Surrendered Militants in the Northeast: Outlived Utilities?
08 Jul, 2002 · 789
Bibhu Prasad Routray questions the efficacy of induced surrenders as a tool of insurgency management while highlighting the lack of sincerity of the concerned administrations
The use of renegades in counter-insurgency operations is a common tactic. The concept of eliminating militants with the assistance of their former colleagues holds great attraction for strategists. Former militants can provide information on the strategy, hideouts and linkages of their former outfits. Surrendered militants also add to the image-building exercise of the government and security forces. They establish that terrorism is the ideology of the misguided.
1 April 1998 financial assistance including a monthly stipend for one year followed by soft loans; reward for sophisticated small arms and explosives brought in and self-employment packages. Militants who surrendered prior to this date are covered by either different accords with the Union government or individual schemes by the State governments, some of which are charged to the Centre.
Assam
, surrendered militants, especially those of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), have emerged as ‘terrorists in civvies.’ Known as SULFA, these former militants control the coal and transport syndicates, have indulged in large-scale extortion and intimidation, and usurped government tenders. Most of them have not cared to refund their bank loans. In June 2002, the Reserve Bank of
India
asked the banks to recover the pending amount from the security amount deposited by the State government.
22 September 2001 , the State government offered fourteen of them home-guard jobs. None of them accepted the offer saying that the job offer does not match their qualifications. The government might argue that no formal accord was signed when these TRA insurgents surrendered in February 1997. But the State government had promised to provide proper rehabilitation and government employment to all those eligible. The hype created to initiate the surrenders is thus proving to be counterproductive for the government. Non-implementation of promises affects plans of other militants wishing to come over-ground.
2 July 2002 if the government fails to announce a proper rehabilitation package for them. In fact, these former insurgents had surrendered more than two and half years ago, but are yet to receive the surrender reward, weapons reward and ration money. The results of the tests conducted for their induction into the State police force in November 2000 are yet to be announced.
30 June 2002 . They allege that even fifteen years after the signing of the Mizo Accord in 1986, they are yet to receive the promised reward of Rs. 60,000 each. Official records, however, show otherwise.
The Union Home Ministry has an ongoing surrender-cum-rehabilitation scheme for militants in the Northeast. This Centre-funded scheme assures all militants surrendering after
An overview, however, reveals that these schemes are mired in controversy arising out of their implementation or non-implementation. For example, in
It is alleged that the SULFA cadres played an important part in the former Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) government’s ‘secret killings’ policy to eliminate the relatives of the ULFA leadership; but they have proved to be a real menace now in the State. Their effective use in counter-insurgency operations is also a matter of speculation. ULFA, as an organisation, has undergone considerable changes since most of the SULFAs came over ground in 1992.
The problems created by the SULFA have not been replicated in any other State in the region. What is common among the surrendered militants however is a sense of injustice prevailing in the respective State administration. Last year, 114 former insurgents of the Tripura Resurrection Army (TRA) went on a hunger strike demanding their rehabilitation and withdrawal of pending cases against them. On
Similarly, in Manipur, eighty-five former militants threatened to commit serial suicide recently on
In Mizoram, an inquiry has been instituted into the alleged embezzlement of funds meant for surrendered Mizo National Front (MNF) militants. The members of the Peace Accord MNF Returnees’ Association (PAMRA) boycotted the 16th Mizo Peace Day, which was celebrated on
These examples reveal great disinterest by successive State administrations regarding counter-insurgency operations. The efficacy of initiating surrenders in terms of weakening an outfit is a controversial issue. The history of insurgency in the Northeast reveals that surrender has never been the reason for decimating an outfit. Large-scale recruitment drives and sophisticated training facilities ensure that the vacuum left behind by these surrenders is quickly filled up. Moreover, large-scale surrenders, more often than not, has led to the birth of new outfits. The governments of the day may be faulted for not only making surrenders financially attractive but also for not following a uniform rehabilitation policy. This only adds to the numbers of the disgruntled, be they insurgents or those who have surrendered.
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