Addressing the Hindustan Times Leadership Summit 2008 via video on 22 November 2008, President Asif Ali Zardari offered no-first-use (NFU) policy of nuclear weapons to India. Should he be taken seriously or not? Much has happened in Indo-Pak relations for declamations of this kind to be taken at face value. While one might see it as an invitation to breathe life into the stagnant on-going Indo-Pak peace process and take it to the next level, it can also be seen critically as Zardari biding his time. One should not to forget that his late father-in-law switched gears after the 1974 tests by India and that was when the euphoria of the post-Shimla talks collapsed. Later, the expectations of the Rajiv Gandhi-Benazir Bhutto bonhomie fell flat too. Likewise, the Vajpayee-Sharif honeymoon was shattered by the Kargil fiasco. Hence, to have any premature expectations, with the past not far behind, would reveal gullibility and exhibit naivete on the Indian side.

The notion of a 'no first use' policy of nuclear weapons is not just a political statement to make South Asia a nuclear free zone but the closest to a nuclear doctrine that the region can have. Pakistan, which developed a nuclear device to deter India, has an ambiguous policy in terms of its nuclear doctrine. More importantly, it does not have declared policy on this. The very fact that the President is willing to discuss a common South Asian nuclear doctrine is in contrast to Pakistan's weapons programme, the development of which was largely seen as an reactionary measure to India's movement in that direction.

Zardari is under duress and pressure from all quarters and has been attempting to lead his country and his people from the front in these hard times. His case for "from aid to trade" can be seen as a desperate attempt to bail out the country from its economic nightmares. It is just not a veiled appeal to Delhi for help but also reveals an undertone of fear that Islamabad may not be able to rely completely on the Americans any more. Then, it is only a question of time before trade, like in most case, takes over the politics of bilateral relations.

The plea of making South Asia a nuclear free zone was accompanied by the offer of a no-first-use policy, which Zardai said that he was willing to work with his Parliament in this regard. However, will he succeed in this considering the fact that nuclear and missile sectors including the ISI are the exclusive domains of the military establishment? This can be seen in the controversial and aborted attempt of bringing the ISI under the civilian control and the recent alleged abolishing of the political wing of the ISI which monitored all political developments in Pakistan.

It is to be noted that Zardari, like his late wife and his late father-in law, enjoys power when the popularity and perhaps the morale of the military is at its lowest. Despite this, the military and old guard therein attached to them got what they wanted. Every popular civilian government in recent memory was coterminous with the waning military popularity that however, soon mended its way back to power. It was thus that Zulfikar Bhutto was removed and then eliminated and a military regime replaced him where as Benazir was replaced and history repeated itself. Nawaz Sharif got too close to arch enemy-India and that heralded the last military coup. It is not an authentic fact but it is not coincidence either that all military takeovers in Pakistan were preceded by a definitive step of normalisation of relations with India.

Will Asif Ail Zardari beat the 'establishment' in its own game? Can he, by any means make the hardliners inside the Pakistani polity see reason in his arguments? Will his attempts in making the subcontinent nuclear-weapon free achieve any result? Will he succeed in re-writing the text and sub-text of Indo-Pak relations both subtly and obviously? These are the questions which loom large. These are speculations left largely undecided. These are the imponderables which need to be observed with caution and with hope.

Can the PPP-led government carry the military, whose sole reason of existence is that of India bashing, with it? Or have the times changed? Indications are not to the contrary, because the February 2008 election in Pakistan was the first when India was not an electoral issue. The seed of change has, perhaps, been sown. Will it grow into a mighty tree? Only time will tell.