Nepal under Maoist Threat

20 Apr, 2001    ·   490

Brig Chandra B Khanduri comments on the rise of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal


"Why can’t we use the army here,” said the Nepalese Prime Minister GP Koirala on April 10, "when it can serve in different countries as peace keeper?” Koirala was reacting to the recent Maoist guerilla attacks at Police posts of Ramukot and Namule in the Dailekh district. He was also referring to a lacunae in the monarchial democracy of Nepal where an elected government has  its hands tied regarding employing the RNA, which remains under the direct control of King Birendra. 

 

 

 

Over the years, this strategically placed country between China and India faces major internal threats to its security emanating from economic depredation, rioting, anarchy and rebellions led by political leaders. In 1951-52, Dr K I Singh’ guerillas of the Communist Raksha Parishad led a rebellion that spread into the Terai. When caught and imprisoned, his guerillas freed him from jail at Kathmandu , and he fled to Tibet . Similar insurrections followed at irregular intervals, until the king later throttled the democratic processes of the Nepalese Congress. Their rebels targeted police posts at Koilabas, Bhajang and Lamjung, besides the Terai But Dailekh district was then the centre of insurgency as it has become since 1996 because the region west of it remains least developed and the old feudal system still survives here.

 

 

At the time of writing, the causalities inflicted by the Maoists on policemen and civilians are over 1,700 killed, including 350 policemen, of whom 69 were massacred in two recent incidents. The immediate demands of the Maoists is for ‘release of their jailed leaders and end to police repression.”

 

 

The Nepalese Government has thus far employed the 10,000 strong Special Police Force (SPF), without much success. They lack mobility by helicopters and radio communications, but also training to confront the Maoist guerillas, who have developed a better intelligence system. Although a three million dollar re-equipment programme by the Government would see the force equipped with 7.62 mm Israeli Galil assault rifles and better 5.56 mm rifles and lighter mortars, long range radio sets and so on, the SPF will need to be motivated and better-led to combat the guerillas. However, learning from our own experience in North East and J&K, handling and liquidating them would demand a larger force level of security forces, including the RNA, besides the political will, a monarchial nod, a sophisticated psy war to win the hearts and minds of the people.

 

 

The RNA is a better organized force now of about 60,000 combat troops organized into 10 brigade groups with the ability to add another three to four brigades from its 44 Independent companies. Having been trained by the Indian Army’s Military Mission since 1952, and international exposure as part of the UN forces and action against the Khampas in 1974, the RNA is an effective force. If employed against the guerillas it could yield good results to prove the way to political solution. But it has very limited heliborne lift capability of two companies, and would require to augment this substantially to be effective against the nimble-footed guerillas in the mountain region of Karnali and Kali Anchals. That is where the Indian Government could help the Nepalese Government. 

 

 

Our ‘Special Relationship’ with Nepal occasionally gets tested. Whilst direct involvement is neither in the spirit of our Treaty of Peace & Friendship nor strategically desirable, it is not inopportune to render material assistance to our Nepalese friends in need.

 

 

The overall strategy devised by the Nepalese Governments should aim at finding a political solution to Maoist insurrection through reconciliation, economic development, and meeting the genuine exceptions of the people. Unfortunately, democracy and political stability have thus far yielded no tangible results that the common man could proud off .

 

 

 

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