Left Wing Extremism
The CPI-Maoist Tech Onslaught: Early Warnings
27 Nov, 2019 · 5635
Dr. Rajat Kumar Kujur examines the CPI-Maoist's increasing capabilities on the technological front and explores policy options to fine-tune counter-LWE efforts.
Given its expansion from guerilla warfare to ‘mobile warfare’ to ‘hi-tech warfare’, it is
pertinent to examine whether the Maoist conflict in India is headed towards a
more dangerous turn. Security personnel, policy makers and analysts are grappling
over this question particularly since the serious and new threat of possession
and operation of drones/unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) by the Communist Party
of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) came to light.
A month ago,
small red and white light emitting drones were spotted flying near the Central
Reserve Police Force (CRPF) camp in Kistaram and Pallodi in Chhattisgarh's
Sukma district. This is a concerning development given how the two camps where
those drones were spotted are located deep inside the Maoist hotbed, and the region
shares borders with the Maoist tri-junction of Odisha, Maharashtra and Andhra
Pradesh.
A year ago, in
November 2018, 35 wireless sets carried by the Cobra 204 battalion suddenly
fell silent in the midst of an active operation in Bastar. How or why this occurred
is still unclear. According
to reports, although officials speculated on various technical problems that
could have affected the sets, they were unable to revive the sets. The inquiry
into this incident, which was termed ‘inconclusive’, did not rule out the possibility
of the CPI-Maoist being in possession of technology that enables the group to
disable radio sets.
Earlier that
year, in March 2018, during a raid at a camp of the CPI-Maoist’s People’s
Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) in Jharkhand’s Gumla district, security forces
came upon evidence of the CPI-Maoist’s tech savvy operations and digital operations.
According to reports, two Samsung tablets, five ICOM walkie-talkie sets, and 14
cellphones were confiscated. The authorities also found a propaganda website
suspected to be based out of the Netherlands, and information on the group’s familiarity
with (and use of) Google Earth for it operations. Reportedly,
the CPI-Maoist
has also begun recording its meetings and sharing the videos across their network.
While it can be argued that Google Earth is far from being a sophisticated tool
that demonstrates the CPI-Maoist’s technological prowess, nonetheless, given the
technological reasons for the group’s use of the software as well as the fact
that the IP address of the group’s website originated in the Netherlands, investigative
agencies have now expanded their inquiry into determining the CPI-Maoist’s outreach
beyond domestic areas, to include areas abroad as well.
Here, it is relevant to note that over the past six decades, the
discourse on Maoism in India has largely revolved around the political and
socio-economic conditions as root causes. In comparison, the technological
cushions that enable expansion of the CPI-Maoist’s reach and capabilities are
less studied.
As per the annual
report (2018-19) of India’s Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), more police
personnel have been killed in Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) attacks than
in direct combat. This is the outcome of a strategic game plan by the CPI-Maoist to mastermind the
use of IEDs in order to avoid direct confrontation with security forces as a
means to minimise causalities among their own cadres. Analysis of the recent
IED attacks shows that the CPI-Maoist has escalated IED warfare on the security
forces using a mix of Command Wire IEDs, Radio Controlled IEDs, Victim Operated
IEDs etc. Reports indicate that the CPI-Maoist has also demonstrated a
capability of launching rocket attacks on security force camps, blowing mine
proof vehicles apart, and creating minefields for targeting a foot patrol.
At present,
having been caught off the guard with the threat of drone use by the CPI-Maoist,
the Indian government has issued a shoot at sight order in all left wing
extremism (LWE) infested states for all suspected UAVs. At this juncture, it is
essential that the investigating agencies also investigate the sources through
which the CPI-Maoist is procuring (or is able to procure) high-tech equipment.
Obviously
they must not have manufactured the recently spotted UAV, but the possibility
of the group developing manufacturing capabilities in near future cannot be
ruled out. Additionally, with Basavaraj at the
helm of affairs of the CPI-Maoist, the new generation of the group’s cadres are
pushing hard to make inroads in to the digital world.
To counter
the threat of IEDs, the Indian government must focus on the parameters of
Prevention, Protection, Preparedness, Operational Coordination, Intelligence
and Information Sharing, Forensics and Attribution, Screening, Search and
Detection, Interdiction and Disruption. That being said, as far as countering LWE
in India is concerned, reliance on human intelligence is essential, but it is
also crucial to understand the CPI-Maoist
beyond the archaic image of rag tag guerrilla fighters armed with bows and
arrows looting traditional arms of the local police. Needless to say, when it
comes to use of technology, the CPI-Maoist
is certainly no match to the security forces. However, CPI-Maoist’s
gaining of access to new technology is something the policymakers must not take
lightly. This is because the combination of
simple operations and increased communicative capacity would facilitate an
increase in the CPI-Maoist’s reach
into other areas, and in all likelihood, the group might already be exploring
this possibility.
The Indian government
must devise a strategy involving
high-end
technology which works in sync with human intelligence, to use as an effective
deterrent for countering the CPI-Maoist modus
operandi. While
indeed the
counter-Maoist strategies have delivered some successes in the recent times, it
is also important to note that reactionary,
knee-jerk policymaking would offer only temporary solutions to the
ever-evolving challenges in the LWE front in India. The state thus has
the new task of devising a new, comprehensive approach which recognises the far-reaching
implications of technology on politics, economy, security and the society at
large.
Dr Rajat Kumar Kujur is Assistant Professor, P.G. Department of Political Science & Public Administration, Sambalpur University, Odisha, India. He may be reached at rajatkujur@gmail.com.