Report of the Seminar held at the IPCS on 25 May 2007

Chair:          Prof P R Chari
Speaker:     Dr Manpreet Sethi
Discussant:  Dr Reshmi Kazi

Dr Manpreet Sethi

The presentation focused on the nuclear strategies of four countries - US, UK, Russia and France - and their implications for India's nuclear weapons strategy. The analyses were made under four heads:

• Nuclear Deterrence

• Ballistic Missile Defence

• Nuclear Arsenal and Weapons Infrastructure

• Arms Control

Nuclear Deterrence

The Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 set the tone for nuclear strategy for US premised on three major recommendations:

• The US must retain a robust nuclear arsenal to provide deterrence against nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. It would also guard against conventional wars, as also hard deep buried targets.

• Significant reduction in nuclear weapons is possible since Russia is no longer a major threat to the US. The NPR suggests a scaling down of operationally deployed warheads to 3,800 by 2007 and to 1,700-2,200 by 2012.

• It called for strategic adaptability to meet the threats from potential enemies. It recommended that the existing downgraded weapons (termed Responsive Forces) be kept as reserves to be recalled if necessary.

As a further step, the Quadrennial Defence Review of 2006 recommended a "tailored deterrence" instead of a one-size-fits-all approach that would deter near peer states like Russia and China or non-state actors or countries with small WMD arsenals. This becomes clear from the concept of the triad. The new concept includes three different legs - Non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities; Active and Passive Defences; Responsive Infrastructure. The earlier triad consisting of three delivery vehicles - ICBMs, bombers and SLBMs - is now a subset within this new concept. Flexibility would be attained not through an earlier Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), but in smaller nuclear force and a more flexible nuclear strike plan like the CONPLAN 8022. It would provide the US with RMA-based capabilities and other information networks to attack with nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons mounted on strategic delivery vehicles.

Nuclear muscle flexing in Russia coincided with a deterioration of its relationship with the West. The Russian nuclear arsenal provides it with the strength

• to pursue domestic policies to counter any external interference on issues like Chechnya

• to resist external threats from the NATO and US unilateralist tendencies

Russia places emphasis on retention and upgradation of its nuclear arsenal which is considered central to their security strategy. In 1992, Russia renounced its 'no first use' policy and placed reliance on its nuclear option even against an attack by conventional, biological or chemical weapons. However, Russia perceives the use of nuclear weapons in a bipolar context - against US unilateralism and NATO expansionism - but not against non-state actors.

The UK pursues an independent nuclear deterrence strategy as is evident from its decision to replace its SSBNs in early 2007. There has been an intense debate in the UK on the role and need for nuclear weapons. The existing nuclear submarines will become obsolete by 2020. Hence, Tony Blair and his successor Gordon Brown took the decision to upgrade their nuclear deterrent. UK has pledged to effect a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons, but nuclear deterrence continues to remain its "insurance policy in an uncertain world".

The concept of Force de frappe has been central to French security forces since 1960. Not only do nuclear weapons guarantee security to France, but it is considered vital for enhancing its international status. The French concept of nuclear deterrence in 2006 while reiterating the same concepts of security and status has expanded the new missions for deterrence from nuclear to chemical and biological weapons. France hopes to deploy flexible nuclear forces with flexible yields and warheads to cater for a range of threats.

Ballistic Missile Defence

The Rumsfeld Commission Report in 1999 laid down the rationale for BMD, which has since developed into a multi-layered interception programme. It is supposed to provide the US with the capability to intercept missiles at every stage of their deployment. With the high rate of success in the BMD test programmes - out of 16 tests, fifteen proved to be successful - the US and its allies were upbeat in 2006. More nations are ready to join because of the success rate and their threat perceptions of North Korea and Iran. As a result, there is a greater discomfort in Russia.

The Russian perception of missile defence in 2001 was very different from what it is today. In 2001, Russia reconciled itself to a limited BMD, and was skeptical regarding the technology involved. Russia believed that though US would have BMD it would also be limited, and hence not impinge on Russian security in any major way. In 2007, Russia's perception of the BMD indicates that it has taken note of the fact that BMD is expanding on its borders. Russia thus views the BMD as destabilizing and threatening to its strategic stability.

Both UK and France were skeptical of the BMD in the initial years. However, the UK now has a radar that is functional and feeds into the US BMD and is also willing to have interceptors on its soil. France is more neutral towards NATO deployment of BMD as of now and is more interested in an EU-centred TMD. Meanwhile, the US considers its BMD deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic to be part of bilateral agreements and believes that NATO can be included in these at some later point in time. Hence, there is no unity of approach in the US, NATO or EU on the issue of BMD.

