Internationalizing the Kashmir Problem

08 Jul, 2002    ·   790

Aisha Sultanat points out that Indian security establishment is perhaps internationalizing the Kashmir terrorism but not the Kashmir problem
Whenever the Indian Government asks western countries, especially the US , to rein Pakistan in and stop cross border terrorism into Indian territory , it is internationalizing the Kashmir problem, whether or not this was intended. Internationalizing the Kashmir problem is not a new phenomenon and can be traced back to the Nehruvian era, when Nehru first put forth the idea of a referendum under the aegis of UN soon after independence. But the futility of this exercise was realized soon after, and Kashmir was treated strictly as a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan . One of the reasons why India does not recognize the nine-country UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which has been in existence since 1949 to monitor the ceasefire in the first Indo-Pak war, is that India saw no role for the UN in Kashmir. The two other prominent reasons that stopped India from accepting any international mediation on the Kashmir issue were the Cold War dynamics and the Western bias against India . However, this argument may no longer be valid. Not only is the Cold War over, but the US and India are, almost for the first time since India ’s independence, seeking a closer strategic relationship. Their national interests have converged in the post 9/11 context. But are these recent developments enough reason for India to let the Kashmir issue be internationalized?

 

 

The recent statements by US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and the wise counsel provided by Russian President Vladimir Putin, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, the European Union Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten and Japanese Foreign Minister Seiken Suguira, highlight the extent to which Kashmir has got internationalized. While concern and good counsel are normal in the multilateral contexts, the statements by Armitage, Straw and Rumsfeld refer to international intervention in Kashmir . The half-hearted denials by New Delhi in this regard are indeed path breaking, if not trend setting.

 

 

It all started when Richard Armitage, during his visit to the subcontinent in the first week of June, said that the US would be happy to consider sharing intelligence from aerial monitoring of cross border infiltration along the Line of Control (LoC) dividing India and Pakistan. He discussed various ‘possibilities and modalities’ to monitor the LoC with the Indian government. Jack Straw went a step further by suggesting the idea of a helicopter force to check infiltration across the LoC. Though he ruled out the possibility of sending British military forces to patrol the disputed border, he said Britain was ready to send military advisors to help India and Pakistan monitor infiltration. Donald Rumsfeld, during his visit to India in the second week of June, set forth the same idea of ‘intervention’, with an Al-Qaeda twist to it. He urged the Indian government to allow deployment of US troops along the LoC to check for Al-Qaeda militants.

 

 

India ’s reaction to the recent spurt of internationalization has been two-fold. On the one hand, India has strongly objected to any kind of third-party intervention. India suggested that instead of third party mediation what suits both the terrain and the situation along the LoC is joint Indo-Pak patrolling. But this will not be possible unless a level of trust exists between the two countries, which is currently non-existent. On the other hand, India has conveyed willingness to let sensors be deployed and intelligence be shared, but it has firmly ruled out the deployment of foreign troops on the Indian side of the LoC. However, the deployment of sensors would require the posting of surveillance experts from UK and US, apart from India and Pakistan . The Indian stance on third party intervention comes across as more or less consistent.  At the maximum, it oscillates between outright rejection of any third party intervention to cautious acceptance of technical assistance.  

 

 

These proposals and counter proposals make clear that the Kashmir issue no longer remains bilateral; it has been internationalized. However, it must be asked if this reflects the changing Indian foreign policy in the emerging geo-strategic and domestic political context, where India sees itself as a global player of significance, capable of setting the tone of regional politics. Many analysts have suggested the possibility of such a policy shift in the post 9/11 context, where terrorism has to be fought vigorously. India , with her experience of dealing with this menace for more than a decade, is only earning friends and sympathizers. Therefore, the Indian security establishment is perhaps internationalizing the Kashmir terrorism but not the Kashmir problem. 

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