Both China and India realise that as neighbours they must coexist, hence there is a new willingness to mend bilateral relations. However, this willingness is tempered by the lack of existing trust between the two. India has a hangover from the 1962 conflict and China is wary of the Dalai Lama’s government-in –exile in India. 

On the Indian side, China is as a major conventional and nuclear threat to India’s security. The unresolved border issue keeps this mistrust alive. Since 1962 China has been consistently villified  in India.  It is necessary to look at the 1962 conflict in perspective and take stock of the political and military failures on the Indian side. Nehru neglected the first rule of international relations when he assumed that extending a hand of friendship towards China meant no vigilance to secure India’s borders with China. Further Nehru’s personal disillusionment with China became part of official policy which has since continued. This is not to say that there is no military threat from China. In fact it is necessary to have a balanced approach towards threat perception and general bilateral relations between the two countries. The insistence on an all- or- none approach is obviously unwise.

It is vital to understand China’s present day goals in South Asia to construct an effective China policy. China wishes to have peaceful relations with all its neighbours as it needs to focus attention on internal matters like its development and tackling the social unrest caused by hard economic choices. Though China does not eschew the use of force as an option to solve its disputes, its current approach towards India is not belligerent. A working relationship with China along the same lines as pursued by the US would be practical. A section of the US establishment believes that by magnifying the China threat they might end up actually creating one. India too needs to pay attention to this.

It is also widely believed in India that since India and China are developing economies hence they are not complementary. However, it is possible and essential to locate economic areas where they can cooperate. This is the most effective way to build a broad-based relationship between the two that can mitigate the hostility generated on other fronts. 

India needs to take a firm stand on nuclear proliferation by China to Pakistan and provide proof for its allegation. This is one area where India must remain vigilant whilst improving relations with China.  China has denied aiding Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes despite ample proof to the contrary. India must highlight this in international arms control fora in the context of its national and regional security concerns. These objectives can only be achieved if India articulate its security concerns vis-a-vis China in clear terms. The latest statement of the Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister, Mukut Mithi that Chinese troops were “unknowingly” violating the Sino-Indian border for the past few months is a classic example of the fuzzy stand India has taken to avoid treading on Chinese toes. This is not to argue that we throw all caution to the winds and go down the George Fernandes route but to say that threat perception needs to be balanced against the effort to mend fences with China. And this can only be done if we recognise that a problem exists regarding the border. The two countries must agree on a time bound programme to work out a mutually agreeable solution to this problem.  This requires an understanding of our national security concerns at home before we negotiate with the Chinese.  And the first step towards doing that is to put the past firmly behind us.