Border Clash between India and Bangladesh: Analysing the Bangladeshi Reaction

11 May, 2001    ·   494

Bibhu Prasad Routray analyses the domestic reaction in Bangladesh to the clashes at the Indo-Bangladesh border


Bibhu Prasad Routray
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Visiting Fellow
Elections in South Asian countries bring out jingoism in the masses, the ruling and opposition parties. It provides the nation an opportunity to commit itself to a host of basic issues, whilst some of them are utilized to whip up patriotic passions. 

 

 

Bangladeshi politics is distinguished by at least two streams of thought regarding its bilateral relations with India . While the opposition BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party) projects itself as being pro-nationalist and anti-Indian, the second group, represented by the ruling Awami League, presents a pan-South Asian posture, which accommodates a friendly relationship with India. In the post-border crisis scenario, the first group has managed to stick to its stance more closely than ever. For the other group, the incident created inherent embarrassments due to its pro-India foreign policies and thus, forced it to adopt postures that brought it closer to the first group. A climate of competitive belligerence made the situation more complicated.

 

 

For the opposition BNP, the incident could not have come at a more opportune time. The protests of Khaleda Zia against the ‘unprovoked attack’ which ‘tantamounts to an aggression’ by the ‘miscreants from across the border’ was also an attack on the ruling BNP for pursuing ‘a subservient foreign policy’. This rhetoric was reiterated in rallies and demonstrations that were converted into anti-Indian platforms.

 

 

While the opposition attempted to create an anti-Indian hysteria in the country, the latter responded by controlled reaction which reiterating its commitment to Bangladeshi territorial integrity. Thus, the initial Dhaka explanation that the BSF (Border Security Force) personnel had been killed by angry villagers, when they had strayed into Bangla territory, gave way to complimentary statements lauding the BDR (Bangladeshi Rifles) for ‘protecting the sovereignty of the country’. The analysis of the incident being ‘the work of a rogue general or the outcome of local opportunism’ paved the way for declaring the dead BDR personnel as martyrs and the awarding of compensation to their families by the Prime Minister herself. 

 

 

In the obtaining situation, the options available with the ruling party were quite limited. The army in Bangladesh has considerable political clout and, consequently, it is difficult for the political parties to ignore its influence. Thus, military-bashing as an option does not exist. Hence, the Bangladeshi Foreign Secretary, Syed Moazzem Ali, was forthright in dismissing the Indian contention that the BDR had committed aggression in the Roumari sector without the knowledge of the government. Any rapprochement with her Indian counterparts was sure to cost Hasina electoral support among the masses, in the hyped up electoral battle. Thus, a public statement sympathising with the dead BSF personnel was ruled out. Accordingly, the Foreign Secretary not only rejected speculations of either the Prime Minister apologising to her Indian counterparts, but also played down her eventual visit to India to ‘explain her position’. What, however, was allowed was a series of flag meetings between the BDR and BSF commanders to diffuse the tension.

 

 

The BDR, unlike the BSF, is officered by Bangla army personnel, who reportedly supported the BDR hostilities along the borders with Meghalaya and Assam . Bangladesh came out with the figures that as many as 415 civilians and 10 BDR personnel had been killed by BSF personnel in the last 25 years within a week of the incident. It also emphasised that ‘in most cases BSF did not return the bodies of the Bangladeshi nationals’. It was also a moment of glory for the nation’s armed forces who need to justify their existence. 

 

 

The media, too, fuelled the anti-India sentiments. They traced the origin of the trouble to the construction of a road by the BSF in no-man’s land on the border, where both nations claim villages that are in each other’s control. Prominent coverage was also given to the Foreign Minister, Abdus Samad Azad’s statement when he said, “We are proud of the performance of our border security forces in protecting the territorial integrity”. Reports such as, ‘In Boraibari, it was Undeclared War’ (Independent, April 27, 2001), ‘Boraibari - India’s Bay of Pigs’ (Independent, Apr 29, 2001) sought to project the incident as a Bangladeshi victory over the Indian army. The tasteless image of a dead BSF soldier being carried by Bangladeshi villagers received front-page coverage.

 

 

Analysis shows that the incident attained a critical proportion but because of the lack of a potent civil society capable of countering the rhetoric. The intellectuals reiterated the stale demands for a ‘full implementation of the Indira-Mujib Agreement of 1974’. It is hoped that after the elections a more sober Bangladesh will have time to deliberate and reach conclusions, which the present atmosphere has not allowed it to do.

 

 

 

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