Five CPI-M workers in the Jalpaiguri district of West Bengal were killed by militants of the Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) on August 17, 2002. This was the first major terrorist act by the KLO whose growth has been camouflaged by their dependence on other outfits. It has come a long way from the days when it had a few cadres with primitive weapons. It also signals the beginning of turmoil for West Bengal, which had its problems earlier with the Naxalites.

     The pattern of insurgent violence in the post-NSCN (National Socialist Council of Nagaland) and ULFA (United Liberation Front of Asom) period in the northeast traverses a three-phase path. Firstly, the emergence of an outfit; secondly, its establishment of linkages with other outfits in the region to acquire arms, ammunition and training; and lastly its transformation from a movement for promoting the special demands of a particular ethnic group to a purely militaristic outfit, which survives by periodic recourse to violence. KLO, though it is not a north-eastern outfit, is no different. However, the most alarming aspect of the recent attack is its entry into the last phase of insurgency.

     Two important factors came to the fore in the recent attack. First, the level of sophistication reached by the KLO over the years. The use of AK series of rifles, though a regular feature for most insurgent outfits, points to its foreign linkages. While ULFA provided the initial stock of AK rifles the KLO has been successful in establishing trans-national tie-ups for acquiring arms and ammunition. Having its operational area close to Bangladesh, the prime source for supply of illegal arms and ammunition to all the north-eastern militant outfits, KLO had little difficulty in acquiring these weapons.

     Secondly, there has been a continuing, if not increasing unawareness in the authorities to devising countermeasures to defeat the insurgents. The attack on the American centre in Kolkata early this year, in which a number of police personnel were killed, displayed the unreadiness of the administration. Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharya now talks of increasing the number of security forces along the Indo-Bhutan border, from where the militants are supposed to come. Why could such measures not be put in place before? Intelligence reports had earlier suggested that KLO militants have established their bases in Bhutan. In Assam, ULFA and the NDFB (National Democratic Front of Bodoland) militants use bases in Bhutan to indulge in hit and run operations; this should have alerted the West Bengal administration. The recent attack yet again demonstrates that counter-insurgency operations have remained only reactive in nature.

     The strategic importance of the Siliguri corridor does not require any emphasis. KLO’s emergence needs to be seen not merely as the surfacing of another outfit, but as a potent force that can sever the linkages between the Indian mainland and the northeast. Thus, the KLO is as dangerous for the West Bengal administration as it is for the seven north-eastern States.

     There is nothing to prove an ULFA link with the recent attack in Jalpaiguri. However, the history of KLO’s violence reveals its active support by the ULFA. It is possible that the ULFA, which uses North Bengal as a corridor to move between Bangladesh and Bhutan, is the real perpetrator of the recent attack. In this eventuality, people celebrating ULFA’s inability to carry out subversive activities prior to the Independence Day celebrations in Assam this year would have reasons to feel disillusioned.

     This attack emphasizes the need for management of India’s relations with its neighbours, Bhutan and Bangladesh. There is a need to stop the use of Bhutanese territory by the ULFA, NDFB and the KLO. Of late, India has been talking of evolving joint operations against these outfits along with Bhutan, which needs to be translated into action. Similarly, Bangladesh also needs to be roped into an agreement for not letting its territory to be used by these outfits. Cox Bazaar, which is used by them for acquiring arms and ammunition from various countries in Southeast Asia, needs immediate sanitization. This is easier said than done. But the crux of the matter is that until such measures are put in place, the war against insurgency in the northeast and north-Bengal will become a long-drawn out battle.