Nuclear Arsenal and Weapons Infrastructure

Although the NPR has technically not favoured any new types of weapons, it has sought modifications in the existing weapons to meet current threats emanating from non-state actors and the small WMD arsenals of rogue states. The US requires smart conventional weapons and smaller nuclear munitions. Accordingly, the US has initiated its Reliable Replacement Warhead programme (RRW) that will replace the aging stockpile to improve the reliability, longevity and certifiability of the existing weapons. The RRWs are not new nuclear weapons but would refurbish the existing nuclear weapons infrastructure known as the Complex 2030. The RRW will also help to develop new and safer warhead designs that will lead to a reduction in stockpiles. Development of Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrators (RNEP or bunker busters) is also on the cards.

Russia is also thinking of developing cutting edge strategic weapons emphasizing quality over quantity. It is likely to deploy the mobile Topol land-based missiles and sea-based Bulava missiles, MIRV its missiles, and develop a new generation of nuclear submarines.

In the UK and France, the design and development of new SSBNs has been sanctioned and is supplemented by the modernization of missiles. France tested an 8000-km range missile in 2006 and is also developing warheads of varied yield, since it wants a range of options for nuclear deterrence.

Arms Control

In the current state of affairs, the prospects for arms control appear dim. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been comatose since 1999. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty also fell apart after 2002, when the US walked out of it. In response, Russia abandoned the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II, leaving it in a state of limbo. The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) is floundering in the CD and has a long way to go. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has been threatened by Russia and the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) - the only existing treaty between the US and Russia - is flexible, reversible and non-verifiable.

Trends and Implications

Classical nuclear deterrence is the most relevant doctrine in India's strategy of deterring peer states. However, with the probability of nuclear terrorism rising, it needs to be asked if India ought to undertake any doctrinal changes for deterrence against non-state actors? Is there any need for flexibility in India's credible deterrent posture? India's nuclear doctrine speaks of massive retaliation against any nuclear, chemical or biological attack but in case of a biological or chemical attack, would it be credible for India to resort to massive retaliation? Or should the doctrine prescribe a graded and proportional punitive retaliation. It is important for India to work towards dispersing its triad for a flexible response.

Unlike the Cold War period, concepts of 'deterrence' and 'denial' are no longer mutually exclusive. They are in a state of co-habitation today. Unlike the US, India believes in the continuance of deterrence by punishment. Deterrence by denial is not feasible for India and has only a limited value. Further, there are limitations on India acquiring BMD capabilities as it involves huge expenditures. In the case of the US, the emphasis is on asymmetric threats, which is not the case with India. However, China is going in for missile defence and hence there has to be simultaneous research and development of offensive and defensive weapons by India.

The US is looking at leaner but meaner nuclear forces, alongside modernization of warheads and delivery systems. It is also looking for a responsive weapons infrastructure. India has smaller nuclear weapons compared to the West and if the taboo on nuclear use is broken, it will create new problems for Indian security. India must accord serious thought to its nuclear weapons infrastructure, especially because of its commitment to separating its military and civilian nuclear facilities in terms of the Indo-US nuclear deal. There must be clear emphasis on improvement in yield to weight ratio.

On nuclear testing, the US position is that it has signed but not ratified the CTBT. Though the US has stated that there will be no testing of new warheads, it has not categorically ruled this out. Russia has already signed and ratified the CTBT, but has maintained that if others test, Moscow would follow. India has a voluntary moratorium on further testing but has not foreclosed that option since it has symbolic value and constitutes an insurance against future uncertainties.

Another trend involves nuclear cutbacks in the form of parallel, but unilateral, reductions, which also includes arsenal rationalization. Though the major powers do not require huge arsenals, they are keeping the option of reversibility. While this has no major implications for India, if it is a case of multilateral arms control, China will come into the picture, and India's calculation of its own deterrent size and composition will be influenced.

Nuclear weapons are here to stay. India must take cognizance of this reality and ensure adequate measures for security. Substantial measures must be taken for conventional modernization to shore up the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. Above all, India must persevere in striving for a nuclear weapons free world.

Dr Reshmi Kazi

Nuclear weapons have emerged as the new means of ensuring security in the 21st century. They continue to play a cardinal role in the conduct of international relations and policies. The concept of nuclear deterrence has been revitalized by the US especially in the aftermath of 9/11. The world today is faced with threats ranging from individual acts of terrorism to nuclear threats. Hence, there is a need for a range of responses that include Special Forces. The efficacy of the concept of nuclear deterrence has also been appreciated by Russia, which chose nuclear deterrence over cooperative partnership with the West in the post-Cold War era. France has already cast its vote in favour of nuclear deterrence by clearly stating that nuclear weapons will continue to be the ultimate guarantor of French security. It believes in quick responsive nuclear forces that can decapitate a regime.

BMD

The concept of BMD has emerged because nuclear deterrence may not be the sole measure to combat exigencies and is gathering importance with new developments in Northeast Asia. Iran's nuclear posture is also making several European states consider the BMD option with renewed interest. The US is working towards setting up 10 interceptors in Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic for protection against Iran. This has created consternation in Russia, which is modernizing its defence force reportedly by developing three long-range missile systems. The UK and France are also considering the BMD option seriously after initial opposition.

