The recent arrest of an Assam Rifles (AR) employee in Shillong for his alleged nexus with the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan raises basic questions about how subversion is being handled by the Indian government in the northeast. Past revelations of this kind revealed an overwhelming tendency to deal with only the symptoms but not the rot in the system. That is why the problem continues.

     The most important official document to date on ISI activities in the northeast was presented by the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) government of Prafulla Kumar Mahanta on 6 April 2000. In this document the Chief Minister detailed the activities of 17 ISI agents in the Assam, providing an account of their role in planning terrorist attacks and fomenting communal tensions in the state. It laid less emphasis on the planning of these attacks by their systematic infiltration into official establishments.

     The recent arrest of the AR employee proves many assumptions regarding ISI operations in the northeast wrong. ISI operation needs to be viewed beyond the phenomenon of Islamic militancy in the northeast. In fact the rise of Islamic militancy and terrorist related activities like fake currency circulation and collection of vital military information are further aspects of the ISI’s operations. Concentration on its assistance to existing outfits like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), and new terrorist outfits like the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) have effectively covered up its other terrorist-related activities.

     Secondly, this incident reveals the ISI’s success in nurturing moles. In addition to poor people, the men in uniform have also become easy prey for the agency due to pecuniary benefits being offered. Till now the assumption was unless senior officers in the security establishments are bought over the set up is impregnable. But the ISI has shown lower rung men in uniform can be utilized to serve their purpose. This vulnerability would be exploited unless systemic arrangements are made to check the rot.

     Not long ago the Manipur police personnel had gone on strike to protest against the non-payment of salary. During the agitation in the state in June 2001 to protest against the Union government’s extension of the area of Naga ceasefire, army personnel had to be airlifted from Assam to control the situation. States like Assam and Manipur suffer from perennial salary payment problems, which has a serious bearing on the morale of the police personnel. It has also been conceded by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs that the arms available with them are inferior to those with the insurgents. Modernisation of the police force in most of the north-eastern States has remained a non-starter; hence subverting security force personnel is not too difficult for the ISI.

     Similarly a comprehensive policy needs to be devised for maintaining the effectiveness of army personnel posted in hostile areas. The duration of their postings needs shortening with a ‘cooling off period’ between two field postings. An upward revision in the current pay package could also be considered apart from increasing the compensation for casualties in operations.

     In addition to boosting the morale of the men in uniform the threat of the Islamic militia in the region needs tackling. Police officials claim that their activities in the region is manageable and tactical arm-twisting is enough to control this menace. This is a dangerous under-estimation of the problem. For example, the char (riverine) areas in Assam, where immigrants from Bangladesh prefer to settle, have been the area hosting the state’s ten Islamic militant outfits. Emphasizing that the Muslim dominated areas are the breeding ground for ISI operations would be incorrect as the recent arrest in Shillong proves.

     As intelligence officials engage in a damage control mechanism and assess the vital information that has already leaked out, it is hoped they would go beyond fixing responsibility to address the root causes of this nexus in its totality.