The historic visit of the President Bush to India from 2-4 March 2006 has placed bilateral relations in a higher orbit. The highlight of this visit was the March 2 India-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Agreement, a logical culmination of the July 18, 2005 Joint Document on Civilian Nuclear Cooperation signed during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Washington. What is the impact of the India-U.S. civilian nuclear deal on the Asian balance of power in terms of U.S. strategy, its impact on India's power potential and its impact on China?

Those who believe in balance of power systems emphasize the maintenance of the status quo, but those who seek to revise the system emphasise matching the power capabilities of status quo powers. In this sense, India and China are revisionist states. The U.S. however has cleverly altered the rules of the game by roping in India to balance China, while allowing India to realize its ambition of becoming a great power.

The United States has sought to prevent the domination of the power matrix in the Asian continent by any one power that could be inimical to the U.S. interest and military presence in the region. China being the obvious contending pole of power in Asia, Washington has to ensure that Beijing plays the second fiddle. This strategy is critically based on the ability of the United States to formulate credible regional partnerships. In this Asia strategy, Washington saw an opportunity to rope in New Delhi, which was not easy. India too, the U.S. realized, nurtures great power ambitions and had to be moved into a great power trajectory if it had to be roped in. This was an implicit recognition of the fact that a strong, stable and democratic India is a safe bet for the United States to contain a strong and authoritarian China in Asia. The civilian nuclear deal was the outcome of this American vision.

As pointed out by K. Subrahmanyam, the civilian nuclear deal can restore the balance in Asia. Bush has realized that a nuclear China has the potential to upset the balance of power in Asia and, towards this end, it was necessary to recognize India's nuclear capability. More importantly, the United States saw that the two largest democracies in the world, working together to maintain the status quo in the international system would serve mutual interests.

India, battling widespread domestic apprehensions of a strategic alignment with the United States, has taken firm steps to bandwagon with the United States. The unsolved border dispute with China and the Beijing-Islamabad strategic ent?nt? notwithstanding, it is clear that India had to complement its internal balancing efforts with external balancing.

It is pertinent to mention that in November 2005 India's Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, had commented that in order to balance China in the Asian continent, it would have to deepen its relations with the United States. We have to see the forward thrust in India-United States bilateral relations in this context. With the nuclear deal in place, India has become a stakeholder in the system. India's duty now includes assuming responsibilities for maintaining international peace and stability.

Furthermore, now that India's future atomic energy requirements are taken care of, Manmohan Singh's government can concentrate on the core task before his government -- economic transformation. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's vision is that only an economically strong India will be able to stand up to China and become a great power.

By placing India as a new pole of power, President Bush hopes to nullify China's U.S. obsession, which has the potential to cause instability in the system. The post-deal reaction of China confirms this. Why China wants India to give up its nuclear weapons and focus on mending its relations with Pakistan is because China has sensed this scenario, and wants India to remain confined within South Asia. Pakistan, too, is upset by the deal and Bush's refusal to negotiate a similar deal with it, and is eager to use its China card to maintain its relevance in the power game.

Summing up, with the nuclear deal in place, India's nuclear isolation in the international community is a thing of the past. India can hope for an uninterrupted uranium supply from the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). This will require some time, but it is clear that a paradigmatic shift has occurred in the balance of power in Asia, the implications of which are not fully evident.