Is Development a Riposte to Insurgency?
25 Jun, 2002 · 770
Bibhu Prasad Routray challenges the view that underdevelopment is the sole factor behind the mushrooming insurgency in the Northeast
Will development of the Northeast region lead to an end to the cycle of insurgent violence? Some analysts seem to believe so. They argue that once the results of development start percolating to the lower strata of society, people will cease to take recourse to insurgency. Developmental efforts would lead to the generation of a host of opportunities for the youth in the region preventing them from making a career in terrorism. These analysts seem to believe that the reason for the rise, growth and sustenance of insurgency in the region is the lack of development. At best this argument is partly true.
It is true that the region as a whole suffers from a visible lack of developmental initiative. It is also true that insurgents in the region have been successful in exploiting the prevailing sense of general deprivation among people to further embolden their position. However, the line of thinking that initiation of developmental efforts would automatically sound the death knell of insurgency is wishful thinking. Such a line of thought fails to analyse the problem in its entirety.
It would not be untrue to argue that over the years a significant portion of the developmental funds have found their way to the coffers of insurgent outfits. The prolonged existence of insurgency in the region has created an amorphous network where seemingly legal segments of the society find themselves in collusion with the outfits. Many of the NGOs, businessmen, bureaucrats, politicians, journalists and lawyers, due to inexplicable reasons, act as the over-ground operatives of the underground elements. The Ministry of Home Affairs has time and again issued notifications against the activity of some of these groups and persons. It would be only natural to infer that many such elements manage to evade the watchful eyes of the intelligence agencies.
The purpose of such elaboration is to drive home the point that the collusion between the sections of the civil society and the malcontents not only defeats the purpose behind such efforts, but on the other hand, acts as a force multiplier for the latter. Insurgency, having lost its pretence of being representative of the popular yearnings, manages to survive through this modus operandi, the basic blame for which should rest with the civil society. It is tragic that such sinister linkages form the backbone of insurgency today.
Rising unemployment in the region, which again can be traced to the lack of industrialisation, is said to be providing the outfits their cadres. Monthly emoluments available to the cadres of the outfits are in the range of Rs. 2500 to Rs. 5000 per month. The lack of any central control by the outfits over the extortion amount collected by the lower rung cadres also comes as a boon for the latter as they can manipulate the actual figures of the amount collected. Most of the states in the region struggle to provide their employees salary every month in time. In this background, a career in insurgency holds a lot of promise for the unemployed. However, all said and done, it appears a little imprudent to assume that insurgency as an employment-generating sector could replace or even supplement the existing public or private counterparts. The numerical limitation of the outfits (the cadre strength of ULFA would be no more than 5000; that of the NSCN is in the range of 7500; and other outfits far less), in addition to the risk factor involved, definitely prohibits mass enrolment in the training for terror. The lack of a long term vision and ideological content also inhibits recruitment in terrorist cadres.
One could presumably conclude that underdevelopment need not be the only reason for the rise of insurgency. It is one of the many contributing factors. On the contrary, insurgency remains a prime factor for the underdevelopment of the region. The suspension of banking activities, laying of railway tracks, operations of the oil companies and so on, constitute a major challenge for the development process. The diversion of developmental funds for security related matters only makes the scenario worse. Most importantly, the continuation of insurgency provides the corrupt political establishment with a smokescreen for its non-performance.
All this however, poses new challenges for developmental planning in the Northeast. What needs urgent attention is the proper utilisation of the funds, not just the announcement of periodic developmental packages. This would additionally require political will and a secure environment. This suggestion would be applicable for any region of the country, not just the Northeast. However, what we experience in the Northeast is the rise in the feeling of alienation, which bolsters the position of the insurgents. It makes the common man a victim of the nexus and ironically strengthens the elements that are responsible for the state of affairs. This needs to be attended to at the earliest.
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