In light of the passage of the US Kerry-Lugar bill in late September 2010, which triples civilian aid to Pakistan to US$1.5 billion per annum for the next five years, an appraisal of the US aid programme and concomitant efforts to overhaul Pakistan’s derelict education system is critical. This paper seeks to discuss three pertinent issues:

Why educational reform in Pakistan is accorded priority status by the US aid programme, the many challenges that frustrate the aid agenda and, suggestions to prevail over these shortcomings. 

The current US Af-Pak strategy is characterized by contradictions. Central to this narrative is its aid programme, through the medium of which much of the Af-Pak policy is deployed. Over the years, US aid has increasingly emphasized development initiatives to buttress the validity of US military strategy in countering insurgency, particularly accentuating educational reform in Pakistan which is generally understood to have the wherewithal to yield a more substantive outcome. Yet, progress has been conspicuous only by its absence.

Pakistan’s education sector features quite prominently on the aid agenda because there is the recognition that a society’s education system is arguably the single most influential factor on one’s individual and collective consciousness. Yet despite this prominence, the US has not been able to meet its deliverables. A report on demographic trends indicates that approximately 37 per cent of Pakistan’s population is under the age of 15, which, when perceived against the crumbling edifice of mainstream education in Pakistan and the consequent proliferation of extremist religious seminaries, paints an alarming picture. Security exigencies alone necessitate a reformation of public education, thereby initiating the integration of largely cloistered students into regular society and undermining the lure of radical religious dogma. The idea is to wage war not just on the ground but against the indoctrination of minds. In this regard, the objective of the US aid education programme is to galvanize the country’s education system through the provision of technical assistance, teacher training and infrastructure. However, there is little to show for their efforts. For instance, the five-year Education Sector Reform Assistance (ESRA) programme, signed in 2002, failed to generate significant results. Also, despite the massive allocation of funds, Pakistani schools have the lowest rate of enrollment in all of South Asia. Corruption is endemic, and uninterrupted neglect has contributed to the decay. Rampant teacher absenteeism perpetrates the existence of ‘ghost schools’, where teachers make an appearance only to collect their salaries. In this unscrupulous environment, it is difficult to envisage aid benefits permeating through to their intended recipients.

As has been demonstrated, the US is faced with a number of challenges that repeatedly frustrate its education reform agenda. Only a strategy rethink holds the possibility of overwhelming these shortcomings. Pakistan’s public education system is deeply mired in a network of bureaucratic malfeasance. In this situation a systemic overhaul of the institution is far more likely to succeed than the current policy of mere renovation, which thus far has come to naught. This is primarily because although aid policy directives by themselves are comprehensive in nature, there is a lack of effective implementation and monitoring. The foremost mandate of the US aid programme ought to be the reinstallation of public trust in the system, which can only be achieved through fair practice. For this purpose, regular dissemination of information charting the progress of the programme would make the process more transparent and hence accountable. It would also be more inclusive; allowing parents to survey hitherto inaccessible information, such as the disbursement of funds. The US would be well advised to set a cohesive standard of measure which would allow them, in collaboration with the Pakistani government, to supervise the attainment of their objectives. As Nancy Birdsall of CGD recommended in her open letter to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, simple yardsticks such as data surveys reflective of the number of children that enter secondary school would be suggestive of the programme’s relative success or failure.