India–Japan relations are special—Japan is the second country after Russia with whom India has annual bilateral summits. The two countries established this format in December 2006, when their relationship was elevated to a ‘Strategic and Global Partnership’. India also holds an annual 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue with Japan along with five other countries—the US, Australia, Russia, the UK, and Brazil. This shows how close India and Japan are to each other. The relationship is bipartisan, and both countries not only have a strong state-to-state connection but also hold goodwill among their peoples. Japan is arguably the most important partner in India’s story of economic liberalisation in the last three and a half decades. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s recent visit to India for the 16th India–Japan Annual Summit on 1–3 July 2026 is a continuation of this longstanding relationship.

During this year’s summit, Japan promised an investment of US$ 62 billion in India over the next ten years. The leaders of both countries also signed milestone agreements related to important domains such as economic security, energy resilience, and artificial intelligence. In a surprise move, India and Japan signed a pact to jointly develop defence technologies for the first time, which would be useful for ensuring the security of maritime routes as well as maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific. India wants Japan to build Mogami-class stealth frigates, naval radio antenna systems (UNICORN masts), and next-generation warship propulsion systems in India. The Japanese prime minister travelled with close to 150 business leaders, and their companies signed around 129 MoUs with Indian counterparts. Both prime ministers attended the India–Japan Joint Economic Forum, and also inaugurated a new Maruti manufacturing plant located in Kharkhoda, Haryana. Indian Prime Minister Modi lauded the fact that “nearly two-thirds of Suzuki’s cars worldwide are manufactured in India and are exported to more than 100 countries.”

Japan is eager to secure its technology pipelines in the semiconductor, artificial intelligence, and robotics sectors. It also wants stable, alternative suppliers for critical minerals and battery production, since China has imposed export restrictions in these domains. Further, Japan and India are exploring joint projects in areas such as clean energy, with a focus on green ammonia, biogas, and upstream oil and gas exploration. They intend to work together on the India–Japan Biogas Initiative, which is expected to lead to the establishment of a thousand biogas and organic fertilizer plants in different parts of India.

India, for its part, is interested in advanced technology transfers, investment in infrastructure, and gaining more localised manufacturing partners from Japan. India would like Japan to provide technical assistance and materials to domestic semiconductor fabrication facilities in India so that it can move higher in the semiconductor supply chain. New Delhi is keen that Tokyo not only continue lending financial and technical support to mega-projects such as the Mumbai–Ahmedabad high-speed rail line but also expedite it. Both are also interested in a bilateral arrangement to transact directly in Indian and Japanese currencies. India would like to see Japan continue investing in Northeast India for industrialisation and to build infrastructure and road networks, which could in the future match Chinese facilities on the other side of the border. India has also been looking to send around fifty thousand technical workers to Japan. Cooperation between the two countries may help stabilise semiconductor, pharmaceutical, and critical mineral supply chains.

Most of these bilateral arrangements are being deepened and broadened in the context of escalating Chinese aggression in recent years. China has added 40 Japanese entities to a restricted list, and is trying to choke Japan by denying it rare earth elements. China has also imposed a blanket ban on Japanese seafood. For India, while relations with China have been relatively stable recently, it is still a structural rival. The two countries have in addition faced moments of great policy pressure due to actions taken by the US under President Trump. Trump 2.0 levied unreasonable tariffs on India and Japan, such as the 100 per cent tariff on semiconductors from Japan. Further, Trump’s accusations of Japanese currency manipulation or insistence on burden-sharing to manage the expenses of having US forces in Japan are problematic as well. Trump’s threats to India—whether related to its engagement within BRICS or the diplomatic snubs since the India-Pakistan crisis in May 2025—can be viewed in the same light. In the above context, India and Japan feel that the trust between them must be enhanced.

While the Trump administration is not so keen on Quad and is openly talking about a G-2 with China, New Delhi and Tokyo feel that their bilateral relations as well as their joint naval exercise, the Japan–India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX), must hold the anchor for the Quad. Both countries have been doing this since 2012 by maintaining their focus on anti-submarine warfare, multi-discipline operations, and maritime security. Overall, rather than being merely a routine meeting between the leaders of the two countries, this year’s summit takes place in a context in which such bilateral interactions assume greater importance.

Dr. Sandip Kumar Mishra is Professor at the Centre for East Asian Studies in SIS, JNU, and Distinguished Fellow, IPCS.