Naga-Cease-Fire Extension: Clash of Imagined Homelands

25 Jul, 2001    ·   529

Bibhu Prasad Routray says the militant outfits would tread a cautious path in resisting both fratricidal warfare and dialogue for peace


Bibhu Prasad Routray
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Visiting Fellow
As the Union government debates over the fall out of a possible backtrack from the June 13 cease-fire extension with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), the Indian Northeast stands on the threshold of a possible phase of turbulence. This time it won’t be led by the people but the insurgent outfits themselves. In what is silently emerging as a classic case of the overlapping of the imagined homelands, the outfits claimed to be fighting for over the years, this peripheral fall out of the ill-advised decision of the government might just prove to be the harbinger of peace in the region.

 

 

The demand for ‘Nagalim’ (Greater Nagaland), which the June 13 Agreement fulfils for all practical purposes, threatens to make inroads into the so-called ‘Naga-inhabited’ areas of Assam , Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. The proposed Nagalim which spreads across an estimated 1,20,000 sq. km. in contrast to the present State of Nagaland with an area of 16,527 sq. km, not only constitutes a challenge on the territorial demarcation of the States but also threatens the very identity of the non-Naga population. The decision by the Union government, and the resultant exultation exhibited by the Naga bodies including the NSCN-IM, has begun to be perceived as a threat by the other terrorist outfits operating within the ambit of the proposed Nagalim. 

 

 

The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) operating in parts of Assam , through the July 17 issue of its mouthpiece, Freedom, ridiculed the idea of Nagalim and opined that ‘history should not be distorted only to satisfy the chauvinistic ego.’ Terming the decision to extend the cease-fire ‘a suicidal act’, the ULFA expressed hope that the ‘Naga leaders would review their stand concerning their most talked Nagalim over others teritories’. Siginificantly, this is one of the rarest of occasions when the ULFA chose to criticise its former mentor. 

 

 

The secret behind ULFA’s outburst against the NSCN-IM’s agreement with the Union government is directed towards achieving twin objectives. Taking up an issue, which every Assamese is passionate about, ULFA attempts in an image building exercise to replenish its declining base among the masses. More importantly, the recent expression is also an attempt to halt further erosion of its area of operation, which has already been restricted to specific pockets of Assam as a result of persistent army operations.  

 

 

In contrast to ULFA’s open criticism of the NSCN-IM’s move, murmurs of dissent have started surfacing in the Naga-inhabited districts of Assam- Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills. The Dima Halim Daoga (DHD), a terrorist outfit, fighting for an independent home land of the Diamasa tribe in the North Cachar Hills, stands threatened of being stripped of its objective as a result of the extension in the area of operation of the NSCN-IM. An identical case is that of the United People’s  Democratic  Solidarity (UPDS). This terrorist outfit operating in the Karbi Anglong district of Assam proposes to establish a ‘ Karbi State ’ which now runs into a clash with the Nagalim. In the event of a final go ahead for the Nagalim, both UPDS and DHD will find themselves stranded bereft of any objective. However, what has so far prevented both the outfits from criticising the NSCN-IM is their proximity with the outfit. Since their establishment, both the outfits have excessively depended upon the NSCN-IM for training and arms. Both the outfits are used by the NSCN-IM for fund-raising activities. It is their relative weakness and dependence over the parent outfit that rules out any open rebel against it.

 

 

There is no such restriction over the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the Meitei outfit in Manipur, t. It finds a solemn reason to challenge the NSCN-IM for the latter’s incursion into its territory, even though at present, it would refrain from interpreting it this way. Any organised opposition to the Naga outfit, in addition to protecting its proposed homeland, would increase its acceptance among the common populace. The bete noire of the NSCN-IM, the NSCN-K has all the reasons to oppose the NSCN-IM’s expansionist move. Its cautious welcome of the cease-fire extension not withstanding, there have been at least two fratricidal clashes between these outfits. 

 

 

The comparative compulsions and the common feeling of isolation, as a result of a perceived expansionist policy of the NSCN-IM presents a scenario when these outfits find themselves in a common forum in opposing the cease-fire. Alternate scenarios emerge out of such possible realignment of insurgent outfits. First scenario is that of a grand fratricidal warfare between the alliance headed by the ULFA and the NSCN-IM. While, any attempt to predict the course of events might prove futile, it goes without saying that irrespective of the outcome, such an eventuality would only add to the culture of violence prevailing in the region.

 

 

The other outcome, of course, is a possible rethinking on part of the insurgent outfits in their strategy of targeting the edifices of governance and opting for peace through a negotiated settlement of disputes. The fear of eliminating each other in the grand fight might induce the outfits to abjure violence and seek protection of their threatened feelings through a dialogue with the government. At the same time, such outcomes will also be affected by the decision of the government and the reactions of the people to any such decision. While the government is expected to indulge in a lot of deliberation before arriving at a decision, the outfits too would tread a cautious path resisting both fratricidal warfare and dialogue for peace.

 

 

 

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