Report of the IPCS Seminar held on 14 August 2008

Chair:
Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Dipankar Banerjee

Speaker:
Prof. Sumit Ganguly, Indiana University Bloomington

Sumit Ganguly

There could not have been a more apt day to discuss the topic at hand than on 14 August which commemorates Pakistan Day. The seminar discussion is structured under four broad sections: the first section deals with the three explanations commonly advocated for explaining the structural roots of authoritarian rule in Pakistan. The second section culls out the shortcomings of these three explanations. The third section sketches out dimensions of alternative explanations. The final section speculates the future and examines some of the difficulties faced in overcoming authoritarianism.

One of the arguments most commonly subscribed to, even by some of the thinking minds of Pakistan such as Hussain Haqqani amongst others, talks in terms of the 'existential threat' faced by Pakistan vis-a-vis India since its very inception. What provided a further impetus to this argument acquiring popular currency were statements coming from no less stalwarts than Pundit Nehru who spoke of Pakistan as our 'wayward brothers' who would return to the fold once they realize their folly. Such statements were cleverly picked up, built upon and woven into the political discourse in Pakistan. Such arguments were further reinforced by India's refusal to allow for an equitable distribution of resources with Pakistan at the time of partition. Thus, the roots of the threat were projected as being external with the blame resting squarely on India's shoulders.

The second explanation that has found popular favor, but can at best be regarded as a partial explanation, is regarding sustained American support for military regimes right from Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia-ul-Haq down to General Musharraf. The third line of argument propounded by some Pakistani scholars as well as some American scholars on Pakistan such as Allan Mc Grath, talks in terms of the forging of a powerful military-bureaucratic nexus that was contemptuous of the rough and tumble democratic politics and that consolidated its hold over the levers of power.

All the three explanations outlined above, however, are inadequate in providing a sound argument regarding the 'structural roots of authoritarian rule in Pakistan.' Although partition did leave behind a bitter legacy, it would be a gross exaggeration to suggest that India essentially posed an 'existential threat' to Pakistan. This line of argument is further undermined in Major General Akbar Khan's work entitled "Kashmir Raiders" which explicitly confirms that the conflict in Kashmir was initiated by him. Moreover, if India did pose an existential threat, then it is only logical to assume that one does not initiate a war with one's adversary. Secondly, it would be a misnomer to believe that the US on its own initiative embraced Pakistan. Rather it was Pakistan that enticed the Americans and deliberately drew the Americans into the country's affairs. The Americans gravitation towards Pakistan got a further impetus through British complicity in 'informing' the US on how to deal with South Asia as also by being convinced, under the influence of Pakistani political elite, of Pakistan's importance as a bulwark against communism. Finally, though the description of the military-bureaucratic nexus is correct, it is merely descriptive and leaves some fundamental questions unaccounted for at a theoretical level. For instance, why were the military and bureaucracy allowed to forge such a nexus? Why did India not follow a similar trajectory inspite of a common colonial legacy?

A study of three main components of the national movement of Pakistan, namely its structure, ideology and organization, seeks to fulfill this lacuna. The Pakistan movement stood in sharp contrast to its Indian counterpart which, under the towering influence of Gandhi and Nehru, had been democratized and came to represent a cross section of the populace. The Congress had also cultivated ideas of democracy through debate and compromise which were not alien to its leadership at the time of independence. On the other hand, the Pakistan movement under the tutelage of the Muslim League suffered from an extremely limited base confined geographically to what broadly constitutes the modern day state of Uttar Pradesh (UP). The socio-economic profile of its leadership was confined to the ranks of UP notables who largely hailed from feudal backgrounds. Against such a setting, M.A Jinnah successfully built up the Muslim League centered on his personality and the idea that the Congress would not guarantee the rights of Muslims.

It must be noted that the Congress did not always succeed in guaranteeing rights of the Muslims, especially in case of poor Muslims, who in turn flocked to Jinnah who talked in terms of 'Islam in danger' and held out to them a prospect of a Muslim homeland ensuring freedom from Hindu domination. However, there was a crucial lacuna in Jinnah's policy that was to have significant repercussions on the trajectory that Pakistan was to subsequently acquire. Firstly, he did not envision a blueprint for governance of Pakistan. Secondly, he overlooked the heterogeneity within the Muslim community in terms of ethnicity, language and culture. Finally, the party was essentially woven around Jinnah's personality and there were no institutional mechanisms to replace his tutelage, unlike in the Congress that had evolved some institutional structures and inculcated ideas of debate, engagement and democracy. As a result of the failure to think through these issues, the political elite in Pakistan was saddled with weak institutional structures and were poorly equipped with skills to put in place a coherent state structure. While on the other hand, the Pakistani state inherited a highly elitist civil service and a powerful army from the British Empire.

By contrast, India managed to forge a constitution as early as 1952, while its armed forces earned their nationalist credentials in 1948 only after having proved their mettle in the Kashmir war that pitted them against their Pakistani counterparts. In fact, Nehru had established the supremacy of civilian leadership as early as 1946 when, he successfully defended the Indian National Army soldiers put on trial for revolting against the British by citing an imperfectly developed aspect of International Law that spoke of the right to fight against an oppressive regime. Yet on the other hand he did not allow them to rejoin the ranks of the armed forces for they had broken oath of office and loyalty. Instead he co-opted them into the civilian structure. By contrast, Pakistan failed to put in place any constitutional mechanism for nine long years and the army's preponderant role in quelling violent unrest that rocked provinces like Sindh also tempted the military to establish control over levers of power.

