Nagaland: Opportunity to Exploit Fortuitous Advantages
28 Aug, 2001 · 557
Bibhu Prasad Routray explains why the NSCN-IM cannot continue their dialect of violence and suggests how India can capitalize on this development
The apprehensions underlying the government’s July 27, 2001 decision to restrict the cease-fire with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) only to Nagaland was the prospect of renewed insurgency. Statements from various sections of the insurgent outfit carried such threats. Going back to the jungles and resuming the bush war seemed the only option available with the insurgents. However, this seemed to miss a fine point by overstressing the hawkish nature of the insurgents. The peace that continues to obtain in Nagaland in the aftermath of the government’s volte face seems to suggest this.
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agreement suggests a transient ethnic cohesion in the State. At another level these people could become supporters of the NSCN-IM, the self-proclaimed flag-bearer of the Naga cause. Thus, with a broad support base, for the first time in its history, the NSCN-IM can claim to be speaking for a majority of Nagas. They are passionate about a Nagaland that transcends the officially demarcated boundaries into the Naga dominated areas of the neighbouring states. Organisations like the Naga Hoho known for their neutrality now speak in favour of the agreement. The NSCN-K and the other NNC factions are being forced by exigencies to support the extension of the cease-fire.
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agreement. The only statement of consequence is that of Chairman Isak who, on August 14, 2001 , flayed the Union government for reneging from the cease-fire agreement. Statements like that of A. Z. Zami, Secretary of the outfit’s Steering Committee on August 9, 2001 , reiterated the norms of peace and a negotiated settlement of the dispute. Any call for a resumption of violence is only directed to a specific segment of audience.
The cease-fire exercise has worked well for the NSCN-IM. Whether this was a calculated move is debatable. But the way Naga civil society has responded to this exercise must have encouraged the outfit’s leadership.
The euphoria generated about a ‘greater Nagaland’ being formed has improved the image of the NSCN-IM. This dream transcends the barriers created between individual terrorist organisations. At least three resolutions have been passed in the State Assembly since 1993 supporting Greater Nagaland. The common people in Nagaland, irrespective of their ethnic divisions, and loyalties towards individual terrorist organisations like the NSCN-IM, National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) or various factions of the Naga National Council (NNC) i.e., the NNC-Federal, NNC-Adino, NNC-Merupfu, the Naga Hoho and so on believe in the goal of a greater Nagaland. However, their ethnic divisions created obvious barriers to their speaking with one voice. This gap seems to have been bridged to a large extent now, at least for the time being. The differences on ethnic lines between the Tangkhuls, Angamis, Semas, for the present at least, have been pushed to the background.
Thus, the massive rallies in Nagaland favouring continuation of the July 14
This is a ‘dream come true’ scenario for any insurgent outfit. The example of the successful culmination of the Mizo insurgency looms large in the minds of all insurgent outfits in the northeast. Intentionally or unintentionally, the NSCN-IM now finds itself close to becoming politically acceptable. It goes without saying that any resumption of guerilla wars would forego all tactical advantage the NSCN-IM has managed to acquire.
It needs being remembered that insurgency by its very nature is a brief phase that seeks fulfillment of an attainable goal. Within its limited life span, the insurgent leadership needs to take prudent decisions that combine concessions, compromises and assertions as need arises. Overdependence on involves violence tends to produce a backlash that has a telling effect on the morale of its cadres. Lack of support in the civil society makes these fighters look like a group of troublemakers.
This explains the restrained statements emanating from the second level NSCN-IM leadership criticising the government’s backtracking from the
The present imbroglio has the potential for creating a broader support base for the NSCN-IM. It would not be surprising if its leadership now agrees to conduct talks on Indian soil. It would also not be surprising if the outfit agrees to accepting a political role within the Indian Constitutional set up. This would suit Indian policy makers. They would now deal with an outfit, which would be willing to stick to the path of negotiation. A coming together of mutual interests, thus, bears the potential to usher peace into the volatile region.
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