The reported decision of the top leadership of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) to visit New Delhi for the second time, on the invitation of the Prime Minister is good news both for the Nagas as well as the Government. Several meetings between the rebel outfit and the Government of India have taken place since the January 2003 visit of Th. Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu to India last time. However, the imbroglio has evaded solution. The proposed visit to New Delhi would certainly mark a step forward towards achieving durable peace in the State.

The peace negotiations with the NSCN-IM, till the latter's recent decision, appeared to have been stuck in the muddle. Throughout the seven years of negotiations in various foreign locations, both sides gave the  impression that they were trying to tire the other side out by merely extending the duration of the ceasefire. Even when in 2002 a timeframe of two years was set for a resolution of the problem, both parties knew well that such a timeframe would simply not work, especially in the absence of an agreement on fundamental issues. Neither the Government of India is expected to give in to the basic NSCN-IM demand of the integration of the Naga-inhabited areas in the northeast, especially after its previous experience in Manipur, nor is the NSCN-IM  likely to start abiding by the principles of the Indian constitution.

However, a new sense of urgency among the NSCN-IM to resolve the issue appears to be gaining ground. A top leader of the outfit, Kraibo Chawang, was quoted on 18 October as having said that "The progress of the talks is very slow and one wonders how many years would the Government of India take to reach a solution?" He further said, "Seven years have passed and any further delay would send wrong signals. We know both sides have lots of problems, but still we want an expeditious solution."

There can be no definite explanations regarding the new sense of urgency within the outfit. However, indications suggest that the tight grip, which the outfit claimed to have over the Naga territory, is slowly slipping away. There is little doubt over the outfit's dominance over the civil society's discourses in the State. The government of the day is responsive to its views and for all practical purposes the outfit runs a parallel administration. On many occasions, its decrees, such as the recent one regarding the State holidays list, has been found to binding on all.

However, the outfit appears to have floundered in keeping its territory free from external aggression. If the twin explosions on 2 October in Dimapur, in which 27 people were killed are an indication, NSCN-IM's grip over the region appears to be loosening. The ISI sponsored Islamist militants now appear to be gaining ground in the State and have been found capable of executing strikes without the knowledge of either of the NSCN factions. The NSCN-IM statement summed the outfit's annoyance. "The blasts in Dimapur were part of a broad game to destabilise the peace process." Even the Khaplang faction hinted at the "Al-Qaeda footprints" in the attack.

There are also indications that the rival Naga factions are reinforcing themselves. In spite of several IM incursions, the district of Phek remains a Naga National Council (NNC) bastion. On 19 October, thousands of people in Phek took to the streets protesting against alleged excesses committed by NSCN-IM on civilians in various parts of the district. In spite of the reversals faced in Mokokchung district last year, the Khaplang faction still manages to ambush and kill the IM cadres in areas traditionally dominated by the latter. Recently on 19 October, suspected NSCN-K militants killed an IM cadre near the Martyrs' Park in Kohima town. Today, fatalities recorded in Nagaland are due mostly to the internecine clashes between the outfits rather than counter-insurgency operations. It is also a failure for the NSCN-IM, which has tried achieving unity among the outfits by browbeating its opponents to submission.

In these circumstances, the restiveness of the outfit can be a good opportunity for the government. However, whether the Government of India will be able to exploit the situation to its advantage is a big question. Can the government effectively push in ideas like economic development or limited autonomy to quell the aspirations for independence of the NSCN-IM will be a matter of skill and tactic, which unfortunately the negotiators have not shown capable of in the past. The leadership of the NSCN-IM are no naïve strategists; it will be imprudent to expect them to accede to the coercions of the Government. On the part of the negotiators, it will require much more than bargaining techniques to convince the rebel leaders that wisdom lies in accepting the possible.