What added to Pakistan's propensity towards an authoritarian political dispensation was the disproportionate share of Punjab in swelling up ranks of the armed forces as also its dominance of the political spectrum. Another significant factor that has contributed to Pakistan's sustenance of authoritarianism was repeated military coups that have put Pakistan onto what is termed as 'path dependence'. So much so that inspite of brief interregnums of civilian rule certain authoritarian structures have become deeply embedded in the country's political culture and authoritarianism has become a 'habit of mind'. This by no means implies that a democratic transition in Pakistan is impossible, going by the example set forth by the transitions in Spain and Portugal for instance. However for that to occur some conditions have to be met, important among them is discrediting of the military. In the Pakistani case, the military continues to successfully maintain the myth of it being a guarantor of national security from 'external' threats both real and imaginary. This coupled with the failure of civilian regimes to effectively consolidate power and being mired in charges of corruption render a transition all the more difficult.

Discussion

Feudal Culture

• Most of the military and political elite of Pakistan hail from feudal ranks. The role of feudal culture in Pakistani politics needs to be more explicitly worked on although feudal mentality will slowly change as the demographic composition of the Pakistani army undergoes a subtle change.

• A large majority of eminent Pakistani leaders such as Liaqat Ali Khan for example hailed from the ranks of the landed aristocracy and thus had no real stake in nation building. This feudal mentality still colors the political culture of Pakistan.

US Role

• President Truman was clueless about the realities of Pakistan. His administration seemed to be firmly convinced about the geo-strategic importance of Pakistan in controlling oil routes of the Middle East as also by Pakistani leaders such as Liaqat Ali Khan's attempt to prop up Pakistan as a bulwark against communism.

• The American role in Pakistani politics is not all that benign for they perceived military dictatorships as relatively easier to engage with than a messy democracy. A cursory glance at various Congress committee reports between 1948-1954 clearly defies any semblance of US innocence in supporting authoritarian regimes in Pakistan.

• The US held up Pakistan as a model of economic growth, the irony being that this growth never percolated down and led Mehboob-ul-Haq to propound his famous 'twenty four families' thesis. While the US cannot be held responsible for the structural roots of authoritarianism in Pakistan, it nonetheless has enough sins in not doing much to forestall authoritarianism.

• Much of the ideological thrust in Pakistani politics came from the bureaucracy and military which used the idea of an 'existential threat' from India alive to keep the flow of desperately needed US aid.

Historical Roots of Authoritarianism

• Authoritarianism goes back to the days of Syed Ahmad Khan whose voice reeks of contempt for the poor. He vociferously argued against the idea of 'one man one vote' for communities such as the chamars for instance who he argues were incapable of judging what was in their best interest.

• The Pakistani political system has followed the course of the viceregal system that prevailed under the British, lucidly illustrated by Jinnah's inclination to step into the shoes of the Governor General as also his disposition towards having a strong Presidential office.

• The basis of the Pakistani constitution i.e. the Government of India Act of 1935 also helped in the drift towards authoritarian rule. Jawaharlal Nehru commenting upon the nature of the act opined 'We have been given a car with brakes but no engine'.

Democracy: A Western Preserve?

• From Khyber to Suez, there are no democratic regimes with India being the notable exception in this regard. Max Weber talked about the legitimate monopoly force being in the hands of the state. Thus, one could argue that authoritarian rule is a natural characteristic of a state while democracy is an aberration that requires explanation.

• The concepts of Western democracy are inherently flawed. Democratic political culture was conspicuous by its absence during the inter-war years in Italy, while Spain and Portugal were under the sway of authoritarian regimes till the 1970s. In Britain too democracy was strengthened through three successive acts to enfranchise the population. While the US claims to be the world's oldest democracy, it truly emerged as a democracy as late as 1964 after it granted equal rights to the blacks. In fact, the eight years that have followed 9/11 have witnessed a considerable recession of democratic laws and civil liberties in the US.

• The idea of democracy as a Western preserve needs to be made historically contingent. In India for instance democracy cannot be regarded as a British legacy that was bequeathed to the Indians. If that were the case, what explains the political trajectory of other former British colonies like Malaysia, Kenya, Nigeria and Pakistan. The answer lies in the difference in the organization, structure and ideology of the national movements of India and Pakistan. Although nationalist leaders of India drew upon Western ideas but they rooted them in the soil and inculcated them amongst the ranks and file of the movement.

The Future Course

• At present, the judiciary, which in 1958 had been complicit in bestowing legitimacy to military rule under the Doctrine of Necessity, is on the right track following the ousting of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Choudhary. These developments, in turn, have also provided a boost to civil society in Pakistan that is still in its nascent stages, but want to see democracy take strong roots in Pakistan.

• The establishment of sound democratic governance in Pakistan faces three key challenges. Firstly, intense political squabbling amongst the political elite has paralyzed the country as personal interests triumphing and dictating the agenda while the economy continues to be in shambles. Secondly, Pakistan desperately needs leadership to add a sense of purpose and civility in its top echelons of governance. One hopeful sign has been the reluctance of the army brass to intervene in the current political crisis facing the country. Thirdly, much depends upon the decisions taken by the Pakistani elite as also the attitude of the new US administration towards them.