The Chair set the framework for the Panel Discussion by posing three questions:

• Where have we reached and what are the near term prospects? What are the systemic factors operating?

• As we look ahead to additional meetings and possibly some positive developments, what may lead to favourable changes? What may reverse these changes?

• What might India's strategy entail in future talks? Can we prioritise the elements of the composite dialogue and the 72 CBMs suggested? Are unilateral steps possible? Why cannot the Governments take positive steps to normalize India-Pakistan relations?

Amit Baruah

with his personal experience of reporting as a resident correspondent for The Hindu from Pakistan from 1997 to 2000, the speaker framed his views on this subject.

The first round of Composite Dialogue commenced in 1997, which however failed. In 1998 the Dialogue did take place, but did not culminate with a review of these talks by the Foreign Secretaries. Presently, there has been a paradigm shift in the bilateral relationship. Pakistan is now willing to discuss these issues without conditions. This shift, unfortunately, has not been recognized in New Delhi. The successful completion of the first round of the renewed Composite Dialogue in September this year is a major achievement given the tense post-December 2001 atmosphere when the Indian Parliament was attacked and troop deployments were effected during the whole of 2002. The Dialogue has improved the atmosphere, though inherent suspicions continue to linger.

BJP's defeat in the last general elections surprised the Pakistanis. It was believed that the new Congress-led government would not proceed with the peace process initiated by Vajpayee. But there has been continuity in policies; and Pakistan has come to terms with the new regime in Delhi. Cricket diplomacy, visit of the Pakistani journalists to Jammu and Kashmir, medical treatment being provided to Pakistani patients and so on was significant departures from the positions that existed earlier. People-to-people contacts are fundamental to the peace process. Significantly, Pakistan is approaching the talks this time around in a long-term perspective. Hence, the talks should be conducted in a committed manner by both countries.

Riaz Punjabi

Kashmir is intertwined in the state policies of Pakistan for over 50 years. There is a consensus in Pakistan now that dialogue is the only feasible way to settle disputes with India. A 'Kashmir Plus' approach has emerged. In other words, Pakistan is willing to discuss Kashmir along with other issues unlike the earlier emphasis that it was the 'core issue' that had to be settled before other disputes could be addressed. Pakistan is also simultaneously building a helpful atmosphere at home. It is now considering the granting of greater autonomy to the Northern Areas and PoK.

In Kashmir there is an alienation sentiment that has to be addressed, which is evident in the leadership of even mainstream political parties like PDP, Congress and National Conference. They are demanding independence despite being considered pro-India. This is a major problem to be taken into consideration. This alienation has led to Kashmir remaining devoid of development. There is no need for any grants from New Delhi. It is enough if the people of Kashmir are allowed to use their own resources for their own benefit without interference by either India or Pakistan. This should be unambiguously conveyed to Pakistan.

There is tremendous international support for a resolution of the disputes between the two countries. It is, therefore, pertinent to create a favourable public opinion in both countries, and it is very important to involve Indian Muslims in the process.

Salman Haidar

Outlining his impressions of a recent visit to Pakistan, Amb Haider said Gen. Pervez Musharraf was in total command of his country. Others, including the Prime Minister and Corp Commanders are only appendages to the system. He could take critical decisions and has the strength to implement those decisions.

He has a clear notion on how to tackle the Kashmir problem as displayed during the Agra summit. He is for a realistic approach. His roadmap is to "identify the region, demilitarise it and change its status" before moving on to various possible options for a solution. It is a well thought out plan. There is no emphasis on a time-frame, except that it should be "reasonable", and he is also not asking for any swapping of territory. According to Musharraf, Pakistan public opinion is ready for a compromise. But, he made clear that there is no departure from past positions.

On cross-border terrorism, Pakistan was not under any significant pressure to respond to India's charges. Pakistan knows that it is a "frontline" state in the global war against terrorism. On the gas pipeline, the opinion prevalent in Pakistan is that India should not think that by accepting the proposal it is doing a favour to Islamabad. India will also benefit in the long run. The ball, therefore, is in India's court. On the Muzafarabad-Srinagar bus service, Pakistan believes that there is no need of visas. There should be greater interaction between Kashmiris across the LoC, but it should be appreciated that there are only a very few divided families.

Discussion

• The discussion that followed was comprehensive, touching upon every aspect of relations between the two countries:

• There is no need for abrogating the Indus-Water Dispute Treaty, since it was not unfavourable to the Kashmiris. If we break it we are heading for major trouble.

• Softening of borders in Kashmir is the best option available.

• Musharraf is not answerable to anyone in Pakistan. He is a 'quasi-democrat' and has distorted democracy to the maximum extent feasible by manipulating political parties and other democratic structures. Indian style democracy cannot be emulated in Pakistan.

• Reopening of consulates in Karachi and Mumbai is the best possible CBMs available. Its implementation will make a great difference to people-to-people contacts and good will.

• By asking "Can we trust Musharraf?" we end up expressing our distrust in him. By extension, we cannot trust any country, as all states seek to achieve their own best self-interests. Instead, what we need to ask is: "Can he manage the system and deliver?"

• It is vital to understand the political forces operating in Pakistan and engage with them for establishing a durable relationship between the two countries.

• The US is an important player in the region now. It controls Musharraf. This, in the long-term, is good for India. Washington might have forced India and Pakistan to enter a dialogue, but the terms of settlement lie solely within the powers of both countries.

• If Musharraf succeeds in resolving the Kashmir dispute, it would certainly raise his standing and legitimacy in his country. This development would be a dangerous precedent. Can we allow this?

• Instead of harping about Musharraf gaining from a resolution of contentious issues between the two countries, we need to see what we can gain from this. We should look at opportunities that are available before us and reap its benefits.

• To gain maximum mileage from the peace process, we have set our house in order, especially as far Kashmir is concerned.

• The gas pipeline through Pakistan serves India's interests more than Pakistan's. There are no impediments to this project except political problems. Along with the Muzaffarabad-Srinagar bus service, it represents a major breach in the wall of enmity, and creates reciprocal mutual stakes in both countries.