Red Affairs
Debates within the Counter-LWE Policy
28 Oct, 2019 · 5627
Dr Bibhu Prasad Routray contextualises the debates on why terrorism occurs and the best way to deal with it in the context of left-wing extremism (LWE) and identifies key features of a successful counter-LWE policy.
On 14 October,
India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, speaking at the inaugural
session of the National Conference of Chiefs of Anti-Terror Squads/Special Task
Force organised by the National Investigation Agency (NIA), seemed to suggest
that if the media stops reporting incidents of terrorism, the latter would die
a swift death. Mr. Doval quoted former British Prime Minister, Margaret
Thatcher, in his defence. In addition, Mr. Doval touched upon several other
important aspects of an effective counter-terrorism (CT) approach, including
the need for judicial reform and a central anti-terror organisation. While such
proposals may serve as the beginning of yet another CT rejig in the country, the
NSA’s thesis brings into focus following debates on why terrorism occurs and
the best way to deal with it. The purpose of this column is to contextualise
the debates in the context of left-wing extremism (LWE) and identify key
features of a successful counter-LWE policy.
(i) Democracies and Terrorism: the
debate whether a totalitarian state or a democracy is better equipped to fight
terror is inconclusive. Until recently, scholars did consider democracies are
inherently prone to terrorism, as terrorists are able to exploit the openness
provided by such regimes. Especially following the watershed 9/11 attacks,
democracies, in the name of protecting themselves from terrorism, started
adopting laws and embracing practices which violated the very principles of
liberal democracy. Policy makers and practitioners talked openly about how a
free press, which provides a wide audience for acts of spectacular violence, do
provide the terrorists some sort of ‘strategic influence’. Individual states
attempted in vain to curb such press freedom.
Contrarian
views, however, express that democracies indeed have deterred terrorism. Since
democracies allow expression of opinion including dissent, in press or in
public forums, they take the wind off the sails of terrorism, which is
understood as form of a rebellion against the prevailing order. According to a scholar,
for instance, democracies indeed have a triple advantage vis-à-vis
undemocratic states. They suffer fewer attacks than other regime types, with a
lower rate of increase, and fewer fatalities. According to this view, regimes
that are essentially totalitarian or democracies that are inclined to adopt
totalitarian measures, must embrace openness in order to effectively fight
terrorism. While some degree of hardening of approach and curbs on personal
freedom are essential to deal with terrorist violence, a linear movement that
fancies getting rid of democratic principles could be counter-productive. It is
useful, therefore, to appreciate the strength of democratic principles as
critical constituents of an effective CT policy.
(ii) State Fragility and Terrorism: The destabilising
impact of terrorism on regions is a well-recognised fact. It is also true that
terrorism finds easy breeding ground in regions marked by absence or failure of
governance. Fragile states or misgoverned or ungoverned spaces within an
otherwise functioning state are more likely to be affected by terrorism than a
thriving and well governed region. Regions affected by LWE in India symbolise
this truism. To begin with, the model of alternate governance that the
extremists preach does not necessarily aim at replacing an existing order, but
is an attempt to supplant a model where none exists. As the will and capacity
of different states to implement governance measures increase, extremism has
receded. This may not be true in case of Kashmir’s externally supported
terrorism. However, several supporting evidences are available in LWE affected
states.
It is hence,
important, that bureaucracy is used as primary weapons to defeat extremism.
While this may not be possible in areas where extremism is well-entrenched and
will have to be achieved through security force action, areas that are either
extremism prone and where extremism has receded must witness implementation of
robust development initiatives. Such approaches can have far-reaching impact by
creating new stakeholders in development in fragile regions.
(iii) Information Vacuum and Perception Management: One of the
primary objectives of denying extremists media space is to ensure an
information vacuum. Since acts of terrorism is understood as directed at
terrorising and coercing people and finding sympathisers, zero or negligible
reporting of terrorist violence would enable the state to make troubled regions
appear peaceful and amplify the achievement of the security forces. However, in
addition to the fact that such a strategy will result in the projection of a
false peace, and may even lead to the prevalence of a false sense of
achievement, in an age of social and alternate media, even this objective would
be difficult to achieve.
With specific
reference to the LWE theatres, a large portion of on-ground happenings reach
the people of the region through either social media or alternate media like
community radio. Extremists have their own mechanisms of reaching out to their
constituencies. No amounts of curbs on the press, hence, would be able to
ensure an information vacuum. On the contrary, in the same way as states
imposing prohibition witness increasing levels of bootlegging and hooch
tragedies, curbs on media may even promote greater circulation of fake news
defeating the very purpose for which restrictions were imposed. What the
government should alternatively do is to establish media centres that makes
authentic news available to the press on a real time basis. Mr. Doval underlined
the need for a ‘transparent’ media policy that takes the media ‘into confidence’.
Even as the security situation
has significantly improved in the LWE affected states, official policies remain
a mix of effective and avoidable measures. Prohibiting the media from reporting
on the extremist violence would certainly belong to the latter category. The
larger debates should remain the guiding principles for official policies,
rather than short-term measures.
Dr Bibhu Prasad Routray is Director of Mantraya, and a Visiting Fellow and columnist with IPCS.