A section in India adheres by the 1994 Parliament resolution, demanding that J&K, including PoK and Northern Areas, be integrated. This section is led by the rightist forces viz. the Sangh Parivar, but is in a minority. Even within the Sangh Parivar, the moderates understand the impracticality of this option, but support its rhetoric. The majority in India would prefer to convert the line of control into an international border. Though the Government of India, so far, has not expressed this, the academic and strategic community in India believes this option would be agreeable to the GOI. But, this option is unacceptable to Pakistan and the Kashmiris. If India is to emphasise the first maximalist option there would be no progress in its dialogue with Pakistan or the Kashmiris. If the second option is pressed, it would keep the dialogue process going with Pakistan and the Kashmiris without achieving much at the ground level. This would lead to a stalemate, as occurred with earlier efforts at rapprochement with Pakistan and the Kashmiris.

what are the options that India could pursue to take the present dialogue onwards to a sustainable peace with Pakistan and also the Kashmiris? India should understand that sustainable peace is not possible if it is to negotiate only with Pakistan, ignoring the Kashmiris. It should pursue a two pronged strategy, dealing simultaneously with both Pakistan and the Kashmiris. In fact, efforts are proceeding to engage the Kashmiris. Wajahat Habibullah is believed to have been requested by the Union government to engage the various groups in Kashmir.

What would be acceptable to India vis-a-vis Pakistan?

What would be acceptable to India vis-a-vis Pakistan, besides converting the LoC into IB in Kashmir? First, Pakistan, it is believed, would be agreeable to a formula, defined as 'LoC plus'. Would LoC plus be acceptable to India? It depends on how Pakistan defines the LoC plus. If Pakistan defines 'LoC plus' in terms of the Chenab formula to annex the Kashmir Valley, this would be totally unacceptable to India. 'LoC plus' would be acceptable to India only if it involves minor adjustments, taking into account the security concerns of both countries. Only minor adjustments and not redrawing the LoC would be acceptable to India.

Second, as an extension of this understanding, any permanent arrangement involving the Siachen glacier would also be acceptable to India. India could also consider demilitarization of the Siachen glacier in a phased manner. At a later stage, both India and Pakistan could work towards converting the Siachen glacier into a science park, as has been suggested elsewhere.

Third, if Pakistan agrees to these two issues, then India could relocate its security forces in a phased manner in the Valley. Alternatively, India could strengthen the state police forces; keep a minimum paramilitary force (either BSF or CRPF) for emergency purposes, while relieving the Army of its counter insurgency operations in Kashmir.

In terms of priorities, it would be acceptable to India to consider readjustments along the LoC, followed by demilitarizing Siachen, and relocation of security forces in the Valley in that order.

What would be acceptable to India vis-a-vis the Kashmiris?

What would be acceptable to India vis-a-vis the Kashmiris? A section inside Kashmir has demanded the unification of the two Kashmirs and independence from both India and Pakistan. This section should realize the futility of this demand. Neither India nor Pakistan nor China (If China is considered as a third party, given the fact that a section of Kashmir territory is under its control) would be agreeable to this maximalist demand from Kashmir. Even the separatists, led by the APHC, understand this, but continue their rhetoric for political reasons.

The following would be acceptable to India vis-a-vis Kashmiris. First, India has informally agreed that Kashmir is a disputed territory. If a section demands a formal acceptance of the dispute as being essential, India could consider the demand. However, neither independence nor a plebiscite would be acceptable to India to decide the future of Kashmir. Second, India could initiate a serious time bound and structured dialogue with the Kashmiris in terms of providing maximum autonomy. Either the 1953 agreement or the J&K state legislative assembly's resolution could be taken as the starting point to negotiate further. Third, it would also be acceptable to India, if the adjusted LoC serves as a 'soft border' allowing the easy movement of people and goods between the two Kashmirs.

To conclude, conversion of the LoC into a soft border, with minor adjustments; demilitarization of Siachen; and relocation of security troops would be acceptable to India vis-a-vis Pakistan on Kashmir. Maximum autonomy, with easy movement across the border to the other Kashmir, would be acceptable vis-a-vis the Kashmiris.