Naga Cease-Fire Extension
16 Jun, 2001 · 506
Bibhu Prasad Routray feels that the extension of cease-fire may end up adding to the complexities rather than providing any solution
With the extension of the four year old cease-fire between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) for one more year, the doubts hovering over the minds of the policy makers seem to have disappeared. However, for the people of the northeast, this has only added to the existing complexities.
July 31, 2001 , has received a fresh lease of life not only in terms of duration, but also in terms its area of implementation. It now stands extended to the Naga-inhabited areas of the entire northeast. This new addition makes the agreement a multilateral deal, bringing in new players to the arena. Until recently the peace process included two players - the Government of India and the NSCN-IM. Hence forth, the affected parties, i.e. the three neighbouring States of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh with significant pockets of Naga population, will have a significant say over the non-delimitation of the area of the cease-fire arrangement.
Assam
has voiced his concern at the unilateral decision. In Manipur various political parties, human rights organisations, non governmental oganisations and student bodies have criticised the move. The reactions in Arunachal Pradesh are expected to be on similar lines.
January 13, 2001 , the security forces accused the outfit of showing scanty respect for the ground rules. On occasions the vehicles carrying NSCN-IM leaders were found to be carrying weapons. Media reports in June also reported the existence of a thriving arms bazaar in the Golaghat district of Assam with the nexus of NSCN-IM, the Karbi National Volunteers (KNV), an
Assam
based insurgent group and some foreign terrorist outfits.
April 28, 2001 the government had declared a one-year cease-fire with the NSCN-K. In May efforts were initiated to pursuade the NNC to sign a similar deal. It is difficult to predict the future course of action in view of the reigning hostilities between these groups. Granting of concession to one might lead to demands for concessionc by the others.
The cease-fire agreement, due to end on
Given the fact that these states, on numerous occasions, have vehemently opposed the extension of the cease-fire into their territories makes implementation of the agreement difficult. Such an extension indicates an enlargement of the trouble zone. It extends insurgent activities, extortion and influx of illegal arms into the already insurgency-marred states. It thus, remains a matter of surprise that the Union Government before doling out a cease-fire largesse to NSCN-IM chose to ignore the concerns of these three States. On the other hand, it has admitted an unofficial attempt by the outfit to redefine the territorial demarcation of the States. The chief minister of
In spite of the ongoing cease-fire since July 1997, peace has continued to elude Nagaland with sporadic incidents taking place at the insistence of the NSCN-IM and the lesser known, National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K). Even after the signing of the revised cease-fire agreement with the NSCN-IM on
The last of the incidents apart from proving the utter contempt of the outfit for the mutually agreed principles, revealed its attempt to coerce Indian government into accepting its long standing demand. It also indicates the inherent danger attaching a stamp of legality to the outflow of a regional conflict into adjacent regions. It is possible that according to the agreed cease-fire rules, the outfit might stop indulging in activities such as attacks, high way hold ups, extortion etc. in the neighbouring states. However, given the track record of the outfit in nurturing infant insurgent movements in various parts of the northeast, there is the danger of the outfit initiating a proxy war through one of these lesser known outfits. The greatest danger of them all is the acceptance of the present demand ultimately leading to the demand for a ‘Greater Nagaland’ (Nagalim) consisting of all the Naga inhabited areas of the entire northeast.
The agreement also adds a twist to the comprehensive effort of the Indian Government to drive all the three Naga insurgent groups, the NSCN-IM, the NSCN-K and the Naga National Council (NNC) into a peace agreement. On
The arrangement leaves several important questions unanswered. How do the security forces battling the other insurgent outfits distinguish between the NSCN-IM and non-NSCN-IM terrorists? How does the Union Government plan to end the internecine clashes between the NSCN-K and the NSCN-IM? Won’t this move serve as a precedent for other outfits who might attempt to force the government into a favourable truce? What will be the approach of the government towards the NSCN-K and the Naga National Council (NNC) who were also to be roped into an agreement in recent months?
Lastly, why did the government take so long to take such a step? After all this demand was believed to have been a bargain deal in the January 2001 meeting for finalising the revised ground rules. The only positive contribution of the four year long cease-fire with the NSCN-IM was a series of regular meetings, used by the outfit mainly for the purpose of deriving international media attention rather than striving for peace. Thus, this current agreement for a cease-fire may end up adding to the complexities rather than providing any solution.
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