The operational details of the Mumbai commando-style suicidal terrorist attack are clear. More facts will emerge when the criminal cases against the alleged perpetrators are launched in India and, hopefully, in Pakistan. The latter has grudgingly and, under American pressure, conceded that the attack was “partly planned” and launched from its territory and that it will prosecute the culprits. The inadequacy of India’s counter-terrorism strategy was, however, exposed by these attacks. The element of surprise was complete, intelligence was not properly assessed or acted upon, maritime security was lax, and the forces deployed to neutralize the attackers, though brave, were inept. One must not be churlish, but salute the heroism of the police officers who sacrificed themselves in an unequal contest. But this not detract from the reality that they were wholly unprepared to counter the attackers. Tragically, unconscionable delays occurred in the only qualified force--the National Security Guards--equipped and trained for this operation, reaching Mumbai and being deployed. The result was a 60-hour drama played out before the TV channels and world media highlighting India’s operational weaknesses. 

All this is well-documented. The question is: what can India do now? What it cannot do is apparent. Despite some three months having elapsed India has been unable to exercise its military option. The various possibilities have been avidly discussed, especially in military circles, like conducting a surgical strike, launching a multi-point attack, mounting covert operations and so on. India’s failure to exercise any of these choices is believed in these circles to reflect procrastination by the civilian bureaucracy, lack of political will, and unwillingness to take risks. It is not appreciated that, since nuclear weapons are available to Pakistan and India, the military option is problematical; there is no good answer to the counter-question why any attack will not escalate, and Pakistan will not issue a threat to use its nuclear weapons or, indeed, reach the nuclear level. Moreover, deciding to use the military option is a major issue, and the decision would be taken by the Indian political leadership, which is very conservative and averse to risk-taking. The examples of the Kargil conflict and the 2001-02 border confrontation crisis reinforce the impression that the Indian leadership will not consider the military option if other options are available.

And, what are those options? This is being currently pursued by bringing diplomatic pressure to bear on Pakistan to proceed against the perpetrators of the Mumbai outrage. The evidence collected by India has been shared with Pakistan, and it is being forced to crack down on the terrorist organizations and outfits nurtured by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence and its Army. Exercising this diplomatic option has included sharing the information collected by Indian investigators regarding the Mumbai attacks with other countries, notably the US, to mount pressure on Pakistan to come clean and take action against the rogue elements in its administration and the country. In fact, the US is helping the Indian investigations by decoding the messages sent by the attackers to their handlers in Pakistan, and by forcing President Zardari to admit that the attacks had been “partially planned” in Pakistan. Stitching together a global coalition against international terrorism, and its epicentre located in the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands, seems to be India’s best option. 

Fortunately, India has refrained from exercising the other diplomatic options available, namely snapping communications with Pakistan by withdrawing its High Commissioner from Islamabad, reducing the consular staff, which would ensure that the number of visas issued would be pruned, and stopping road, rail and air traffic between the two countries. These modalities were exercised in the past, and were put into effect after the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. The fecklessness of these measures is apparent, since they only affect ordinary citizens, largely divided families that are the best peace constituency available in both countries. Further, the banning of over-flights hurt India more than Pakistan since the former had more aircraft that were crossing Pakistan en route to Europe than the latter had flying east to Southeast Asia.

Ultimately, of course, India and Pakistan will need to revive their peace process, which is temporarily in recess, and go back to negotiating the vast agenda of confidence building measures comprising the agenda. India must draw a distinction between Pakistan’s weak civilian government and its dominant Army-ISI combine, and not treat Pakistan as an undifferentiated hostile entity. Somewhere in this process it needs to convince Pakistan that it cannot hope to continue using terrorism as a foreign policy instrument, which has already placed it on the wrong side of history.