Dealing with the NDFB

31 Jan, 2002    ·   689

Bibhu Prasad Routray suggests that attempts to contain the NDFB, the most violent outfit in Assam, must commence with neutralising its advantages

Bibhu Prasad Routray
Bibhu Prasad Routray
 Visiting Fellow
Within one week, terrorists of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) have struck twice. On 16 January 2002, thirteen persons were killed near Bijni in Bongaigaon district. Again, on 21 January 2002, seventeen were killed in a village under Udalguri police station in Darrang district. Both places are near the Indo-Bhutan border and in both cases the victims were from the Bengali/Bihari communities. 

 

 

The purpose of these attacks is seen as the organization’s desperate attempt to emerge as the dominant Bodo outfit. However, the prominent Bodo organisations in the area have supported the Union government’s ongoing negotiations with the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT). The proposed creation of the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) has been projected as the final solution to the vexed Bodo problem. In this situation, refraining from violence would strip the NDFB of its significance. And by targeting non-Bodos, which has been its general practice, the NDFB seeks to convey its commitment to the ‘cause’ of creating a Bodoland for the ethnic Bodos. In addition, it attempts to convey the impression that placating the BTC would not end Bodo insurgency. 

 

 

Over the years the NDFB has shown little willingness to enter into a negotiated settlement to pursue its demands. Last year (2001) its publicity secretary, Mainao Daimary, had outlined the pre-conditions for peace negotiations: 

 

 

• Talks must be held in a foreign country.

 

 

• They must be held under the supervision of the United Nations (UN).

 

 

• Talks must be centred on the concept of sovereignty of Assam .

 

 

Interestingly, these conditions were similar to those outlined by the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). However, due to lack of seriousness by the NDFB and the government’s obsession with working out a peace deal with the ULFA, this process never took off. In fact, the NDFB has benefited from this ULFA-centric approach to counter-insurgency operations in the State. Countering the ULFA menace has been the basic objective of the policy makers in Assam ; hence, other insurgent groups like the NDFB have been ignored. The Assam police has stated that in 2001, the NDFB was involved in 187 incidents compared to 186 involving the ULFA. During the year, the former killed 146 civilians and security force personnel, in comparison to 85 by the ULFA. Thus, the NDFB clearly emerges as the most violent outfit in the State. It suffered fewer casualties also; only 108 of its cadres were killed in various operations whereas the ULFA lost 143.

 

 

Its acts of sabotage in 2001 included an explosion in the Northeast Express on 25 September 2001, in which more than 120 persons were injured. In a daring move, the NDFB attacked a police station at Labdabguri in Barpeta district with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) on 19 October 2001, resulting in the death of three police personnel. 

 

 

The NDFB has developed the ability to engage in hit and run tactics. Its main area of operation remains the Bodo inhabited districts along the Indo-Bhutan border viz. Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon and Darrang. After their attacks, its cadres retreat to the safety of NDFB camps in Bhutanese territory. According to police sources, NDFB cadres were involved in the January 21 massacre in Darrang district and came from the Zabrang camp in the Daifam sub division of Bhutan , which is 16 kilometers from the Indo-Bhutan border. The fact that this massacre was committed three kilometres inside Indian territory highlights the mobility available to the terrorists.  

 

 

Any effort to contain the NDFB must commence with neutralising its advantages, which is primarily the safety it enjoys in Bhutan . For too long, Indian authorities have been asking Bhutan to act against these militants and close down their camps. But, this has had little visible effect on the Bhutanese authorities. Their much publicised understanding with the ULFA to reduce its activities has achieved little results on the ground. The NDFB, on the other hand, is reported to have declined to accede to such requests by the Bhutanse authority. 

 

 

India must now persuade Bhutan to act against these outfits. It needs be made aware of the economic and diplomatic repercussions of not heeding to India ’s request. Given the limitation of the Bhutanese security force personnel, even the plan of a covert operation by the Indian security forces needs to be given a serious thought. The ability of the terrorists to indulge in hit and run tactics must be disrupted by strengthening the intelligence network. This would also require effective border control machinery. Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi would like to build a boundary wall along the Indo-Bhutan border, which seems a far fetched idea. But there is urgent need to make the border less porous. 

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