Following the Indo-US agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation between the US and India, the debate has centred to the belief that the already ailing global non-proliferation regime has been dealt a death blow by this India-specific exception. Arguments in this regard derive from the understanding that the non-proliferation regime is a monolith, which must continue to limit horizontal proliferation. While this is an aim worth pursuing, the means adopted must undergo institutional modifications for their effective functioning in the post-Cold War era wherein non-state actors pose as much of a threat as state actors, if not more, to global nuclear stability.

The main arguments of this article are: First, regimes must not be confused with "institutions," the essential features of which are "the conjunction of convergent expectations and patterns of behaviour or practice." [Cited in Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization, vol. 34, no. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 491-517.]. Institutional change does not mean the collapse of the regime, which is usually a sum of different institutions functioning together, and the nuclear non-proliferation regime is no different. Second, that all regimes, including the nuclear non-proliferation regime, are social constructs that reflect the prevailing global social mores.

In elaborating the first argument, it must be reiterated that critics of the Indo-US deal have made broad references to the demise of the non-proliferation "order" or "regime." In fact, the basis of this critique - one that is valid - is that India-specific exceptions will encourage other countries to seek similar arrangements either from the US or other willing partners. Hence, the critics fear an unravelling of the existing mechanisms comprising the elaborate safeguards that have been devised since the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into effect. Hence, far from eroding the global non-proliferation regime, this deal requires long due changes in these institutional mechanisms at multiple levels ranging from US laws to NSG rules.

The second argument is based on Oran R. Young's definition of regimes, which states that they "are social institutions governing the actions of those interested in specifiable activities (or accepted sets of activities). Like all social situations, they are recognised patterns of behaviour or practice around which expectations converge." Therefore, regimes are social structures, which must not be confused with the functions of those structures. Once again, the debate surrounding the Indo-US deal pertains to recalibrating the functioning of the regime, but does not question the viability of the regime itself. To simplify the argument further, Young defines regime formation as a social institution based on ordering, which can be further classified as regimes arising as spontaneous orders, negotiated orders and imposed orders. With this definition in mind, the nuclear non-proliferation regime can be explained as a social construct that can be classified as an amalgam of a negotiated and an imposed order, which came up during the Cold War milieu. Young further adds that the, "social structure of the regime must not be confused with functions, though operations of regimes frequently contribute to the fulfilment of certain functions." Hence, in the post-Cold War milieu, the same order needs to redefine its operational functions to achieve its original aim of preventing nuclear weapons proliferation. The Indo-US deal does not undercut the aim of preventing nuclear weapons proliferation; it must not be viewed with undue suspicion.

Any misconception that the current non-proliferation regime is an unchanging monolith must be dispelled. They do undergo constant changes and this is not effectively conveyed to the world as it happens over a period of time. Hence, it seems as if it never changed, and therefore draws severe criticism when a landmark event occurs. The following example is a case in point. The NSG, as a part of the non-proliferation "architecture", was formed as a direct reaction to India's "Peaceful Nuclear Explosion" in 1974, and despite its tough legal provisions, it permitted export of trigger list items to India until 1992. Changes were made after 1992 to paragraph 4 of the NSG guidelines as a response to Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme. Now, after the signing of the Indo-US agreement, there is again a need to amend the NSG guidelines. This clearly shows that the non-proliferation regime has been constantly reworked and proves that the regime is not a monolith. Instead, like all social institutions, it needs to respond to changing global mores, in this case, the blossoming of Indo-US relations into the strategic realm and the energy needs of the world with nuclear energy being seen as the solution.

However, the real threat to the collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation regime emanates from the current American nuclear doctrine and its insistence on developing "usable nuclear weapons" and efforts to weaponise space. Addressing these pertinent issues will greatly enhance the debates surrounding the nuclear non-proliferation regime.