greater geographical spread. Thus, one discovers ULFA’s influence growing in North Bengal through its alliance with the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), in Meghalaya through the Achik National Volunteers Council (ANVC), in Nagaland through NSCN’s Khaplang faction (NSCN-K), in Tripura through the ATTF and now in Manipur through the UNLF.

  Logically, this would mean that counter-insurgency operations in the region have succeeded in driving these outfits to seeking protection in each other’s company. Between years 1992 and 2001, as many as 3,611 insurgents have been killed in the northeast. Assam leads the table with 1,418 deaths. The relative growth in the capability of the security forces has led to a marginalisation of the insurgents in terms of individual striking power, which is now sought to be regained by tactical tie-ups.

  These alliances would mean protracted battles for the security forces- battles that would have to be fought beyond the boundaries of individual States. Curiously, this brotherhood among the militants can only be countered by putting in place a system for organised cooperation among the counter-insurgency set-ups in the States of the northeast. Sharing of intelligence information, joint operations and training coordination among security force personnel would be the broad parameters of such an arrangement. This idea was recently mooted in a meeting of the police chiefs of the NE states. There is urgent need to give shape to this idea.