Plebiscite to Engagement: The New U.S Outlook Towards Kashmir

30 Dec, 2000    ·   446

Parama Sinha Palit says the present US policy of non-commitment on Kashmir can be traced to the evolving contours of its foreign policy in the post Cold War
Parama Sinha Palit
Since the partition of the Indian subcontinent, Kashmir has been a source of friction between India and Pakistan . The mutual conflict over the issue spread beyond the confines of South Asia becoming one of the several points of discord between the US and USSR. The earlier US stance on Kashmir was a result of the broader objective of restraining Soviet influence in the region. India ’s proximity to the USSR led to American patronage of Pakistan on Kashmir as a natural corollary of the Cold War dynamics. As a nation, Pakistan was crucial to the US in determining the balance of power in South Asia . Its strategic location, in terms of links with the Middle East and Central Asia , made it a geo-politically sensitive entity and shaped the history of superpower intervention in South Asia . 

 

 

Historically, Pakistan has always questioned Kashmir ’s accession, raising the issue in various international fora for garnering the support of the international community. Its demands were backed by the US on different occasions at the UN Security Council. However, the decade of the 90s saw things changing. In recent years, the US has gradually distanced itself from the Pakistani demand of plebiscite in Kashmir in favour of bilateral negotiations. 

 

 

While the collapse of the USSR has considerably diluted Pakistan ’s strategic significance for the US , sweeping economic reforms have converted India into a land of substantial promise for US commercial interests.  The resultant outcome has been a more open and friendly American policy towards India . The earlier US policy of zero sum dynamics has made way for a more rational strategy of engagement in the Indian subcontinent. 

 

 

Apart from commercial interests, terrorism has emerged as a common concern for both India and the US . In October 1997, the US Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering, underlined the resolve of both nations in fighting terrorism  “whether it is sponsored from the moon or from any other corner”. Since then major initiatives have been taken by both countries in the matter. The US has declared the allegedly Pakistan-funded Harkat Ul Ansar as a terrorist outfit. It has also pledged full support of the G-8 to India ’s proposal for an international convention on terrorism under the aegis of UN.

 

 

Terrorism in Kashmir continues unabated. The role of the Taliban and Afghan militants in promoting violence in the state is now well recognized. The Indo-US joint initiative on terrorism indicates America ’s willingness to co-operate with India . In this regard, the US has indicated that it is seeking the support of major countries for strengthening the UN sanctions against Afghanistan . The initiatives, if not aborted, can definitely impact the rising tide of militancy in Kashmir .

 

 

The American policy of downplaying all demands of self-determination in Kashmir was evident in the almost complete lack of reaction to the recent autonomy proposal of the Jammu and Kashmir legislature. Except for Stephen P Cohen’s dismissive reaction (calling it a “two steps forward – two steps backward” development) no official views were offered in the matter. 

 

 

Politically, however, Kashmir continues to remain a stalemate. Possibilities of mediation have arisen twice in the recent past. The first occasion, entailing a call for ceasefire by the Hizbul Mujahideen in July this year, was short-lived. A few days back, India has again set the ball rolling by announcing ceasefire during the month of Ramzan. Though Pakistan has responded positively, a lot more has to happen before the stage is set for fruitful talks. Like on the earlier occasion, the US has appreciated the latest Indian gesture too.

 

 

The present US policy of non-commitment on Kashmir can be traced to the evolving contours of its foreign policy in the post Cold War, globalising world. As world leaders in technology and information, US can gain significantly from the opportunities arising from globalisation. But for doing so, economic considerations must become predominant in bilateral relations. This cannot happen unless sensitive issues like Kashmir take a backseat. While autonomous developments in Kashmir are beyond the US control, the least it can do for helping its cause is to be non-committal on Kashmir . 

 

 

Supporting Pakistan , and thereby lending credibility to its traditional demand for annexation of Kashmir , doesn’t gel with the current non-confrontationist strands of the US policy. The increasing mutual interests between the US and India underline the growing significance of the latter in the US perspective. In his recent farewell visit to India , Karl Inderfurth reiterated the intention of both nations to take forward the Dialogue Architecture instituted by President Clinton during his visit, irrespective of a new administration in Washington . A pro-Pakistan US stand on Kashmir at this juncture can only be counterproductive. 

 

 

All these however, is not to suggest that Pakistan ceases to figure from the US list of priorities. Despite strong evidence, US has refrained from declaring Pakistan a terrorist state. President Clinton’s brief stopover in Pakistan earlier this year also indicates US willingness to keep open the channels of communication. Notwithstanding military rule and better ties with India , the US can’t write off Pakistan due to its geo-political significance. American action, or the lack of it in Kashmir , must be conditioned accordingly.

 

 

 

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