Nuclear Arms: Strategic and Regional

15 Feb, 2000    ·   325

Report of IPCS seminar held on 24 January 2000
Speaker: Ernest W. Lefever 

 

 

Senior Fellow, Ethics and Public Policy Center . 

 

 

Dr. Ernest Lefever began by assessing the reactions to India 's nuclear tests stating that he disagreed with the US administration reaction whose statements were both “arrogant and extravagant.” He attributed this to the unassailable assumption in the American psyche that nuclear weapons “are inherently evil”, a consequence of a culture that has got used to demonizing the bomb. This is nothing new in history since the time gunpowder was considered satanic. The Western mind tends to view nuclear weapons merely in moral terms ignoring its presence as a strategic reality. This is peculiar since there was no outrage in the West over firebombing Tokyo during the World War II that incidentally wrought more damage than the Bomb did on Hiroshima . 

 

 

Strategically, nuclear weapons have had their utility since they helped maintain peace among the great powers. This is evident in the case of Berlin , which Lefever reckoned was " America 's Kashmir " as a potential nuclear flashpoint since NATO and Warsaw Pact tanks were sometimes just 50 meters apart. Nuclear weapons evoked restraint during the Cuban Missile Crisis and they generally create restraint at the strategic level during conventional war fighting. 

 

 

The Clinton administration erred in coming down strongly on India after the Tests. No sanctions should have been imposed, instead the President could have spoken to the leaders quietly and conveyed American concerns. The US President missed an opportunity to “transform the bomb into an instrument of peace” in South Asia through diplomatic belligerence. 

 

 

If treaties are not efficacious instruments for maintaining peace in a nuclear neighborhood then command and control, warning systems, a hotline between adversaries need to be in place. America might well have thought of providing assistance in this regard instead of striving for the diplomatic isolation of the two South Asian countries. 

 

 

Lefever conceded that terrorism and wars would go despite nuclear weapons. Nukes may not prevent conflict but make war between great powers improbable. By evoking nuclear prudence they create conditions for long-term conflict to be resolved. The chances of achieving peace in Kashmir are greater now than before May 1998. India need not be worried about her two nuclear neighbors acting in concert since it is inconceivable to think that China will ever come to Pakistan 's nuclear rescue. 

 

 

Nuclear weapons in South Asia will not change world politics drastically. India is in a situation like Brazil , looking for both prestige and a great role. China is more worrying for the US since it still holds on to a Middle Kingdom dream and is thus building a formidable submarine fleet. 

 

 

On American foreign policy, Lefever said the US , by virtue of being in the Big Three of the nuclear club with Russia and China apart from being among the three biggest economies alongside Germany and Japan is trying to balance all the five powers. It is trying to prevent proliferation, is concerned about the level of nuclear research in China and is severely anxious about nuclear proliferation that the Russian mafia is capable of executing. America is an imperial power but not an imperialistic power. 

 

 

Discussion

 

 

A former general said that non-nuclear weapon states feel that they lose their independent status if they do not possess nuclear weapons. The most credible form of deterrence is submarine based missile system, which India does not possess as yet. He concurred with Lefever that nuclear weapons produce prudence going by India 's posture of containing itself with a minimal arsenal, desisting from an arms race and adopting a no first use doctrine. He disagreed with the widespread belief that nuclear weapons prevent conventional war, saying that no military academy for the last 50 years has ever taught so. 

 

 

Another general asked if anyone in America 's strategic community that shared Lefever’s perception about dealing with a nuclear India and Pakistan . However, he disputed the prudence argument stating that deterrence between the US and the Soviet Union eventually led to disarmament only because the latter was a declining power which could not keep up with the arms race. That would not hold in the subcontinent. 

 

 

Lefever responded by clarifying that he did not advocate India 's tests. He pointed out, however, that in the US the arms control community and the “disarmament theologians” influence the US administration. A possible Republican administration from January 2001 might adopt a position close to his, Lefever felt. 

 

 

Lefever was asked about the possibility of irresponsible statements creating nuclear tension like that of Pakistan Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar who wrote recently that Pakistan might respond with a nuclear strike in the event of a “piercing attack” by the enemy. He responded saying that there is always a wedge between a nation's declaratory policy and its actual position. Nuclear weapons do not prevent war and countries should clarify for themselves whether nukes exist for the purpose of prestige or for safeguarding national security. India has to figure out whether Pokharan was for prestige or not. 

 

 

A research scholar asked if 50 years were too short a time in world history to judge the efficacy of deterrence, since it has not factored irrationality of the political actors convincingly in its paradigm. Another participant spoke of accidents as an antidote to deterrence. Lefever reckoned that the 2-key system to detonate the bomb is a reliable device against irrationality. There are other safeguards during the transition to a 2-key system such as separation of warheads from missile silos etc. The existence of a hotline at the highest political level is a must while a three-way hotline with China will be of immense use. 

 

 

Other participants highlighted the impudence that characterized Pakistan 's behavior in the region, cataloging its support to terrorism in Kashmir , the provocation of Kargil which was unpardonable after the Lahore Declaration. They felt that the US is not taking cognizance of Pakistani intransigence and felt that American evenhandedness is unjust. They also pointed to American quiescence with China 's missile assistance to Pakistan . Lefever demurred that America is doing more though backchannels in Pakistan than India realizes or concedes. 

 

 

On the question of prestige as the propellant for Pokharan, a participant said that the progress of India 's nuclear program reveals that security was the primary motive at each major juncture. The program began under the guidance of Homi Bhabha who influenced Nehru greatly. Significantly, China exploded its nuclear device in 1964 -- the same year that Nehru died -- heightening Indian fears. In fact in October 1964, there was a full-fledged three-week debate in the Indian parliament after which a clandestine program began. So security was the primary reason to begin with. 

 

 

The turbulence of 1971 followed with Henry Kissinger’s visit to China , followed by a perceived Pak-US-China threat owing to the Bangladesh crisis. India went on to sign the 20-year Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty as a countervailing move. Thereafter, the influence of nuclear and defense scientists created its own dynamic. One must remember that this community was in a position to influence the political leadership since various bodies like the Atomic Energy Commission worked directly under the Prime Minister's Office. So India 's nuclear program can be said to be a combination of all the three factors. 

 

 

 

 

 

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