Negotiating with Terror: The Case of ULFA
07 Oct, 2001 · 595
Bibhu Prasad Routray argues that "while the military operations continue with ruthless intent, the promotion of a non-governmental body to shuttle between the outfit and the government could become a viable policy initiative"
The peacemakers and proponents of a military solution to insurgency in
Assam would agree on a negotiated settlement to the problem, although they might differ on the timing of this process. While the peacemakers would seek to talk their way through the defences of the insurgents, the latter would prefer military operations to precede a negotiation process forcing a weakened outfit to talk. However, following several attempts to bring the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) to the negotiating table, which failed to see the light of the day, the recent statement of the Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi that the government had received positive signals from the outfit to engage in a dialogue process appears to be just another political gimmick by his four month old regime less to address the problem, and more to influence particular constituencies.
Assam has diminished the probability of success. There are, however, occasions when the outfit has indicated its willingness to drop its preconditions. But intelligence sources and media reports suggest that a corresponding ‘go easy’ response by the government has been exploited by the ULFA to indulge in massive recruitment and extortion drives. After a while, the resurgent ULFA returns to a ‘no talks’ stance.
Assam ’s sovereignty. But such expressions are only symbolic and part of the rhetoric it indulges in regularly to grade the media headlines.
The protracted ULFA insurgency has given birth to a peculiar mindset in the State, as reflected in the approach of the current and previous regimes to solve the problem. While the previous Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) government led by Prafulla Kumar Mahanta was reportedly involved in a number of ‘secret killings’ targeting the ULFA cadres and their family members with the help of the surrendered ULFA (SULFA) members, the present Congress regime is perceived to be pursuing a soft policy towards the outfit. Beginning with its swearing in, the government has been talking of negotiations and unilateral cease-fire to bring the insurgents into the mainstream. It needs emphasis that the approaches exhibit a certain commonality, i.e. a belief in the perpetuity of insurgency in the State. Thus, they fall short of mitigating the problem and lay more emphasis on its containment.
ULFA, throughout its history of struggle for a ‘swadhin Asom’ (Independent Assam) has continued to resist entering a negotiation process. The conditionalities laid down by it, even before the initiation of a dialogue process, are themselves major impediments. Its insistence on the talks being held in a foreign land with third party mediation to decide the sovereignty of
The lack of transparency in initiation and the indulgence in the negotiation process with the outfit also sends out confusing signals. Brief mentions apart, neither the Chief Minister nor any of his cabinet colleagues have come forward to discuss these issues in public. Thus, such announcements become non-events and disappear as swiftly as their appearance. Such moves on the part of the government appear to be nothing more than image building exercises.
ULFA’s mouthpiece Freedom remains a regular and most articulate publication brought out by insurgent outfits in the northeast. It carries no indication whatsoever about any peace prospects. On the contrary, in response to the Chief Minister’s call for peace in May 2001, the ULFA labeled the regime as only ‘old wine in a new bottle’. On the occasion of it’s foundation day on
Apart from the recalcitrant insurgent outfit and an inept administration, what ails the peace process is the absence of an effective organization or people’s body capable of acting as a mediator between the outfit and the government. The non-government organizations in the State remain either front organizations of the outfits like the Manab Adhikar Sangram Samiti (MASS) or frivolous institutions incapable of winning the trust of the government or the outfit. Thus, suspicions persist and the mayhem continues.
A negotiation process with ULFA would require few basic essentials. While the military operations continue with ruthless intent, the promotion of a non-governmental body to shuttle between the outfit and the government could become a viable policy initiative. While the negotiators can chose to keep the whole process opaque, the political establishment would do well to desist from half-truths, which only adds to the complexities of the problem. An image building exercise should give way to a more serious approach to solving the problem.
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