Can Musharraf be Trusted? - Yes, the Atmosphere is Conducive

10 May, 2005    ·   1734

Lt Gen A M Vohra contends that positive factors like flexibility, denunciation of military approach and appreciation of a post 9/11 disposition have enhanced Indo-Pak peace prospects


Peace is the key to socio-economic development. Poverty, illiteracy, health care and the unemployment are problems for both India and Pakistan, and require immediate corrective measures. However, there is no dearth of people obsessed with suspicion of evil objectives of the other. The "Intelligence" communities in both countries are convinced of the worst intentions of the other despite the universal acceptance of the limitations of military power. Has India, then, accepted the establishment of Pakistan? An assurance to this effect was given by Atal Behari Vajpayee's formal visit to Minar-e-Pakistan in February 1999 during the Lahore Summit. Leaving aside the fringe fanatics, the vast majority in India and Pakistan wish to get on with their lives.

India-Pakistan relations became inimical in the very year of independence, with the procrastination of the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir. Suffice it to say that India and Pakistan have frequently gone to war over Kashmir. The Simla Agreement of 1972 foresaw a solution which has not materialized but led at least to the demarcation of a Line of Control (LoC).

Pakistan considers J&K as the "core issue". In 1991 the USIS initiated a dialogue to reconcile Indo-Pak differences, among groups involved in the matter, conducted over radio with control at Washington and with Islamabad and Delhi as outstations. The moderator at the control suggested to the participants the advisability of taking on the easier issues first; their solution could lead to an atmosphere in which the difficult issues could be better discussed. The point was to move from the periphery to the centre - the core. This was not acceptable to the link at Islamabad.

A noticeable feature of the current parleys is that it is all encompassing. There was one-to-one dialogue between President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Kashmir. The emphasis is that borders cannot be redrawn, the LOC cannot become the international border, but that borders can be made irrelevant is of great significance. This is not just talk if viewed vis-a-vis the potential volume of cross border movement and trade. Apart from increasing the frequency of Srinagar-Muzaffarbad bus, Khokrapar-Munabao rail link is to be opened by December 2005. Jammu-Sialkot bus is on the cards. The Poonch-Rawalkot bus is being talked about as also road communications between Ladakh and the Northern Areas. Meeting points on the LOC for divided families and for trade also appears possible. Softening of the borders is likely to create an environment in which agreement on other issues would be possible.

As for trade, the 'joint panel' is to be revived as also the 'joint business council' for the private sector. There is great scope for trade in for instance sugar, cotton yarn and fruit from Pakistan and tea as well as tyres from India. India is prepared to 'tear down trade barriers'. There is talk of "Prosperity in Unity". Minister level talks on gas pipeline have been scheduled in May.

There has been an affirmation by the leaders "not to allow terrorism" to impede the peace process or the discussions for a final settlement of the Kashmir issue. In the midst of this bonhomie, an awkward question has been raised: can Musharraf be trusted? He has to be given the credit for creating an opportunity for talks during the Indo-Pak cricket fixture. Addressing the Editors Guide on 18 April 2005 at Delhi he said, "Post 9/11, the world has changed; so have I." He continued, "The focus has changed from geo-politics to economic development." Stressing the need for negotiations, he said that the 10-month Indo-Pak stand off after the attack on Indian Parliament exposed the futility of seeking a military solution.

To assess the chances of Indo-Pak amity, it is necessary to take stock of the Agra Summit in July 2001 and the developments thereafter. Addressing the BJP's national executive on 28 July 2001, Vajpayee said that Musharraf was in no mood "to pursue the path of friendship" with India. The proxy war was in full swing. A cease fire has been effective for sometime now. The full scale mobilization during 2003 has proved the futility of a military solution. There is also the impact of globalization and the importance of getting one's economic act together rather than being left out. Pakistan cannot hold it all up until the 'core' issue is resolved. Is there, in any case, some rethinking on the 'core' issue? The April 2005 talks have certainly displayed certain flexibility of approach; of mending fences in other areas, of giving scope to other issues influencing the solution of this issue. Then, there is also the question of Musharraf's concern about the time available to him. If he can evolve a power sharing formula between the Army and 'political' Pakistan before 2007, when his term expires, he would have made this mark. Musharraf can therefore be trusted to work out relations with India to ensure economic and political stability in Pakistan.

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