Afghanistan
Where is Kabul Headed?
09 Jan, 2019 · 5541
Maryam Baryalay and Abdul Mateen Imran contextualise recent developments pertaining to Afghanistan's peace process and politics.
Afghanistan is gearing up for a possible political
overturn. The ongoing peace talks between the US and the Taliban; talks of
withdrawal of 7000 US troops; the three-month push-back of the Afghan
presidential election; and the appointment of two staunch anti-Pakistan
politicians – Amrullah Saleh and Asadullah Khalid – as the ministers of interior
and defense respectively, are post-signs indicative of strategic changes in the
US policy towards the country, as well as Afghanistan's future path.
Dissecting the Events
With the onset of the US launched two-party talks with
the Taliban without the government of Afghanistan (GoA) at the behest of the
Taliban’s insistence and rumors of a possible US troops withdrawal in late
summer 2018 became an accepted fact by late autumn 2018. As the peace-talks
headed by US Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad began in Qatar and
continued without achieving any tangible outcome, the GoA realised it had to make a move sooner
than later to gain a footing in an ever-looming situation of Kabul's
disadvantage. The US’s bilateral talks with the Taliban weakened the GoA's
position and placed Afghan President Ashraf Ghani in a precarious position,
discrediting his government in the region and especially with its enemy, the
Taliban.
Days ago, the Afghan presidential election was postponed
by three months citing the need for additional preparation time for the polls. Many
inside Afghanistan view this as a US attempt to pressurise the GoA by not
financing the elections, so that
the GoA accepts
the interim-government solution proposed (indirectly) by the Taliban as a
starting point for any further steps. If such an interim government comes to
be, it would enable Washington to realise its much sought after ‘dignified exit’ from Afghanistan and
the credit of succeeding in reaching a peace deal with the Taliban.
However, the GoA and the incumbent establishment in Kabul
would be the main losers of such a scenario. The rationale of this scenario – a
US imposed interim-government with the Taliban – has all relevant
Afghan-stakeholders inside and outside the Afghan government so anxious that
major opposition formations literally disintegrated at the prospect of such an
outcome. Key opposition figures have either stepped aside or signaled possible
alignment with a second-term Ghani government. The alternative, namely the
possibility of an interim government with the Taliban (and the insofar absent clarity regarding the capacity in which they will join, given the
unpredictability of decisions coming from the US) has undoubtedly become an unfavorable
option for the Kabul political elite.
The appointments Saleh and Khalid, both former heads
of Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security, must also be viewed in conjunction
with President Ghani attempting to consolidate his position at home. With the
appointment of these men, President Ghani has sent an clear message to all the neighbouring
countries that either have or are attempting to initiate their own bilateral
talks with the Taliban (Iran being the latest in the list) that any such
attempts at peace will not be acceptable to the GoA, and must not be held without
the GoA. The move has already generated some positive changes in public
perception – something President Ghani
desperately needs given the internal pressure of growing public discontent and the
overall deteriorating security situation. Both
ministers are relatively popular in their ethnic communities, most prominently
for their anti-Taliban and anti-Pakistan stances. Moreover, the appointment of
the two – one Tajik and one Pashtun – is indeed killing two birds with one
stone as it also serves as a silencer to President Ghani's Pashtun and Tajik
critics and competitors. While the GoA does want to strike a peace deal with
the Taliban, it wants to do this on its own terms, most likely on the terms
they got in the peace deal with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami.
Likely Scenario
The current trajectory does not
indicate significant changes in the overall political and security situation in
the short term. While the usual winter lull will witness a slight decrease in
fighting in the provinces and major population centers, high profile
installations will remain a potential target, especially in Kabul. This is
because the Taliban will attempt to demonstrate their resilience and fighting
morale, and the Islamic State ‘Khorasan Province’ will try to just show that
they exist. In the meantime, the Afghan National Security Forces headed by the
two new ministers will try to make positive inroads and gains to demonstrate
the capability and capacity of the forces. The Ministry of Interior has already
introduced significant disciplinary measures concerning the national police
forces. These and other steps with regard to new appointments or dismissals in
Kabul or the provinces are all connected to consolidating President Ghani's
position and reelection chances. In this backdrop, the peace talks and the
prospect of a possible peace deal will continue to take reverse steps until the
presidential election is conducted, mainly because the political elite in Kabul
have to align and rearrange themselves with new realities that will decide
their fate.
Maryam Baryalay is a Berlin-based security
analyst. Abdul Mateen Imran is a Kabul-based political and security researcher.