Why did 13 December 2001 attack on Indian Parliament took place? Was it because the Agra summit failed? Was it because September 11 inspired the non-state actors in South Asia to carry out similar spectacular attacks in the region? Was it because India failed to adequately respond to an earlier attack on J&K State Legislative Assembly in October 2001? Did India fail to anticipate such an attack? Had the Agra summit succeeded or had India responded heavily on the October attack, would 13 December still have occurred?

In retrospect, December 13 attack seemed to have occurred in which both the state and non-state actors (NSAs) in Pakistan had a convergence of interests, though they had different objectives and aimed at fulfilling different strategies. First, after the Kargil conflict in 1999, General Musharraf wanted to change the status quo in Kashmir politically. Pakistani military efforts in Kargil though have been perceived as a failure, it had revived militancy; the deadly fidayeen attacks are a post-Kargil phenomenon. Internally political equations changed for Pakistan; General Musharraf took over and wanted to have a bilateral dialogue with India, especially over Kashmir in his own terms. His zeal to change the status quo politically failed in Agra summit. Pressurizing India to negotiate with him on Kashmir became the main bilateral issue for Musharraf after July 2001. He seemed to have learnt crucial lesson from his failure in Kargil. Pakistan failed to convince the international community that it was Mujahideen who fought in Kargil simply because it was not the case. What if it was indeed a jihadi effort? Obviously Kargil type intrusions could not take place again, but what about a deadlier fidayeen attack that would keep the conflict within the threshold, yet would force India to deal with Pakistan politically?

Second, the NSAs had their own objectives in the post-Kargil period. There was a clear divide amongst them between the militant and jihadi groups - the former led by the Hizbul and the latter led by the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad. There was not only a clear divide between these two sets of groups but also within them. The Hizbul Mujahideen was/is dependent solely on Pakistan for its political and material support in terms of their daily survival, weapons and explosives, training and safe havens. Syed Salahuddin, though was the leader of the grand United Jihad Council, he could not act independently, thus creating a divide within the Hizbul. A section led by Abdul Majid Dar wanted to act independently of Pakistan's objectives. With the Indian government also trying to reach out to the Hizbul, the fault lines became apparent. The short-lived cease-fire offer by Hizbul in 2000 should be looked through these internal divisions. The ceasefire offer should also have caught Pakistan by surprise, though it managed to bring it under its control through Salahuddin's ultimatum calling for the inclusion of Pakistan. The entire cease-fire drama and the subsequent fissures inside the Hizbul might have also made Pakistan to realize to look beyond. (Majid Dar and his close associates were killed later by pro-Pakistani Hizbul militants)

On the other hand, the jihadi groups had their own objectives and strategies outside the Hizbul. By 2001, these groups had succeeded in cultivating adequate political and material support outside Pakistan, from the Middle East and also from al Qaeda. For training camps and materials they were no more dependent on state support; and had their own recruiting network mainly from their madrasas. Besides these jihadi groups, the Lashkar-e-Toiba especially succeeded in infiltrating the criminal underground in India led by Dawood Ibrahim and his gang. (Perhaps, this could have been the primary reason behind India demanding a list of individuals mainly belonging to this group) These groups no more needed support from Pakistani intelligence agencies to provide logistical support to carry out an attack inside India. With a jihadi zeal to bring India down on its knees, these groups had/have pan-Islamic objectives, unlike militant groups such as the Hizbul who remain focused only on Kashmir.

Perhaps, it was here that the objectives and strategies of Pakistan and the jihadi groups converged resulting in the attacks on J&K Legislative Assembly and the Indian Parliament. After the failure of Agra summit, Musharraf was looking for a 'militant' pressure on India without an overt involvement from his intelligence apparatus so that India would engage Pakistan politically over Kashmir. The jihadi groups with pan-Islamic objectives were trying to hijack the political-militant movement in Kashmir and bringing India to its knees, with or without support from Pakistani intelligence agencies. Two actors - state and non-state - in Pakistan were working for two different objectives trying to exploit the other to achieve their own. The October 2001 attack was the outcome of these two different yet parallel movements and should have been designed much before the 9/11 attacks. Irrespective of the severity in India's response to the October attacks, the 13 December would still have happened due to the different objectives of the actors involved. Attack on Kaluchak camp in May 2002 would prove this point.