Nuclear Arsenals and Infrastructure

The US is investing millions for developing state-of-the-art weapons. Two such weapon structures are the RNEP and the RRW. The US regards the RNEP as a militarily useful weapon intended to overcome its problems in a non-nuclear conflict. Currently, the Pentagon possesses 50 upgraded bunker busters known as B61-11. However, they can only penetrate up to 20 feet in dry soil. The target country could build its underground bunkers much deeper, thus reducing their vulnerability to a RNEP attack. Nuclear bunker busters, designed to be "usable" weapons, constitute a threat to the non-proliferation regime. RRWs will substantially undermine the international community's ability to fight against proliferation. If the United States eventually proceeds with the RRW, it should do so only after ratifying the CTBT. That the RRW does not have much support within the US Congress was indicated by the reduced funding by Congress to complete RRW studies.

If this is the state of affairs on nuclear weapons thinking and strategies, is it feasible for India to abandon or neglect its nuclear deterrent? The underlying rationale for nuclear deterrence remains the same. India cannot afford complacency in building its nuclear deterrent capabilities. China's current estimation and future projections have to be taken into account while planning for India's nuclear deterrent. India's nuclear strategy for combating terrorism differs from the global strategy in dealing with this problem through improved intelligence, export controls and more vigilance. Dr Sethi's paper addresses the fact that India must pay attention to upgrading and modernizing its nuclear arsenal to address the uncertainties of the future while, at the same time, emphasizing that India adheres by a restrained nuclear policy. If, according to Dr Sethi, India's nuclear threshold is raised to thwart any adventure by Pakistan, this will open a Pandora's box of proliferation concerns. While a verifiable FMCT, UNSCR 1540, and no first use (NFU), seem to be favoured in India, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) remains a matter of concern as it sidesteps international law, lacks UN backing and militates against the Convention on the Law of the Seas.

DISCUSSION

BMD

The standoff between the US and Russia over the BMD issue is a major area of concern. BMD in Eastern Europe was not designed against Russia but directed against North Korea and Iran. However, the Russians have taken serious exception to this and have considered setting up radars in the embassies of neighbouring countries. Russia is considering the possibility of using pre-emptive strikes with interceptors using nuclear warheads. Though Russia abandoned BMD initially because of its enormous costs, it appears to have restarted it now.

With BMD increasingly a reality, the weapons systems or the launch platforms from where the nuclear warheads will be delivered or the way these are going to be transported will be entirely different. The weapons platforms that India has at present can achieve an accuracy of 10 metres and strike the target with a velocity, which is 8 to 9 times more than the normal velocity of weapons systems. This can ensure a degree of destruction of the target as much as nuclear weapons. Thus, deterrence by conventional weapons with higher accuracy and greater velocity will provide the same benefits as nuclear weapons. If these weapons are used against certain power projects, nuclear installations, or petroleum refineries it will produce much greater effect than nuclear weapons. There will thus be a greater usage of conventional weapons in future than ICBMs and IRBMs that might be easily intercepted.

There will be greater mobility of platforms because anything that is static will be detected and attacked. The problem of range can be overcome by getting closer to shorelines. Unlike the US, India need not go for longer ranges and can attack its targets with shorter range missiles. The future will belong to a weapon system, which is more powerful and lethal, is mobile and can mount both conventional and non-conventional weapons.

There is a conceptual problem in reconciling deterrence with BMD. The more effective the BMD, the more likely that the nation having this capability would acquire a first-strike-capability, that is, since it becomes invulnerable to a second strike, it assumes that it can launch a first strike. This was the dilemma of the Soviets in the 1980s. If nuclear weapons remain available to a few nations then others will think why they are being denied them. This was apparent during the recent Preparatory Conference for the 2010 NPT Review Conference in Geneva. The nonaligned and developing countries on the one side and the nuclear weapon countries on the other were deeply divided on their obligations under Article II and Article VI to the NPT.

Massive Retaliation

The usage of the word 'massive' instead of 'punitive' in India's nuclear doctrine is debatable. However, the actual words relevant are 'unacceptable damage', which derives from a subjective analysis. Hence, the word 'massive' should be avoided.

Disarmament

India must work towards nuclear disarmament and a nuclear weapons-free world. Nuclear weapons could breed proliferation and constitute the greatest danger to the world. There is a contradiction in the assumption that India has to work towards pursuing a credible nuclear deterrence and also towards a nuclear weapons-free world.

Relevance of Nuclear Weapons

The question of relevance and utility of nuclear weapons has to be addressed. This will lead to the rationalization of India's nuclear doctrine. As long as the existing reliance on nuclear weapons continues, India will have to continue with nuclear deterrence. Given this strategic context, India needs to build up its nuclear weapons arsenal.