The Nuclear Priority

23 Jun, 2000    ·   370

Arpit Rajain argues that if India has to go down the nuclear road, then a number of transparency measures aimed at instilling confidence, increasing credibility, avoiding miscommunication and clear policy statements are needed
Arpit Rajain
Two years ago when the South Asian nuclear tests took place they generated a heated debate around the country and the world. Quickly, the government termed 11 May as “technology day”. This year 11 May came and passed with a small number of articles in the national press underscoring the importance of the day. One did expect the papers to be full of articles falling in two broad groups-those who felt it was absolutely necessary to test at that time, and the others who would see the connection between Pokhran Kargil, Kandahar and Kashmir . These weren’t any such articles. The press has been busy with the drought and the NPT Review Conference.

 

 

On the foreign policy side, much water has flown under the diplomatic bridge over the last two years -- the Jaswant Singh - Strobe Talbott talks became the longest standing Indo-US engagement over the last five decades. It may have contributed in no small measure to helping Clinton spend 5 days in Delhi but only 5 hours in Islamabad . Still the US has not made India a member of the coveted nuclear club although, Indian security concerns have been recognized. Relations with the NAM have not improved as they remain unconvinced about India 's rationale for testing. India has engaged France in a security dialogue while with China the JWG resumed talks and the President too has visited China . Germany has just opened it markets to Indian information technology professionals. But the basis of improving relations with various countries has a lot to do with the forces of liberalisation, the information technology strength of India ’s economy and the size of the Indian middle class rather than with India testing a nuclear device. 

 

 

Doctrinally a body of literature over the last couple of years has emerged. Soon after the test there were statements recommending ‘hot pursuit’ by responsible people in the Indian government. If India does indeed decide to go in for air raids on terrorists camps in Pakistan held Kashmir what would the Pakistani response. A series of misperceptions and miscommunications could lead to brinkmanship and Pakistan might respond with nuclear weapons. 

 

 

Moving further, the Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes propounded his thesis of ‘limited war’ at a seminar in New Delhi . In theory it characterizes what is called the ‘stability-instability’ paradox. In short, stability at the nuclear level may endanger stability at the conventional level. This also helps in making sub-conventional conflict safe. What the Defence Minister could not make clear was whether ‘limited war’ was a military strategy or is it now the official policy. Constraints like geographical extent, weaponry used, minds of the decision-makers, the pressure of external actors and time operate simultaneously to determine the outcome of a conflict. Its criticism appears even in the theory that there is no guarantee that such conflicts will not escalate to the nuclear level. The dilemma  here is of risk taking capability by the political leader. Often this varies from individual to individual. Pakistan has exhibited that it can take a bigger risk (by crossing the LoC in Kargil) while the same capability prevented India from crossing the LoC.

 

 

Over the last two years what has been the trend and what can one contemplate about the future. One school of thought has been asking what have the tests deterred, and has Indian security been enhanced. While the other school of thought, who base their arguments on the success in the ‘limited war’ argue that deterrence has been successful and that India should go ahead, weaponise and deploy. With the right wing BJP government firmly in power this seems to be a real possibility. India seems firmly on its way towards weaponising and deploying - a process that may not instill any confidence in Pakistan . One hopes that the gradual arms race that is taking firm roots will not bring the two countries to the brink of another crisis. With both countries now becoming nuclear states, preventing such crises from escalating will be a difficult job. 

 

 

South Asian nations need to reassess their priorities and understand the change in threats to their security. If indeed India has to go down the nuclear road then a number of transparency measures aimed at instilling confidence, increasing credibility, avoiding miscommunication-that may lead to misperception and misinterpretation-and making clear policy statements are needed.

 

 

 

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