Problem of Insurgency in Northeast: Looking Beyond Conspiracies
22 Nov, 2001 · 641
Bibhu Prasad Routray criticizes the union government’s attitude for blaming outside nations for the problem in the Northeast and suggests a revamp of the counter-insurgency strategies currently in use
The Defence Minister George Fernandes accused
Pakistan
once again of being responsible for terrorism in the Northeast and
Jammu and Kashmir
. The Home Minister and Prime Minister have made similar accusations. These statements and beliefs do not analyse the real problems afflicting the strategy to counter insurgency in the Northeast.
Assam
have expressed their reservations against the army operating independently, and favour assigning the State police a primary role in counter-insurgency operations. But the police during President’s rule in Manipur, for example, have shown little competence in maintaining law and order in the State. Thus, a clear framework is the need of the hour.
Previous attempts to deal with insurgent outfits by army operations have proved futile. The onus lies on the State administrations, but it needs to be emphasised that insurgency in the region has suited various people. The present day insurgent outfits are bereft of any ideology and have degenerated into an assemblage of criminals seeking financially secure lives by easy means. In spite of the fact that insurgency has ceased to command popular support in the region, it defies the prophecies of doom. The need, therefore, is to revamp the strategy adopted for dealing with the insurgent outfits.
The foremost task before the government is to clarify the nature of the problem. To date it is unclear whether insurgency in the region is a law and order problem to be handled by the State police forces or a grave threat to national security that requires the security forces. The lack of clarification, despite the presence of a large number of security forces in these States, creates avoidable friction between the police and the army. Some of the State governments like
There is a growing feeling among intellectuals in the region that the Northeast will be administratively much better off with the empowerment of traditional institutions; otherwise, opportunist forces masquerading as administrators or political leaders would only be strengthened. Innumerable cases of collusion between the politicians, the administration and the insurgents are grim reminders of these facts. The traditional institutions of the tribal population can play a meaningful role within the existing structures of governance.
Mizoram remains the only example of a peaceful solution to insurgency in the region. One would have expected the lessons learnt in that State to be practiced in various other conflict situations; but, nothing of that sort has happened. The peace process with the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) has become irrelevant by the government’s decision to involve non-Bodo groups in the peace process. Why the government decided to involve them at this late stage is beyond comprehension and has rightly been considered by the Bodos as a delaying strategy. The other peace process with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) proceeds endlessly with the outfit continuing with its depredations. Now a decision has been reached on a time frame of ‘one or two years’ to find a solution to the problem. The casualty in these protracted peace talks is not only the confidence of insurgents involved in the process but also that of the outfits sitting on the fence. It places a serious question mark on the government’s ability to carry the dialogue process to fruition.
The lack of a civil society initiative has been decried as a persistent drawback to crafting a policy for peace in the Northeast. The ‘active’ human rights organisations present a distorted view of the overall picture by only highlighting the abuses by the security forces. Other informal groupings prefer not to profess an anti-insurgent viewpoint out of fear. The government, for its part, has done little to instil confidence in these groups. The need is for talking every opportunity to involve the local populace in conflict resolution. Instead of attempts to impose a solution, this should emerge from the consent of the people.
Thus, the overall requirement is to look beyond the conspiracies of other nations and create a situation that negates a breeding ground for those strategies. A nation needs to fight its own war and policy makers need to have an inward looking attitude.
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