Leading Towards Sino-Indian Detente

30 Dec, 2000    ·   447

Brig Chandra B Khanduri suggests that the Government should build up public opinion and parliamentary support for the various options it could pursue to settle the Sino-Indian border dispute
The Chinese are reported to have sent their maps of the Sino-Indian border to the MEA. This is a sequel to the earlier agreements on the LAC and CBMs of 1993 and 1996. It is also learnt that while the Chinese accept the 1914 MacMahon line for the Arunachal and UP-Tibet they follow the 1899 Macartney-MacDonald Line for the border in Ladakh. This line conforms to the boundary claim of the Chinese west of the Aksai Chin- Xinjiang road, running generally east of Demchok-Chang La-Lake Pangong-east of the Karakoram. Even the official Chinese maps have begun to show only the Aksai Chin salient as disputed, ignoring their earlier claims to Tawang.

 

 

For the Chinese the Aksai Chin Highway has acquired enormous strategic significance as it leads to the old silk Route, its nuclear testing site of Lop Nur the oil and gas resources in the Takli-mikan Desert in Xinjiang. The highway is also the main logistics artery to its four armies deployed in Tibet and Xinjiang. The hope of changing its alignment in the overall Sino-Indian boundary dispute might be farfetched but is not improbable. 

 

 

The Chinese sprang another surprise over India when in connivance with Pakistan , it built the strategic
Karakoram Highway
 through the 3,000 Sq Km Shaksagam Valley in POK. As part of a larger Sino-Pak collusion, it links Tibet and Xinjiang with Gilgit and thereafter Islamabad India has to negotiate its boundary settlement with China in the light of these two ground realities. The Chinese may be generous and accept certain minor changes in the existing claim line in Ladakh. There has been a millennium shift in China ’s vision of the 21st Century. It has prioritised it larger problems at home and modulated the clamour for annexation of Taiwan apart from inflexible stand on the boundary disputes; it sees a big demographic challenge as its population is expected to rise to 1.6 bn in the next 30 years, the widening gulf between the rich and poor the need for economic restructuring and so on. The Chinese regime seems more attuned move to settling their disputes. Its overall satisfactory status despite internal resistance is responsible for its more genial position of give and take. 

 

 

Settlement of Sino-Indian is also in India ’s interest. Our challenges are no less than those facing the Chinese although India , is militarily strong and is capable of providing of dissuasive deterrence against China besides handling Pakistan . While it will be counter productive to revert to the pre-1962 argument on the boundary aligment in Ladakh, India could:

 

 

·                     Insist on a No-Man’s- Land of 10 to 20 Km between our LAC and the Chinese forward line of deployment. 

 

 

·                     We could insist upon movement of our pilgrims to Kaiilash and Mansarovar from both Ladakh and Uttaranchal, if not seek the transfer of the enclave to India , on religious cum spiritual grounds.

 

 

·                     On these adjustments, India could ask for and sign a treaty on ground rules for maintenance of force levels, grazing rights, situation update, trans border migration et al.

 

 

The Government will do well if it built up public opinion and parliamentary support for the various options it could pursue to finally settle this border dispute. 

 

 

 

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