The decision of the Government of Manipur to de-notify the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) from two districts of the State against the wishes of the Union government is one of many such moves by different State governments of the northeastern region. As militancy in various States of the region show little signs of abatement, such decisions unveil a trend of assertive State policies on matters of security.

What followed the Manipur decision was a statement from N Rio, Chief Minister of Nagaland, where there has been an organised movement demanding the repeal of the Act. Speaking in Kohima on 15 August, Rio said "though the term of the Disturbed areas act was extended by another year, the government believes that the State could now do without it."

Similarly, Assam differs in assessment of the security situation from the Centre. On 9 August, Assam State Minister for Home Affairs, Rockybul Hussain, in a statement in the Assembly, said that the State government has no direct evidence of the presence of ISI operatives in the State. In contrast, the recent Annual Report of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), suggests that Pakistan sponsored terrorism "first appeared in Punjab and then in Jammu and Kashmir and it was later extended to the North-east by providing funds, training, equipments to terrorists and promoting infiltration."

The Assam Chief Minister, while speaking at the Independence Day celebrations in Guwahati on 15 August said: "Normalcy has returned to Assam after our government took over three years ago. The people have been able to move around freely after an era of fear and uncertainty that prevailed earlier had come to an end." In contrast, the MHA Annual Report categorises Assam as affected by high degree of violence. The report reads, "The level of violence in Assam was second only to Jammu and Kashmir and was highest in the North-east. The whole of Assam except Karimganj and Hailakandi district in Barak Valley are affected by insurgency in varying degrees."

Examples of such a trend are not few. Way back in the year 2000, the decision of the Union government to proscribe the two militant outfits in Meghalaya, the HNLC and the ANVC, was contested by the State government who termed the then prevailing situation as not too serious and the move of the centre as unwarranted.

The reasons of such different assessment are mostly rooted in the political ground. For example, in Assam, it is now an established fact that illegal migrants from Bangladesh have changed the pattern of politics in few of the districts and constitute an important segment in the State. Each of the political parties in the States needs to take their sensibilities into account while asking for support during elections. As a result, no political party can be seen as overtly anti-Bangladeshi, which can be easily interpreted, as anti-minority.

The second reason is the attempt by the different State administrations to boast of (nonexistent) peace as their achievements. It is this trend, which leads Chief Ministers and other authorities to announce the onset of peace long before its actual arrival.

Third is the pressure from the civil society and community based organisations in the State. In various States, such groups do exercise significant influence and are seen to be in favour of a political solution to the problem of militancy. As a result, in spite of spiraling violence, the State governments  restrain themselves from declaring an all out war on the militants.

Fourth  is the functioning of the intelligence agencies. The State level agencies are under instruction from their political masters to produce reports, which does not really contravene their public postures. As a result, their efforts end up suppressing the ground realities. However, the central intelligence agencies, who usually function independently from their State level counterparts, tend to take a detached view. There are, however, times when they have been found to have produced grossly inflated figures to suit certain political needs at the Centre.

A correct assessment is imperative for an effective counter-insurgency policy. Contrasting assessments not only lead to a friction between the States and Centre, but also act as a source of directionless policies towards establishing peace in the region. A middle ground needs to be evolved. The idea of a single, yet effective intelligence agency demands serious attention.