More than 45 explosions by the suspected ULFA militants in 2005 appear to have broken several expectations of a plausible peace deal with the outfit. Although these explosions have resulted in few civilian or security force casualties, they underscore the ability of the outfit to engage in such activities at times of its own choosing. It also emphasises that the State's inability to deal with such developments whenever they arise.

Since years the authorities have related ULFA's indulgence in violence to its sense of desperation. And such trends continue. For example, on 2 April, the outgoing GoC, 4 Corps and military commander of the Unified Command Structure, Lt Gen Anup Singh Jamwal said the people's complete lack of support to the ULFA had driven them to these acts of desperation. Similarly, speaking to the press in Shillong on 7 April, the Director General of the Assam Rifles, Lt General Bhoopinder Singh termed the ULFA as a spent force, which is showing a growing inclination for peace. Such assessments, in view of the intermittent violence, appear to be only partially true and in any case are reiterations of earlier views.

A look at the State's response mechanism to the ULFA's activities underlines its adhocism and lack of direction. On 5 April, police in Dibrugarh made public announcements over loud speakers about the presence of four ULFA militants who are believed to have sneaked into the district to indulge in acts of subversion before the outfit's Raising Day on 7 April. Panic gripped the city as shopkeepers downed their shutters and people vanished from the streets. Such a move to make people aware of the imminent danger is often counter-productive.

The recent spate of bomb blasts have made a mockery of the State government's claim of having a grip over the law and order situation. The Congress government, which replaced the previous Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) regime in May 2001, has repeatedly claimed to have improved the law and order situation in the State. The Chief Minister has cited instances of late night shows in movie halls as an indicator of enhanced safety. He has even arranged late night dinner parties for journalists and others in off- the-capital roadside restaurants to underline the claim. However, as his government approaches the last year of its five-year term, it appears that there has been very little visible transformation in the security situation in the State. ULFA continues, in spite of the claims of its decimation, to be a force in Assam.

There is an indication that the outfit, in spite of the supposed setbacks, is not willing to climb down from its core demand of sovereignty for Assam. The outfit's chairman, Arabinda Rajkhowa, in his Raising Day speech on 7 April reiterated the demand and appealed "to every section of our society, every organisation of Assam and the civil society in general to get united and be unanimous on the question of sovereignty and freedom of Assam." A year back, Rajkhowa, on 7 April 2004 had reiterated, "If India is sincere in real democracy, she must organize the referendum for the Assamese nation and all other ethnic groups on the question of Independence of Assam. The GOI is yet to show its sincere willingness to resolve the Assam-India conflict politically." Thus, the deadlock continues, in spite of the outfit forsaking two of its demands for negotiations, i.e. mediation by the United Nations and negotiations in a foreign country.

Reports suggest that the Chief Minister has asked the outfit to come forward to participate in elections in order to prove its popularity. On 9 April, Tarun Gogoi said, "I appeal to the ULFA, as well as the NDFB, to shun violence and enter the democratic process of elections and try their luck. If they are really interested in the welfare of Assam, they should come and capture power through democratic means." Previously, the State government had extended an amnesty offer for the militants in the State, which was rejected by the ULFA. At the same time, the Prime Minister's office is reported to have conveyed to Indira Goswami, who has been trying to play the role of a mediator, that it does not favour the idea of the Prime Minister directly responding to the ULFA's letter detailing the negotiation modalities.

The potential of the outfit needs to be analysed in terms of the consolidation of its nexus with the radical elements in Bangladesh and the newfound alignment with the Maoists in Nepal. The outfit's network of support for its arsenal and finance is gradually widening. The high expectations from the December 2003 Bhutan military operations to effect a dent in the outfit's capability has not materialised. Thus, the Union government's designs of weakening the outfit to submission may be too far fetched an idea, unless it opts for either negotiation or synchronised military operations. However, given the fact that the outfit's infrastructures are outside the country, military operations would continue to have limited utility.