The US President’s speech at West Point Military Academy in December 2009 has become a virtual looking glass through which all Afghan watchers are now predicting the future drift of US policies in this region. It is considered by many as an endorsement of General Stanley McChrystal’s assessment of the Afghanistan war effort and the counter-insurgency strategy laid out by General David Petraeus. The President made two very critical announcements, first the infusion of an extra 30,000 troops, in the face of domestic as well as external opposition towards further troops surge, but simultaneously he also announced the first of troops’ withdrawal, which was hailed as a sure sign of American military pull out from Afghanistan.

However it is important to read both the presidential speech as well as Gen. McChrystal’s Assessment document, which put together, spells out; preparing adequate space through military effort for transition; winning hearts and minds of civilian population through creating and reinforcing civilian surge, a move towards “Afghanisation,” and securing civilian population areas; building meaningful as well as effective partnership with Pakistan, and,  finally reconciliation as well as reintegration.

These counter insurgency goals set by the US military high command has several implications for Pakistan. To start with, anti-terrorism effort and Pakistan military’s operations in the Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa province (former NWFP) coupled with drone attacks waged by the US from across the border has been raising extreme discontent amongst the civilian population, who have not only endured a high level of collateral damage but the entire fabric of socio-political and security apparatus has been severely affected. A further troop surge is not being looked upon very favourably, coupled with the fact that the withdrawal of American troops after the proposed 18 months is being viewed skeptically. The proposed plans of building and strengthening the indigenous Afghan law enforcement and military capacity, as well as creating private citizen militias may not prove an adequate bulwark against the Taliban insurgents.

The American COIN wish list is being considered very idealistic by both Pakistan and other interest groups, whether it is the Afghan National Army or the Afghan National Police; neither of the two forces have the capacity and the power to replace the heavy foreign presence, which stands as a barrier between the insurgents and civilian population. Both the ANA and ANP are inadequately trained, with international actors making a hotchpotch of security sector reforms and buildup agenda. Besides, corruption, defection and desertion from ranks are very common amongst these two security apparatuses. And more importantly, the political set up and governance machinery is discredited as being highly corrupt and lacking transparency and control. Gun-running, drug money and other forms of malpractices and warlordism still persists. Islamabad fears that an eventual US troops pull out, may leave the state of affairs in the hands of indigenous forces, which are not only inadequate, but may also prove partisan in a worst case scenario, and push the country back into the post-1989 civil war situation. This time, it would prove worse than before.

The implications of such a scenario are most troubling for Pakistan, which is already grappling with terrorism and infused militancy internally. At the same time, many in Pakistan do not see a complete US troops’ pullout, given the heavy investments made by the US, and are looking at implications of having US as a permanent next door neighbour, and how that would reflect on the domestic politics. There would be a further intensification of discontent amongst domestic political and religious forces, which are already wary of US ambitions in the region, coupled with dissatisfaction on issues such as detainees and missing persons’ cases.

The acknowledgment of Pakistan’s role and centrality in a future stable Afghanistan by the US through its above mentioned policy documents, as well as at the London Conference, is a very important development. Plus the endorsement of Pakistani policy of reconciliation and opening avenues of dialogue and reintegration of moderate Taliban elements has been adopted as a key feature of a future sustainable and viable Afghanisation effort. Though Gen McChrystal’s COIN strategy has moved away from reconciliation to focus more on re-integration, unless there is an across-the-board dialogue, both the Kabul as well as Islamabad governments would remain involved in fighting their respective anti-insurgency operations. Although, the recent arrests of high ranking al-Qaeda leadership by Pakistan has brought criticism from Afghanistan as being damaging to its reconciliation efforts, it is high time that a clear distinction is made between the al-Qaeda, Afghani and Pakistani Taliban, to be able to deal with them separately. A mere acknowledgment of Pakistan’s centrality in the future stability of Afghanistan is not enough. The need is for more military to military contact between the two neighbors as well as increased intelligence sharing and cooperation. A positive role played by Pakistan in the building up of ANA, ANP and other security apparatus is most necessary and would have very positive implications for both neighbours.